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ABSTRACT 
 
TRADITIONAL APOLOGETICS IN A POSTCONCILIAR CHURCH: FROM 
SCHOLASTICISM TO COMBINATIONALISM AND BEYOND 
 
 
 
By 
Glenn B. Siniscalchi 
May 2013 
 
George S. Worgul, Jr., S.T.D., PhD, Dissertation Director 
 Recognizing that Christians cannot adequately understand the mysteries of faith 
from a single vantage point, Catholic theologians have been keen on emphasizing the 
multidimensional nature of theological understanding since Vatican II.  The advantage of 
such a method has helped believers to understand the rich, in-depth quality of Catholic 
faith.      
 One of the fields of theology which has not been discussed in the models 
approach, however, is apologetics―which includes as one of its aspects the art and 
science of defending the doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church.  When all of the 
relevant passages in the documents of Vatican II are taken into consideration, a unique 
apologetical approach emerges that incorporates key advances as they emerged 
historically from the Church‘s apologists.  Each of the individual apologetic systems 
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from the past will be shown to have its own particular strengths and weaknesses.  By way 
of contrast, I will argue that the best way to ―make a defense for‖ the Gospel in a 
postconciliar church is to advance the integrated model of the Council.  This integrated 
model of Catholic defense is called combinationalism.  The interests and views of the 
apologists are proven to be complementary rather than competing.   
 This integrated model helps apologists and evangelists to recognize that although 
one approach might be needed in a certain context, it would be an egregious mistake to 
take that one system and use it as the exclusive means to reach persons situated within 
different circumstances and cultural contexts.  This essay will not only exploit the 
different apologetic models in the post-Vatican II period, it will also serve as a serious 
work of apologetics in its own right by focusing on certain challenges as test cases to 
highlight the pertinence and livelihood of each model.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Today apologetics has a questionable reputation among Catholic scholars.  So 
strong is this suspicion within the Church that even outsiders begin to question whether 
―arguments for faith‖ are constitutive of what it means to be a Christian.  Because 
Christianity is a matter of faith, they say, apologetics must be taken as a curious example 
of modern day fundamentalism.   
It is not difficult to see how the anti-apologetical mindset plays itself out in a 
myriad of ways.  Cheap slogans such as:  ―Only the Holy Spirit can draw unbelievers to 
faith, not arguments!‖ are well known in many Christian circles.  Other half-truths, such 
as ―Lead by example and not words!‖ are often taken in a way that undercuts the 
apologetic mandate (1 Pet. 3:15).  What enthusiastic Catholic has not felt awkward in the 
company of lukewarm believers (let alone in the presence of unbelievers), knowing that 
our culture has relegated religious expression to Sunday worship alone?  And even when 
Catholics go to Church, who has not seen the lack of reverence in outward gestures that 
are supposed to be indicative of what is going on in the heart?        
Yet another problem for apologetics is that of postmodern relativism (see chapter 
2 of this dissertation).  The issue of perspectivalism sometimes leaves the apologist 
reeling—hesitant to swish a spiritual sword in the dialogue with a potential convert lest 
she loses a friend or even family member ―to the other side of the fence.‖   
 And if all this was not enough, theologians and apologists must face the problem 
of relevance (see chapter 4 of this dissertation).  For, apologetics is often seen by 
Catholics as something for intellectuals, not the ordinary person in the pew who wants 
something that applies directly to their life.  Before we embark on the relevance of 
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apologetics for the greater purposes of developing this dissertation, it would be profitable 
for us to reintroduce some of the reasons for anyone to engage in apologetics.     
 First, Scripture commands that Christians do apologetics.  In Jude 3, Christians 
are told to ―contend for the faith.‖  In Colossians 4:5, 6, Paul warns the Church: ―Conduct 
yourselves wisely toward outsiders, making the most of the opportunity.  Let your speech 
always be gracious, seasoned with salt, so that you know how you should respond to each 
one.‖  Paul saw his own role as that of an apologist.  In Phillipians 1:16, he wrote, ―I am 
here for the defense of the Gospel.‖ ―Consequently,‖ says Walter Kasper, ―faith, as 
understood in the Bible, is not a blind venture, not an irrational feeling, not an 
uncalculated option and certainly not a sacrificium intellectus (sacrifice of the intellect).  
Rather, faith can and must give a rational account of itself.‖1  1 Peter 3:15 says we are to 
always be ready to give a reason for our hope.  Notice that the passage says that believers 
are to always be ready to give a reason for faith, not just sometimes.           
 Second, the Magisterium urges theologians to do apologetics (see chapter 1 of this 
dissertation).  In Fides et ratio, John Paul II reiterated the traditional teaching of the 
Church: 
Recalling the teaching of Saint Paul (cf. Rom. 1:19-20), the First Vatican Council pointed 
to the existence of truths which are naturally, and thus philosophically, knowable; and an 
acceptance of God‘s Revelation necessarily presupposes knowledge of these truths.  In 
studying Revelation and its credibility, as well as the corresponding act of faith, 
fundamental theology should show how, in the light of the knowledge conferred by faith, 
there emerge certain truths which reason, from its own independent enquiry, already 
provides.  Revelation endows these truths with their fullest meaning, directing them 
towards the richness of the revealed mystery in which they find their ultimate purpose.  
Consider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of distinguishing 
divine Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition of its credibility, the capacity 
of human language to speak in a true and meaningful way even of things which transcend 
all human experience.  From all these truths, the mind is led to acknowledge the existence 
                                                             
 1 W alter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O‘Connell, (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing, 1984), 67.   
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of a truly propaedeutic path to faith, one that can lead to the acceptance of Revelation 
without in any way compromising the principles and autonomy of the mind itself.
2
       
 
―Theological science,‖ says Pope Benedict XVI, ―responds to the invitation of truth as it 
seeks to understand the faith. It thereby aids the People of God in fulfilling the Apostle‘s 
command (cf. 1 Pet 3:15) to give an accounting for their hope to those who ask it.‖3  An 
apologetical mind is one that coincides with a heart for Christ.  Hiding the truth is not a 
sign of love, but of fear.  If intellectually engaged Christians truly believe that Jesus is 
Lord, then they will express their faith in every way that is humanly possible, not just in 
ways that exclude the mind and verbal persuasion.  Arguments can and must be given for 
faith.  However, being argumentative is an abuse of apologetics and should always be 
avoided in every circumstance.   
 Arguments, moreover, are not exclusively directed to unbelievers, but are 
designed to motivate believers within the context of the faith community.
4
  Indeed, 
apologetics is needed for believers to become confident about what they believe in order 
to explain and defend their faith.                      
 Third, common sense suggests that apologetics is needed.  God created human 
beings with the ability to reason.  God therefore expects us to use reason.  It also helps 
people to determine what is true, and how to justify one‘s beliefs.  Without reason, there 
is no justification for holding to any one set of certain beliefs over and against another set 
of beliefs.  Socrates once said that ―the unexamined life is not worth living.‖  The same 
goes for Christian faith: the unexamined faith is not worth believing.  Since God did not 
                                                             
 2 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, N. 67.    
3 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the 
Theologian, 
(May 24, 1990): N. 6. Cf. 1, 5, 7, 10.  
4John C. Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science (New Haven: Yale University,  2010), 
123-149.    
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create anyone without a mind, it is normal for all people to have questions and even 
objections to the truth.   
 Fourth, apologetics helps to inculturate the Gospel.  Christians must be able to 
understand the wider cultural context where they live in order for evangelization to take 
place.  The intellectual zeitgeist of West can be traced back to the secular philosophies of 
the Enlightenment.  The hallmark of this movement was to free humanity from the 
―shackles of organized religion‖ (especially Catholic Christianity).  The impact of this 
movement is still felt in the academy today.  The upshot of these philosophies is that faith 
is equivalent to an opinion or personal taste; only that which is observable is worthy of 
public discussion and debate.   
 Kasper elaborates on the cultural malaise, offering a solution in the process: 
―Especially in a situation like ours today, when everything depends on the Christian faith 
making the transition to new cultural horizons and a new epoch, there can be no question 
of the Christian retreating into the realm of private experience.  Today, as hardly ever 
before in the history of Christianity it is essential that the Christian faith emphasize its 
reasonableness which is accessible to all human beings.‖5  If the very concept of truth has 
come under fire in our culture, then it only makes sense to explain and defend the very 
fact of truth before one can explain what is true.     
 Fifth, the results of apologetics confirm the apologetic effort.  Sometimes 
Christians and unbelievers complain that apologetics never accompanies conversions to 
Christ.  But this is a serious misreading of Christian history.  After trying to debunk the 
historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection, for instance, Frank Morrison became a Catholic after 
recognizing the historical evidence for the resurrection (for more on evidential 
                                                             
 5 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 71.     
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approaches to apologetics, see chapter 4).
6
  C.S. Lewis came to believe in Christ under 
the influence of apologetics.  In fact, Lewis was convinced that many of the people that 
he knew in England at the time who believed in God did so because of arguments for 
God‘s existence (thus chapter 3): ―nearly everyone I know who has embraced 
Christianity in adult life has been influenced by what seemed to him to be at least a 
probable argument for Theism.‖7  Augustine embraced Catholicism after hearing a 
thoughtful Catholic debate with a Manichean.
8
  Although many more examples could be 
given, the point is that the Christian defense has accompanied conversions in the past.   
When believers engage in the apologetic task, it creates an atmosphere that makes 
the Christian faith reasonable for outsiders to believe in (or at least judge it to be 
reasonable).  So the question is not whether there are reasons for faith, but what kind of 
reasons we have.  No one believes in anything unless they know that it is first believable.  
This would not mean everyone is able to articulate those reasons, but those reasons 
certainly do exist.  
No matter what the circumstances, Christians must never make it their goal to win 
arguments with their dialogue partner.  The apologist must develop the skill of making 
the Christian faith attractive, being respectful to their dialogue partner in the process.  
Ideas need to be presented and challenged, not persons as such.
9
  One of the most basic 
components of apologetic work is to love and care for our partners.
  
This would not mean 
that Christians should refuse to make hard truth claims.  Rather, the focus in the 
postconciliar period must remain on how our defense is made.  As John Paul II argued in 
                                                             
 6 Frank Morison, Who Moved the Stone? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987).   
 7 C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays in Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdman, 1970), 173.    
 8 See Augustine‘s The Confessions.    
9 Gaudium et Spes, 28, 92.   
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Redemptoris Missio, the Church always proposes, she never imposes anything on 
anyone.
10
   
True, apologetics can make people feel uncomfortable.  But perhaps this stems 
from apprehending the truth of Christ in the discussion.
11 
 Let us remember the words of 
John‘s Gospel (3:19-21): ―And this is the verdict, that the light came into the world, but 
people preferred darkness to light, because their works were evil.  For everyone who does 
wicked things hates the light and does not come toward the light, so that his works might 
not be exposed.  But whoever lives the truth comes to the light, so that his works may be 
clearly seen as done in God.‖   
Whether it is the past or the future, the message of the cross and resurrection will 
always be countercultural, demanding a radical change of lifestyle.  And this encounter 
will be uncomfortable to face at times.  As Dulles explains, in defense of apologetics: ―If 
they [accusations made against the validity of apologetics] come from a mentality that. . . 
shrinks from any kind of confrontation, the criticisms should probably be discounted.  
Apologetics has to be somewhat controversial; it should be forthrightly defend the settled 
teaching of the Church.‖12  Not only should we always be ready to give a reason for our 
hope, we should also be ready for rejection, if not persecution.   
 Lastly, a blind faith can lead to self-destruction.  Alternatively, a reasoned faith 
can lead to sanctity. Atheist Richard Dawkins once noted that faith ―leads people to 
believe in whatever it is so strongly that in extreme cases they are prepared to kill and die 
for it without the need for further justification.‖13  Dawkins is partially correct: blind faith 
                                                             
10 John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio, N. 39.     
 11Avery Dulles, ―The Rebirth of Apologetics,‖ First Things, No. 143, (May 2004): 19, 20.    
 12 Ibid., 20.   
 13 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), 198.  
7 
 
can lead one down the path of violence (see the second half of chapter 6).  But a healthy 
faith will seek to understand the object in which their faith is placed.  Indeed, healthy 
faith does not forget to reason.  When Christians limit the intellectual engagement of 
faith, it can literally steer them down the path of extreme forms of violence.  Faith that is 
based on experience and subjective religious experience at the expense of reason leads 
one to embrace heresy.  At other times it leads one to be violent against others.  Reason 
reinforces faith and makes it come alive (see chapter 3); fideism ruins the very impetus 
for faith itself.  Apologetics and practice are on two different sides of the same coin.  
Thus there should be different ways in which this relationship works itself out.  Let us 
now turn to some of these reasons.    
 
Apologetics and Practice 
 Apologetics can enhance believers‘ awareness and confidence to proclaim Christ.  
Because the truth element of theology tends to be overlooked nowadays, it is more 
important than ever to focus on the truth of Catholic faith.
14  
Indeed, the Church is the 
very place of truth.  In this respect apologetics safeguards believers from becoming 
indifferent about discipleship.  As Avery Dulles puts it: ―If we do not consider that it is 
important for others to hear the Christian proclamation, we inevitably begin to question 
its importance for ourselves.‖15   
                                                             
14 For a theological and philosophical definition and defense of Catholic truth, see Ignace de la 
Potterie, ―Truth,‖ in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, ed. René Latourelle and Rino Fisichella (New 
York: Crossroad, 2000), 1133.  He writes: ―In tradition, in addition to the use of the notion of truth derived 
from Greek philosophy [i.e., truth as correspondence], we find in some of the fathers and in the liturgy a 
resumption and development of the biblical conception of truth, but sometimes with a stronger emphasis on 
its doctrinal aspect.  Generally speaking, truth designates the Christian faith, i.e., the divine revelation as it 
has been handed down in the church.‖  I speak about ―truth‖ at length in this dissertation in chapter 3.    
 15 Avery Dulles, ―The Rebirth of Apologetics,‖ First Things, No. 143, (May 2004): 20.    
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 Apologetics plays an important role in facilitating the process of conversion—one 
of the primary tasks of the Church community.  Authentic discipleship begins with 
authentic conversion.  One of the values of engaging in the apologetic task is that it 
deepens and enriches an understanding of the truth.  Since authentic parish unity is 
impossible to achieve without interior conversion, apologetics helps to facilitate the 
process of the Church becoming dynamic, evangelical, and one.  As Christians become 
more and more confident that Jesus is the way, the truth, and the life, they inevitably 
become who they were meant to be, together in Christ 
 A ministry that neglects apologetics can destroy the driving impetus underlying 
missions. If dialogue is understood in the erroneous sense that faith in Jesus is 
unnecessary or unimportant, and that Christians only have to dialogue to understand one 
another for mere mutual enrichment, then the missionary mandate loses its underlying 
rationale.  But evangelization is essential to the Church‘s life.  As John Paul II writes, ―In 
the Church‘s history, missionary drive has always been a sign of vitality, just as its 
lessoning is a sign of a crisis of faith.‖16   Part of the reason for this lessoning is due to a 
reductive understanding of ministry that forgets the importance of apologetics.  A 
Catholic Church is not just inclusive, it is expansive.  Conversely, if the Church is not 
expansive, then one must seriously question whether the Church is fulfilling its mission.    
 Apologetics is needed for theologians to understand the inner-rationale of beliefs 
or viewpoints that are different or even contrary from the Church‘s doctrines.  The 
evangelical endeavor (one of the main purposes of the Church) demands that Christians 
familiarize themselves with different viewpoints.  Repressing disagreement is not healthy 
for authentic faith, and certainly not with full Catholic faith.  In recognizing differences 
                                                             
16 John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio, N. 2.    
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one makes the first step to understand the problems that need to be addressed for 
reunification and/or evangelization to take place.  Although the full reunification of 
Christendom is a complicated endeavor, the apologetic enterprise enables Catholics to 
apprehend and appreciate the credibility of beliefs and practices that are different or 
contrary.   
 Apologetics is actually a form of compassion expressed by believers.  In this 
sense apologetics must be incorporated into theology and the ministry.  Disagreements 
within the Church (and other Christian communities and religions) do not have to be 
completely incompatible for pastors and theologians to become more apologetical in 
scope.  It only requires that believers at least think that their beliefs are apparently 
different from other viewpoints.  The apologetic element to dialogue will help to reveal 
whether these differences are real or only apparent.  The same theme works in reverse.  If 
I hold to beliefs that are wrong or misguided, then I certainly would want other persons to 
point out where I might have gone wrong.  Good apologetic arguments, which are 
favorable to views that are contrary from my own, can help me to see my own theological 
errors.   
 
          It is strange that apologetics would be so lowly esteemed in so many Christian 
circles.  Apologetics is needed more now than ever.  The New Testament writers and 
early Church Fathers had to be heavily apologetical, for there was no Christian influence 
in culture yet.  In a post-Christian context, it seems reasonable that we should have the 
same approach.  An apologetical outlook might make greater inroads into the wider 
world.  If we understand what apologetics is in its most basic sense (the positive and/or 
negative defense of the Gospel in both theoretical and practical forms), then obviously 
10 
 
apologetics is relevant at any time.  Even though our culture and theology continues to 
change, Christians still live in an era where people need to be convinced that Jesus is 
Lord.  Obviously this entails that Christians will have to make a defense of the Gospel.  
Again, there will always be objections to the Gospel, whether they are sub-consciously or 
openly stated by outsiders and those within the Church.  And this is precisely the reason 
why apologetics will always remain a significant part of theology and ministry.   
 Even though there is real warfare going on between the Reign of God and the 
powers of this world (see Eph. 6:10-20), the believer‘s interaction with other believers 
and the outside world should be more diplomatic than combative.  Although Christianity 
is already philosophically well positioned to deal with most objections, the more tactical 
concern of the apologist has to do with the engagement.  Defending the faith requires 
more than knowledge.   It requires an artful method.  Often a clever apologist can 
outmaneuver someone who is more intelligent or has better arguments on the table at the 
moment.  Let us look at some tactics that might help ambassadors for Christ to use 
apologetics to advance the Reign of God.       
 
 
Previewing this Dissertation 
 The first chapter of this essay is dedicated to inculcating the Vatican II‘s vision of 
Catholic defense.  Many scholars seem to think that ecumenical theology and/or 
interreligious dialogue have trumped the use of apologetics in the Catholic Church since 
Vatican II.  But nothing could be further from the truth.  Soon to be shown, the Council 
11 
 
endorses at least four different models of Catholic defense.  This models approach will be 
discussed in the first chapter.     
 Before turning to the different approaches, however, it is imperative to discuss the 
problem of faith and reason in a postmodern context (chapter 2).  This discussion needs 
to be mentioned because it would be useless to defend Christian claims unless they are 
first construed as universally true.  The title of the second chapter, ―Does Postmodern 
Relativism Defeat Apologetics?,‖ is not meant to be a refutation of postmodernism.  
Many good things have come from the demise of the modern age for the purposes of 
religious faith.  But there is an element of postmodernism that needs to be addressed if 
the apologetic enterprise is to make sense to theologians and potential converts.  
Postmodernism serves as a construct of truth, and it also serves as a corrective to the 
errors of modernism.              
 The first model is called ―scholastic apologetics‖ (chapter 3).  Vatican II also 
called for a reasoned faith, and, at times, reiterates and defends the teaching of Dei Filius 
on the natural knowability of the existence of God.  The Jesuit theologian John Hardon 
writes: 
Among the satisfying features of the Catholic faith is seeing how providentially, 
sometimes prophetically, the Church‘s magisterium anticipates the needs of the future.  
Who would have thought, as early as 1870, that by 1970 almost one-third of the human 
race would be under the political domination of an ideology that professedly excludes the 
existence of a personal God?  Yet in 1870 the same Council that elaborated the divine 
attributes to strengthen the faith of believing Christians also evaluated the position of 
those who, only vaguely then, were devising to supplant the divine majesty … By the 
second half the twentieth century, loss of faith in God or indifference to his existence had 
assumed global proportions.  Vatican II took stock of the situation in the longest and most 
elaborate analysis of atheism in the sixteen hundred years of conciliar history. This fact 
alone gives some indication of how different are the issues facing the Church today from 
those that threatened its integrity during the days of Arius, Nestorius, and Pelagius.17 
 
                                                             
17 John A. Hardon, The Catholic Catechism (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 58, 60. 
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Vatican II displayed more historical consciousness and cultural awareness than Vatican I, 
but the former also emphasized the validity of permanent truths.
18
  Guadium et Spes 
reaffirmed the twofold order of faith and reason and praised Aquinas‘s theology as a 
model for understanding this relationship.
19
  This apologetic concern of the Council 
seems appropriate in a post-Vatican II context.  Regardless if one is Catholic, Protestant, 
Anglican, or Eastern Orthodox, believers can empathize with the deleterious effects that 
atheism and unbelief is having on Christendom and society.   
A second model focuses on evidence (thus chapter 4).  Because the Council 
coincided with the third quest for the historical Jesus, I will focus on the importance of 
evidence for Christ‘s resurrection.  The newest quest for the historical Jesus has ushered 
in a strong wave of apologetic writings defending the historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection.  
According to I. Howard Marshall:  
Why, then, should it be thought odd to offer to twentieth century audiences the historical 
backing that they need in order to know whether they should commit themselves in faith 
to the Jesus who is subject of Christian preaching?  Modern people want to know if Jesus 
really existed.  They want to know if he was the kind of person that the Gospels make 
him out to be.  They want to know if he died and rose from the dead.  They want to know 
whether his general manner of life supports the claims made on his behalf by Christians.  
And they are entitled to receive answers to these questions.20   
 
The main evidence considered usually consists of the post-mortem appearances of Jesus 
to individuals, groups, and enemies, the discovery of an open and empty tomb by a group 
of Jesus‘ women followers, and the origin of the earliest disciples‘ belief in the 
resurrection despite their predispositions to the contrary.   
For the most part skeptics have taken these reported facts seriously but have tried 
to account for them in naturalistic terms.  Another salient component of earliest 
                                                             
18 Gaudium et Spes, 10; Dignitatis Humanae, 3. 
19 Gaudium et Spes, 10, 59. 
20 I Howard Marshall, I Believe in the Historical Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 83. 
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Christianity is the Church‘s worship and devotional life.  This phenomenon has been 
outlined and explained by brilliant scholars such as Larry Hurtado, Richard Bauckham, 
and James Dunn. And yet, most apologists in the newest quest have neglected to interact 
with their pioneering work.  I will also survey the most salient criticisms of the 
resurrection hypothesis and address them as well.   
The third model focuses on human experience (chapter 5).  Echoing the theology 
of the Council, for instance, John Paul II wrote: ―This universal presence of the Saints is 
in fact a proof of the transcendent power of the Spirit.  It is the sign and proof of God‘s 
victory over the forces and evil which divide humanity.‖21  The four ecclesial attributes 
of the Church (one, holy, catholic, and apostolic) exert a special attraction for evangelists, 
ecumenists, and apologists today.  Indeed, so strong is the encounter with vibrant 
Christian communities that it can bring about conversions.
22
  By their fruits we will know 
God.  The ordinary person is not usually persuaded to believe in Christ through 
arguments as much as they are concerned to see God‘s work in people.23  As John Henry 
Newman said, ―as ‗the heavens declare the glory of God‘ as Creator, so are the saints the 
proper and true evidence of the God of Christianity, and tell out into all lands the power 
and grace of Him who made them. . . They are the popular evidence of Christianity.‖24   
Although the argument of this chapter is not based upon a phenomenological 
encounter with holiness, it tries to elucidate some of the positive changes that Christian 
cultures have left upon the world for the better.  This chapter tries to make sense out of 
the objection: ―Does Christian belief make a difference in the lives of believers?‖  These 
                                                             
21 John Paul II, Ut Unum Sint, N. 84.   
22 Vatican II, Lumen Gentium, N. 50.   
 23 Avery Dulles, ―Seven Essentials of Evangelization,‖ Origins, 25.23, (November 23, 1995): 400.      
 24 V.F. Blehl, The Essential Newman (New York: Mentor Omega, 1963): 334.    
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changes can be highlighted to reinvigorate an almost forgotten argument in the Catholic 
Church known as the via empirica.  Notwithstanding the positive changes found in 
cultures that are unaffected by institutional Christianity, the via empirica can be defended 
in a postconciliar church on behalf of the Divine Founder.  Given the basic truth of 
Christina faith (see chapters 1 and 2), it is imperative that we show its practical relevance 
in this chapter.   
Here I have briefly explained each of the models and what will be discussed in 
this dissertation.  In the conclusion I will explain how they all resonate together given the 
Council‘s endorsement of the multi-models approach.  I will show how the different 
models are complementary given the different problems that have been highlighted in 
each of these cases.   
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CONCILIAR APOLOGETICS: AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF CATHOLIC 
DEFENSE 
 
 
 Recognizing that Christians cannot adequately understand the mysteries of faith 
from a single vantage point, Catholic theologians have been keen on emphasizing the 
multidimensional nature of theological understanding since Vatican II.  Avery Dulles, for 
instance, convincingly argued that many of the debated conceptions of the Church 
proposed by different theologians throughout Church history were complementary rather 
than contradictory.
25
  Many theologians followed Dulles‘ multiple-models approach since 
the early 1970‘s when the book was first published.26  The advantage of such a method 
has helped believers to understand the rich, in-depth quality of Catholic faith.      
 One of the fields of theology which has not been discussed in the models 
approach, however, is apologetics―the art and science of defending the doctrines and 
practices of the Catholic Church.  When all of the relevant passages in the documents of 
Vatican II are taken into consideration, a unique apologetical approach emerges that 
incorporates key advances as they emerged historically from the Church‘s apologists.  
Each of the individual apologetic systems from the past will be shown to have its own 
particular strengths and weaknesses.   
 By way of contrast, I will demonstrate that an important way to express the 
Gospel in a post-conciliar church is to advance the integrated model of the Council.  This 
model will be called ―combinationalism.‖  The interests and views of the apologists are 
                                                             
25 Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1974). 
 26 Some other examples would include Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Maryknoll: Orbis, 
1992); Sallie McFague, Models of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1987); Kevin W. Erwin, Models of the 
Eucharist (Mahwah: Paulist, 2005); Stephen B. Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, rev. exp. ed. 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002).     
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therefore proven to be complementary rather than competing according to conciliar 
teaching.   
 As the Catholic Church became increasingly aware of the plurality of thought 
patterns and the various ways in which inculturation takes place, the Catholic bishops 
recognized that different needs and personality types will demand different approaches to 
evangelization.  All believers come to faith through different means.  The integrated 
model of Vatican II helps apologists and evangelists to recognize that although one 
approach to Catholic defense might be needed in a certain context, it would be a foolish 
mistake to take that one system and use it as the exclusive means to reach persons 
situated within different circumstances and cultural contexts.  Similarly, no single 
personality type will carry that same measure of credibility or effectiveness in all 
environments.     
  
An Apologetics of Decline and Renewal 
 Many Catholics have a difficult time with anything that resembles a defense of 
the faith.  These critics seem to recast the same arguments that were repeatedly lashed out 
against the manualist approach to apologetics which prevailed prior to Vatican II.  This 
approach was merely one way to defend the faith.  Since these generalizations are still 
heard today, the discipline as a whole tends to gets a bad name.  As Paul Griffiths rightly 
observes:  
‗Apologetics‘ has itself become a term laden with negative connotations: to be an 
apologist for the truth of one religious claim or set of claims over against another is, in 
certain circles, seen as not far short of being a racist.  And the term has passed into 
popular currency, to the extent that it has, as a simple label for argument in the service of 
17 
 
a predetermined orthodoxy, argument concerned not to demonstrate but to convince, and, 
if conviction should fail, to browbeat into submission.27   
 
Surely the ―fighting words‖ of the apologist seem out of touch with Vatican II‘s more 
inclusive, dialogical stance.  The result of this anti-apologetical mindset is played out in 
theology curriculums in Catholic colleges across the United States.  Apologist Peter 
Kreeft of Boston College writes: ―My own college, the nation‘s second largest Catholic 
university―and, I think, in most ways a very fine one―has a theology department that 
offers about fifty different courses each year; but for over a decade not one of them has 
been in apologetics.‖28   
 There are many other reasons for the decline in Catholic apologetics.  Imitating 
the Enlightenment philosophers‘ search for indubitable certainty in what is known as 
classical foundationalism, apologists from the time of the Reformation until Vatican II 
generally sought to rationally demonstrate the truth of the Catholic Church through a 
cumulative, step-by-step method.  ―Its presentation,‖ Benedict Ashley explains, ―often 
suffered from two grave defects.  First, it was developed in a rationalistic manner as if 
faith were the conclusion of a syllogism rather than a gift of God surpassing the mode of 
all human reason and involving not only the human intelligence but also the totality of 
the human person.   
 Second, it was presented in a manner which neglected our pluralistic culture and 
contradicted our commitment to ecumenism.‖29  Although the more narrowly-conceived 
pre-Vatican II apologetical approach proved fecund in for a time, it bore epistemological 
weaknesses that would render it ill equipped for a ―post-Christian‖ age, to wit, an age in 
                                                             
 27 Paul J. Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of Interreligious Dialogue 
(Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 2.   
28 Peter Kreeft, Fundamentals of the Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988), 15. 
 29 Benedict M. Ashley, Choosing a World-View and Value System: An Ecumenical Apologetics 
(New York: Alba House, 2000), x.        
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which the Church no longer holds the same authority or power over worldly affairs that it 
once had, and one in which there was a multiplexity of spiritualities or spiritual 
―options.‖ 
 Third, the rise of biblical studies in Catholicism also turned theologians away 
from the general defense of dogma.  Scriptural theology almost became the norm for 
doing all of theology.  Third, Thomistic philosophy—a staple of Catholic apologetical 
methodology—became increasingly fragmented in the middle of the twentieth century.30  
There were existential Thomists (J. Maritain, E. Gilson), transcendental Thomists (K. 
Rahner, J. Maréchal, B. Lonergan), orthodox or strict observance Thomists (A. Gardeil, 
R. Labourdette, R. Garrigou-Lagrange), eclectic Thomists, and Aristotelian Thomists (R. 
McInerney).  To be a ‗Thomist‘ could mean a variety of things.   
 Fourth, if the rise of biblical studies and the intramural debates within Thomism 
were not enough, the burgeoning need to become more aware, concerned, and 
appreciative of historical and cultural contexts seemed to drive a stake through the 
classical apologist‘s heart.  Apologists naively thought they could defend the faith 
without considering the contingencies of time and place.  Fifth, the emergence of the 
nouvelle theologie made strident headway into Catholic intellectual circles.  This 
movement called for a resourcement to the theologies and spiritualities of the early 
Church Fathers.  Some of the pioneering theologians of the nouvelle theologie included 
Jean Danielou, Henri De Lubac, Aloys Grillmeier, Yves Congar, and Louis Bouyer.   
 Lastly, the liturgical movement, which began at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, also detracted from the longstanding emphasis on defending the faith.   
                                                             
 30 Gerald McCool, The Neo-Thomists, From Unity to Diversity: The Internal Evolution of 
Thomism (New York: Fordham University, 1992); idem, The Neo-Thomists (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University, 1994).      
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Each of these factors led to a serious reevaluation of apologetical method and, for 
a time, fomented a radical decline of active, apologetical praxis.  But, as Avery Dulles 
espies, we are now witnessing ―the rebirth of apologetics.‖31  He is encouraged to observe 
that, while many Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and other Protestants depreciate 
the discipline of apologetics, Evangelicals have been taking the lead in presenting first-
rate arguments in reputable journals and other publications in defense of the faith.  But he 
is not completely in favor of the style of apologetics that Evangelicals have generally 
upheld, for it seems to resemble the one-sided approach that prevailed before Vatican II 
in Catholic circles―the approach that Catholics should reject as ineffective for deeply 
inculcating the faith in a more holistic manner.  Dulles cautions that the discipline needs 
to be shaped under the broader theological vision of the Council.   
Although the revival of Catholic apologetics is still young and maybe even 
uncertain, it needs to be nurtured by scholars now working in the mainstream.  Arguing 
against popular level Catholic apologists, Richard Gaillardetz is one of few Catholic 
theologians who has described what a postconciliar apologetics might look like.
32
  
William Cardinal Levada―the current Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith―has defended the use of classical apologetics, but wants to see it mended from its 
earlier epistemological shortcomings.  For Levada, it can be reformulated in a way that is 
consistent with Catholic theology.
33
   
                                                             
 31 Avery Dulles, ―The Rebirth of Apologetics,‖ First Things 143 (May 2004), 18-23.   
32 Richard Gaillardetz, ―Do We Need a New(er) Apologetics?,‖ America (February 2, 2004). 
http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3390.  See also Richard Gaillardetz, 
―Apologetics, Evangelization, and Ecumenism Today,‖ Origins 35.1 (May 19, 2005), 9-15.  See also 
Thomas P. Rausch, Reconciling Faith and Reason: Apologists, Evangelists, and Theologians in a Divided 
Church (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2000), 35-52. 
33 For the full speech by the Cardinal, see http://www.zenit.org/article-29086?l=english    
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What is sorely lacking in most of these discussions is reference to the salient 
passages of the Council that speak about Catholic defense.  An analysis of the Council 
might help to alleviate the tension that anti-apologists have with defending the faith, and 
it might also help popular level apologists to round out an approach that is more in line 
with earlier Catholic traditions.               
 
In Defense of Conciliar Apologetics 
Pope John XXIII originally called for the Second Vatican Council to let some 
fresh air into the life of the Church.  His intention was not to break off from Sacred 
Tradition.  As theologian Francis Martin writes: ―It is, after all, not a council‘s role to 
embark on new speculative teaching but rather to clarify and substantiate the Church‘s 
traditional teaching and to elucidate the way in which it is a light to the pilgrim Church of 
the present and the future.‖34  Correct readings of Vatican II will therefore include the 
older methods of Catholic apologetics, but will correct the mistakes within these 
approaches.   
According to the Vatican I document on faith and reason, Dei Filius, for instance, 
God reveals himself supernaturally,
35
 conveying truths that go beyond the reach of 
human reason.  This message is accompanied by the outward signs of miracles and 
prophecies which show the credibility of God‘s revelation.  Once this revelation is given 
to humanity, it is capable of being penetrated rationally in order for people to gain a 
                                                             
34 Francis Martin, ―Revelation and its Transmission,‖ in Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering, 
(ed.), Vatican II: Renewal Within Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008), 55.     
35 When I refer to God‘s supernatural revelation, I speak of the disclosure of Godself in a way that 
cannot be ordinarily known by common human experience.  According to Catholic theology, this revelation 
of Godself takes place in human history.  And, without this divine disclosure, persons remain cognitively 
ignorant of the truth about God.        
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greater understanding of it.  This apologetical method resembles the method of classical 
(scholastic) apologetics.  
 So although Vatican II did not elaborate on any method of apologetics in detail, 
this does not mean the Council Fathers did not see classical apologetics as unimportant or 
irrelevant.  As Catholic theologian M. John Farrelly rightly points out: ―Vatican II gave 
primacy to the meaning of God and Jesus Christ but also insisted that reason, common 
human experience, and the historical value of the Gospels support our faith in the 
existence of God and his revelation through Jesus Christ.‖36  One could mention many 
other themes which did not have a prominent role in the Council: trinity, incarnation, 
pneumatology, protology, harmartiology, angelology, etc..  Yet all of these disciplines 
still play a significant role in contemporary Catholic theology.   
 There can be no denying the official conciliar endorsement of apologetics.  
Appealing to the central apologetics passage of the New Testament (1 Pet. 3:15), the 
bishops urge that ―all the disciples of Christ, persevering in prayer and praising God, 
should present themselves as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God.  Everywhere on 
earth they must bear witness to Christ and give an answer to those who seek an account 
of that hope of eternal life which is in them.‖37   
 In the Declaration on Religious Liberty, the Fathers state that ―The disciple has a 
grave obligation to Christ, his Master, to grow daily in his knowledge of the truth he has 
received from him, to be faithful in announcing it, and vigorous in defending it without 
having recourse to methods which are contrary to the spirit of the Gospel.‖38  Though 
Catholics can persuade unbelievers over to faith in Jesus by their lifestyle, this would not 
                                                             
36 M. John Farrelly, Belief in God in Our Time (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1992), 46.    
37 Lumen Gentium, 10.   
38 Dignitatis Humanae, 14. 
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mean that words, and, by implication, argumentation should not be included in the 
attempt to evangelize others.
39
   
 The task of defending the faith is commanded by the Church, especially as 
believers become more accountable to God‘s standards of Christian discipleship.  
Christians ―are more perfectly bound to the Church by the sacrament of Confirmation, 
and the Holy Spirit endows them with special strength so that they are more strictly 
obliged to spread and defend the faith, both by word and by deed, as true witnesses of 
Christ.‖40   
 Catholics are not merely called to dialogue with non-Christians, but must seek to 
convert them to the Risen Christ.
41
  The Constitution on Divine Revelation goes so far as 
to say that we must ―fight in defense of the faith.‖  Of course, this rhetorical phrase is 
stressing the great lengths that Catholics must go in order to preserve the Church‘s 
doctrine against the multitude of challenges that confront us:   
And so the apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the inspired books, 
was to be preserved by an unending succession of preachers until the end of time. 
Therefore the Apostles, handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful 
to hold fast to the traditions which they have learned either by word of mouth or by letter 
(see 2 Thess. 2:15), and to fight in defense of the faith handed on once and for all (see 
Jude 1:3).42 
   
Believers have the duty to defend the faith, but the task of ―safeguarding‖ the 
Gospel is officially entrusted to the Magisterium: ―. . . the task of authentically 
interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted 
exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, whose authority is exercised in the 
name of Jesus Christ.‖  Moreover, ―This teaching office is not above the word of God, 
                                                             
39 Lumen Gentium, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28.  
40 Lumen Gentium, 11.   
41 Ad Gentes, 30, 39, 39, 40.  This statement should be taken into context in the Cocuncil.  The 
Catholic Church recognizes that Jews can find salvation through their own religion. See the relevant 
passages in Vatican II‘s Nostra Aetate.         
42 Dei Verbum, 8.   
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but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it 
scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the 
help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it 
presents for belief as divinely revealed.‖43  Bishops are called to be both practical and 
theoretical defenders of the Church.
 44
   
 One of the great themes of Gaudium et Spes has to do with reading the signs of 
the times in order to effectively answer persons‘ deepest questions about God and 
humanity.
45
  Hence, ―The Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the 
times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel.  Thus, in language intelligible to 
each generation, she can respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this 
present life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other.‖46  In 
reading the culture, Catholics are not only called to engage outsiders with arguments, 
they must learn effective ways to do it.  Method and context must therefore be taken into 
consideration for effective evangelization to take place:
47
 ―within the requirements and 
methods proper to theology, [men and women] are invited to seek continually for more 
suitable ways of communicating doctrine to the men of their times; for the deposit of 
Faith or the truths are one thing and the manner in which they are enunciated, in the same 
meaning and understanding, is another.‖48  In Christus Dominus, we read that the bishops 
should be presenting the Gospel in a way that is conducive to the modern mindset.
49
   
                                                             
43 Dei Verbum 10.   
44 Christus Dominus, 13.     
45 Gaudium et Spes, 10, 11, 12, 41. 
46 Gaudium et Spes, 4 
47 Apostolicam Actuositatem, 6, 13, 25, 27; Ad Gentes, 10, 20, 21; Presbyterorum Ordinis, 10, 17;  
Perfectae Caritatis, 20.   
48 Gaudium et Spes, 62.   
49 Christus Dominus, 13.   
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 Some preliminary conclusions about the conciliar vision of apologetics can now 
be drawn.  First, Vatican II is unambiguously concerned about defending the faith.  
Arguments and evidence can be used for the sake of evangelization if the appropriate 
circumstances allow for it.  However, we are to never force our dialogue partners into a 
win-lose situation.  What is more, interreligious dialogue is not a substitute for 
apologetics.  Conciliar apologetics has a practical and theoretical component for purposes 
of the evangelization.   
 We turn now, then, to the different ways the Council utilizes each apologetic 
model.  Unlike the individual advocates of each system, Vatican II does not challenge the 
other viewpoints but includes them all within the broad range of her teaching.  By 
implication, this means that at least certain versions of each model are compatible with 
one another.                     
 
Vatican II and Classical Apologetics (Scholastic Apologetics) 
 Even though the Council does not use the term ―classical apologetics‖ in any of 
its documents, it endorses some of the key elements of this method.  In the first place, the 
use of verbal argument is necessary for the purposes of evangelization: ―Christ, the great 
Prophet, who proclaimed the Kingdom of His Father both by the testimony of His life 
and the power of His words…does this not only through the hierarchy who teach in His 
name and with His authority, but also through the laity whom He made His witnesses and 
to whom He gave understanding of the faith (sensu fidei) and an attractiveness in speech 
so that the power of the Gospel might shine forth in their daily social and family life.‖50  
                                                             
 50 Lumen Gentium, 35.   
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Verbal discourse (and, by implication, friendly debate) is therefore encouraged for the 
sake of evangelization.   
There are many places in Dei Verbum where the Council Fathers insist that the 
faith must be preached in words (and not just in deeds).  The direct implication is that by 
preaching one must give reasons for the things that are said.  Because Christ taught with 
words, the faith must be taught and thus defended in the same way.
51
  Appealing to this 
common sense approach to evangelization, Gaudium et Spes affirms that the more one 
loves in action, the more one will speak the truth.
52
 Apologetics, then, can serve as a form 
of compassion for evangelists:  
Love and good will, . . . must in no way render us indifferent to truth and goodness. 
Indeed love itself impels the disciples of Christ to speak the saving truth to all men. But it 
is necessary to distinguish between error, which always merits repudiation, and the 
person in error, who never loses the dignity of being a person even when he is flawed by 
false or inadequate religious notions.  God alone is the judge and searcher of hearts; for 
that reason He forbids us to make judgments about the internal guilt of anyone.53    
 
Following the lead of Dei Filius, the natural knowledge of God is reaffirmed in the 
Council.
54
  Traditionally the Church has not held that individuals can know that God 
exists only through faith.  That would be fideistic and contrary to Catholic apologetics.  
The way that individuals can reason about God‘s existence is by considering the things 
that have been made.  Hence, the move will be from effect to cause, not through an innate 
awareness of the idea of God (as in the case with the ontological argument).  Thus the 
framers of Dei Verbum announce that: ―God, the beginning and end of all things, can be 
known with certainty from created reality by the light of human reason (see Rom. 1:20); 
but teaches that it is through His revelation that those religious truths which are by their 
                                                             
51 Dei Verbum, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25 ; Ad Gentes, 15, 25; Apostolicam 
Actuositatem, 6, 11, 13, 14.   
52 Gaudium et Spes, 92. 
 53 Gaudium et Spes, 28.   
 54 Dei Verbum, 3; Nostra Aetate, 2.  
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nature accessible to human reason can be known by all men with ease, with solid 
certitude and with no trace of error, even in this present state of the human race.‖55   
Keeping in line with the Church‘s tradition apropos to natural theology, the 
Church approves of the argument from desire to the truth of Christianity.
56
  People 
remain restless in their hearts until they experience the one true God.  For example, if one 
begins with a proper understanding of the human person, Christian teaching is seen as the 
best fit for humanity.
57
  The bishops assert:  
Above all the Church knows that her message is in harmony with the most secret desires 
of the human heart when she champions the dignity of the human vocation, restoring 
hope to those who have already despaired of anything higher than their present lot. Far 
from diminishing man, her message brings to his development light, life and freedom. 
Apart from this message nothing will avail to fill up the heart of man: ‗Thou hast made us 
for Thyself,‘ O Lord, ‗and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee.‘58   
 
Hence, the human person has a natural knowledge of God‘s existence, nature and 
providence over creation.  This aspect to conciliar teaching is an indispensable element of 
classical apologetics.  For this method begins with the truths accessible from natural 
theology.   
 The Church boldly favors the use of human reason: ―In her loyal devotion to God 
and men, the Church has already repudiated and cannot cease repudiating, sorrowfully 
but as firmly as possible, those poisonous doctrines and actions which contradict reason 
and the common experience of humanity, and dethrone man from his native 
excellence.‖59  Indeed, rational argument should not be dismissed in light of the problem 
of atheism―whether it is of the critical or practical variety.  Indeed, the Church 
                                                             
55 Dei Verbum, 6. Cf. Gaudium et Spes, 12 
 56 Gaudium et Spes, 18.   
57 Gaudium et Spes, 21, 36, 41, 41, 45, 58. 
 58 Gaudium et Spes, 21.   
 59 Gaudium et Spes, 21.   
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―courteously invites atheists to examine the Gospel of Christ with an open mind.‖60  This 
passage provides an endorsement of classical apologetics (and could be used to support 
the Council‘s endorsement of rational apologetics as a whole).  Subsequent endorsements 
of rational uses of apologetics will also be seen in encyclicals such as Fides et Ratio and 
Benedict XVI‘s lecture at the University of Regensburg.61   
Similarly, in Optatum Totius, the Council affirms that seminarians must study 
philosophy for the purposes of defending the doctrines of Catholicism: ―The history of 
philosophy should be so taught that the students, while reaching the ultimate principles of 
the various systems, will hold on to what is proven to be true therein and will be able to 
detect the roots of errors and to refute them.‖62  Hence the study of philosophy should be 
designed to foster an apologetical spirit in those men studying for the priesthood. 
 
Vatican II and Evidential Apologetics 
 Elements of the evidentialism are also upheld in the conciliar documents. By 
viewing science, history, psychology, and human beings in the correct way, it becomes 
easier to perceive the truth of the Gospel.  According to Gaudium et Spes: ―When man 
gives himself to the various disciplines of philosophy, history and of mathematical and 
natural science, and when he cultivates the arts, he can do very much to elevate the 
human family to a more sublime understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the 
                                                             
 60 Gaudium et Spes, 21.  
 61 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, 67.  See also Pope Benedict XVI, ‗Faith, Reason and the University 
Memories and Reflections‘, Lecture at the University of Regensburg, Germany, September 12, 2006.  Can 
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formation of considered opinions which have universal value.‖63  Interpreting the secular 
world in Catholic terms is an important theme of the entire Council.
64
   
 In the Decree on Priestly Formation, for instance, the bishops remark that recent 
findings in the social sciences can provide an effective means to win people over to 
religious vocations.
65
  The use of science can be used for evangelical purposes, whether 
evangelization is directed to outsiders or those inside the church.  In the Declaration on 
Christian Education it is said that part of developing a Catholic view of the world, the 
cosmos, and human beings will include skills to defend Catholicism.
66
  As the bishops 
put it:  
A Christian education does not merely strive for the maturing of a human person as just 
now described, but has as its principal purpose this goal: that the baptized . . . learn not 
only how to bear witness to the hope that is in them (cf. Peter 3:15) but also how to help 
in the Christian formation of the world that takes place when natural powers viewed in 
the full consideration of man redeemed by Christ contribute to the good of the whole 
society.67   
 
One of the roles of faculties in Catholic schools is to teach the various aspects of theology 
and the other sciences in order to foster a deeper understanding of revelation, its 
plausibility, and internal coherence.
68
   
 An affinity for the use of historical evidence is found in Lumen Gentium: ―The 
Miracles of Jesus also confirm that the Kingdom has already arrived on earth: ‗If I cast 
out devils by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you.‘  Before all 
things, however, the Kingdom is clearly visible in the very Person of Christ, the Son of 
God and the Son of Man, who came ‗to serve and to give His life as a ransom for 
                                                             
 63 Gaudium et Spes, 57.   
64 Lumen Gentium, 36; Gaudium et Spes, 21, 43, 76; Apostolicam Actuositatem, 14, 16, 19, 20; 
Gravissimum Educationis, 1.   
              65 Optatum Totius, 2  
66 Gravissimum Educationis, 3, 10, 12. 
 67 Gravissimum Educationis, 2. 
 68 Gravissimum Educationis, 11.   
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many.‘‖69  Christ‘s life is apologetical in the sense that he testifies to the reality of the 
Kingdom.
70
  A historical approach to Jesus‘ life can therefore help one to see the truth 
about God and his love for humanity.  Seen in this way, Christ‘s life is apologetical.  A 
historical and theological study of the person of Jesus can convince others that his 
message is indeed trustworthy.  Christ himself gave compelling evidence of the truths he 
preached.
71
  As the bishops explain in another place: ―It is common knowledge that 
among all the Scriptures, even those of the New Testament, the Gospels have a special 
preeminence, and rightly so, for they are the principal witness for the life and teaching of 
the incarnate Word, our savior.‖72   
 Dei Verbum affirms the fundamental historicity of the Gospels.  However, this 
would not mean that the Gospels are straightforward, historical reports, but that they are 
reliable at the core: ―Holy Mother Church has firmly and with absolute constancy held, 
and continues to hold, that the four Gospels just named, whose historical character the 
Church unhesitatingly asserts, faithfully hand on what Jesus Christ, while living among 
men, really did and taught for their eternal salvation until the day He was taken up into 
heaven (see Acts 1:1)‖73  In corroboration of this point, the bishops announce that the 
Four Evangelists‘ original intention was transposed from their recollections of the 
original eyewitnesses‘ beliefs to relay the truth about Christ.74  
 Moreover, a historical and sociological study of the Church‘s influence upon the 
world might be persuasive to inquirers.
75
  Conversely, ―it must be admitted that the 
                                                             
 69 Lumen Gentium, 35.    
70 Lumen Gentium, 5.  Cf. Dei Verbum, 4; cf. Dignitatis Humanae, 11; Ad Gentes, 9.       
 71 Gaudium et Spes, 3.   
 72 Dei Verbum, 18.   
 73 Dei Verbum, 19.   
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temporal sphere is governed by its own principles, since it is rightly concerned with the 
interests of this world. But that ominous doctrine which attempts to build a society with 
no regard whatever for religion, and which attacks and destroys the religious liberty of its 
citizens, is rightly to be rejected.‖76   
 
Vatican II and Experiential Apologetics 
 Experientialism is the premiere model of the Council.  Like a splash of cool 
water, this model compensates for the heavy intellectualism of the other systems.  
Perhaps the pastoral concern of the bishops provides the reason for this emphasis at the 
Council.  In Gaudium et Spes, we read: ―The People of God believe that it is led by the 
Lord's Spirit, Who fills the earth. Motivated by this faith, it labors to decipher authentic 
signs of God's presence and purpose in the happenings, needs and desires in which this 
People has a part along with other men of our age.‖77  The witness of a holy life makes 
the faith more believable.
78
  Indeed, as Catholics we are ―living witnesses to him.‖79  
Mother Church ―exhorts her children to purification and renewal so that the sign of Christ 
may shine more brightly over the face of the earth.‖80   
Apostolicam Actuositatem insists that all persons are called to testify to the Lord‘s 
presence by the manner of their life: ―The very testimony of their Christian life and good 
works done in a supernatural spirit have the power to draw men to belief and to God.‖81  
Impelled by the love of Christ, those who have faith and seek to advance the kingdom 
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inevitably draw men to Christ.
82
  The evidential power of human holiness is repeatedly 
maintained.
83
  Pastors should remember that in their daily conduct and concern for the 
members of the parish they testify to the Gospel to the world.  In so doing, outsiders will 
judge whether the Christian message is indeed worthy of belief.
84
  Unless priests are 
personally holy, they will be ineffective as Catholic evangelists.
85
  Indeed, the best 
apologetic maneuver for winning persons over to join religious communities is seen in 
the life of its members.
86
  
The Church itself is a sacrament which points to the Savior, especially when it 
radiates with prayer and holiness in the context of liturgical worship.
87
  As 
Presbyterorum Ordinis states: ―The ecclesial community by prayer, example, and works 
of penance, exercise a true motherhood toward souls who are to be led to Christ.  The 
Christian community forms an effective instrument by which the path to Christ and his 
Church is pointed out and made smooth for non-believers.  It is an effective instrument 
also for arousing, nourishing and strengthening the faithful for their spiritual combat.‖88   
Similarly, the liturgy is capable of building people up so that they might shine 
forth as a reason for outsiders to become Catholic.
89
  When believers fail to live up to 
their calling, this can serve as an anti-sacrament, repelling outsiders to faith.
 90
  In 
Perfectae Caritatis it is said that a materialistic way of life can detract from the apologia 
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of religious communities.
91
  For instance, the response to outsiders should not be on 
providing sophisticated philosophical refutations, but on living a life that can convince 
persons to think in spiritual terms: ―Since in our times, different forms of materialism are 
spread far and wide even among Catholics, the laity should not only learn doctrine more 
diligently, especially those main points which are the subjects of controversy, but should 
also exhibit the witness of an evangelical life in contrast to all forms of materialism.‖92 
 Under the greater theme of holiness are more specific themes such as the witness 
of the saints:
93
 In the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, the Council Fathers write:  
When we look at the lives of those who have faithfully followed Christ, we are inspired 
with a new reason for seeking the City that is to come and at the same time we are shown 
a most safe path by which among the vicissitudes of this world, in keeping with the state 
in life and condition proper to each of us, we will be able to arrive at perfect union with 
Christ, that is, perfect holiness.  In the lives of those who, sharing in our humanity, are 
however more perfectly transformed into the image of Christ, God vividly manifests His 
presence and His face to men. He speaks to us in them, and gives us a sign of His 
Kingdom, to which we are strongly drawn, having so great a cloud of witnesses over us 
and such a witness to the truth of the Gospel.94   
 
The witness of martyrdom,
95
 the domestic church,
96
 and celibacy
97
 all help in the 
Catholic Church‘s in her case for saving faith.  Poverty and charity also serve as motives 
of credibility.
98
  Sacred art has a persuasive effect on observers of Catholic worship.  In 
Sacrosanctum Concilium, sacred art and architecture is thought to be fruitful for 
evangelism.
99
        
When the Church qualitatively manifests the four ecclesial attributes (oneness, 
holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity), this can also provide compelling evidence for 
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Catholicism.
100
  The writers of Unitatis Redintegratio insist that divisions within the 
Body of Christ becomes anti-sacramental, destroying the Church‘s witness before the 
world: ―Such division. . .damages the holy cause of preaching the Gospel to every 
creature.‖101  In its Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, the Council asserts 
that: ―The division among Christians damages the most holy cause of preaching the 
Gospel to every creature and blocks the way to the faith for many.‖102  But when the 
Church is truly one, she becomes effective in the apologetic case for faith.  Christians 
should anticipate the one visible church of God so that the world might be converted to 
the Risen Christ.
103
  To be sure, the fact that local churches could share common 
aspirations for unity counts as evidence of the Gospel.
104
  Unity is a significant concern 
of the Council for the sake of evangelism.
105
  Collaborating together in united action is an 
effective means of effectively reaching the world with the Good News.
106
   
 
Theological Apologetics and Vatican II 
 It is imperative to teach Catholic doctrine correctly so that the world might come 
to believe in the one true Savior.
107
  False doctrines can destroy belief, but accurate 
presentations of Catholicism can make it easier for persons to see the inner-rationale of 
Catholic beliefs.  ―Therefore, following in the footsteps of the Council of Trent and of the 
First Vatican Council, this present council wishes to set forth authentic doctrine on divine 
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revelation and how it is handed on, so that by hearing the message of salvation the whole 
world may believe, by believing it may hope, and by hoping it may love.‖108   
 By contrast, teaching false doctrines (or living hypocritically) will ruin the 
Church‘s witness for the sake of converting the world: ―To the extent that they neglect 
their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are deficient in their 
religious, moral or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the 
authentic face of God and religion.‖109 
 Because all Scripture is divinely inspired and is useful for refuting error (2 Tim. 
3:15- 17), it is also useful for evangelical purposes.  The Fathers contend that hearing 
Scripture can literally open up the minds of its hearers for them to be receptive to the 
Spirit:  
For in the sacred books, the Father who is in heaven meets His children with great love 
and speaks with them; and the force and power in the word of God is so great that it 
stands as the support and energy of the Church, the strength of faith for her sons, the food 
of the soul, the pure and everlasting source of spiritual life. Consequently these words are 
perfectly applicable to Sacred Scripture: ‗For the word of God is living and active‘ (Heb. 
4:12) and ‗it has power to build you up and give you your heritage among all those who 
are sanctified‘ (Acts 20:32; see 1 Thess. 2:13).110   
 
Thus a form of presuppositionalism seems to be upheld.  By hearing and understanding 
the Scriptures the light of supernatural faith is bestowed on unbelievers and believers.
111
  
Thus the proclamation of the Gospel is capable of drawing men and women, regardless if 
they believe in Christ or not, to faith.
112
   
The framers of Presbyterorum Ordinis also declare that preaching the word of 
God should not be abstract and overly generalized, but should address the particular 
circumstances that people commonly face in the world (in order to persuade them unto 
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deeper faith).
113
  If preachers exposit God‘s word accurately, then this can open up the 
eyes of unbelievers.  ―Taught by the word and example of Christ, the Apostles followed 
the same way. From the very origins of the Church the disciples of Christ strove to 
convert men to faith in Christ as the Lord; not, however, by the use of coercion or of 
devices unworthy of the Gospel, but by the power, above all, of the word of God.‖114  A 
passage in Dignitatis Humanae expresses the same understanding of presuppositionalism: 
―They followed the example of the gentleness and respectfulness of Christ and they 
preached the word of God in the full confidence that there was resident in this word itself 
a divine power able to destroy all the forces arrayed against God.‖115   
 Negatively speaking, the Church denounces false philosophies such as scientism.  
Human ―intelligence is not confined to observable data alone, but can with genuine 
certitude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin that certitude is 
partly obscured and weakened.‖116   
Gaudium et Spes is the only conciliar document which actually presents 
arguments against the philosophies undergirding unbelief.
117
  Marxist atheism, for 
example, holds that humanity is thwarted from true liberation by believing in God 
because it focuses our attention on things above, not on things of this earth.
118
  The 
Council Fathers respond: since human life does not end at the grave, all persons are held 
accountable for their actions during their earthly life.  In the end the scales of justice will 
finally be balanced, and righteousness will prevail over evil.  Every evil will therefore be 
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transformed for the greater good.  Every decision that is made by Christians in this 
lifetime has eternal significance because there is something to hope for in the end.  As a 
result, Christians should make decisions that run against contrarian pressures and 
embrace acts of extreme self-sacrifice in this world for the greater good.
119
 
 
Integrating Models 
 Vatican II presents distinctive elements of each apologetic system.  The Council‘s 
stress on reason (classical apologetics), facts (evidentialism), experience 
(experientialism), and Scripture and Church teaching (theological) all seem evident in the 
conciliar documents.  What we do not see is an exclusive stance to any single model.  
The vision of conciliar apologetics should help theologians to recognize there is no single 
way to defend the fundamental claims of the Church about Jesus Christ.   
 By implication, there must be ways in which the systems work harmoniously 
together.  Similar to the apologetical mind of the Council, it is not a coincidence that a 
kaleidoscopic picture of doctrine and practice is presented in Vatican II.  As the 
Magisterium became increasingly aware of the challenges associated with globalization, 
she also recognized that the individual needs of persons are not all alike.  Different 
thought patterns within each culture will demand different apologetic approaches for the 
purposes of evangelism.  Everyone comes to faith through different means.   
 Even the most convinced apologists tend to gravitate to those methods that have 
personally affected them the most.  Given the person-relative nature of evangelism, 
apologists should try to match their methods with the kind of person they are in dialogue 
with.  Someone with an academic background who is capable of processing empirically 
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based evidence might be influenced by evidentialism.  Someone who struggles 
emotionally with the Church‘s claims should not be introduced to classical apo logetics 
(which focuses on reason), but might be attentive to the warmth of the community of 
believers (thus experientialism).  Confused individuals might be relieved by classical 
apologetics, which is concerned with building a gradual case for faith, one step at a time.  
Hence these individuals will not be sympathetic to classical apologetics.   
 Catholics must now consider intangible factors such as attitude, aptitude, 
personality, and background experiences when presenting the case for faith.  They must 
also recognize that questions are often framed in different ways and so must be answered 
in ways that might further a constructive conversation.  From this discussion of conciliar 
apologetics we have seen that Christians are not only called to provide answers to 
skeptics‘ questions and challenges, they must also live out the faith in holiness (thus the 
emphasis on experiential approaches).  That is to say, they must not exclusively rely on 
classical apologetics and/or the evidential approach.   
But it must be remembered that if one is holy, then they will use every means at 
their disposal to reach one‘s dialogue partner, not just ways that exclude the mind and 
verbal persuasion; holiness may be more than rational, but is certainly not less than 
rational.  Conversely, if one uses rational argument, then this can become a means by 
which the Spirit sanctifies outsiders and even doubtful believers.  The Tradition of the 
Church, the historical context of Vatican II, and the documents of the Council all testify 
to the fact that rational approaches to Catholic defense remain an indispensable 
component to discipleship, apologetics and evangelism.       
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 Christian presuppositions will always affect the apologist.  One cannot begin with 
every Christian belief from nowhere.  However, according to Catholic theology, some of 
the mysteries of faith can be known by all normally functioning individuals without the 
help of divine, authoritative revelation.  At this point the natural philosophy (God‘s 
existence, objectivity of truth, etc.) of the classical apologist gives the evangelist 
something that theological apologetics cannot provide him or her with.  Indeed, without 
positing some mutually shared starting points with unbelievers and other doubters (which 
the classicalist can provide), the apologetic enterprise as a whole will collapse.
120
  Indeed, 
presuppositionalist turns into fideism without the help of the universal philosophical 
conclusions that can be previously established by the classical apologist.  If each and 
every mutually shared starting point with outsiders is illusory, then evangelists are forced 
to work out of the fideist theological mindset.            
 Alternatively, some uses of presuppositionalism can provide Catholics with the 
recognition that we must begin with Scriptural and ecclesiastical presuppositions.  For all 
people interpret reality in a way that is consistent with their presuppositions, including 
unbelievers.   
 Nonetheless, it is commonly assumed that theological presuppositions can change 
through arguments and lived experience.  Even if the apologetic mandate demands that 
Christians work with a certain set of presuppositions, this would not have to mean that 
the Gospel is irrational (or that evidences in favor of Christian faith cannot be trusted).  
Perhaps the Gospel is true and the evidence is trustworthy.  As C.S. Lewis, that doyen of 
twentieth century apologists, wrote: ―I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has 
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risen—not only because I see it, but because of it, I see everything else.‖121  It is possible 
that Christians know the truth about God because of faith, not in spite of it.  Again, what 
is needed to help one determine this is the careful weighing and assessing of the 
evidence.  And this assessment is where the evidentialist and the classical apologist are 
again needed.            
Classical apologists provide positive arguments for the Gospel.  Proponents of 
this method argues for God‘s existence, the reasonableness of Jesus‘ divinity, and the 
divine origins of the Catholic Church.   Presuppositionalists and evidentialists can 
complement the classicalist with negative arguments (arguments that deflect the 
challenges to Catholic belief and practice), demonstrating where competing viewpoints 
are fallacious or shortsighted.  Not to be overlooked, the evidentialist and theological 
apologist can also provide positive arguments for faith.  But the classicalist complements 
the evidentialist by providing the necessary philosophical framework that is needed for 
apologetic engagement to begin with.  That is to say, evidence without a prior 
philosophical framework can be interpreted in a variety of ways.  Thus proceeding with 
logical steps can be supplemented with the probabilistic evidences given by the 
evidentialist.  The experiential apologist complements all three of these approaches, both 
negatively and positively, by providing an existential means of persuasion to outsiders 
and by reinforcing the commitment of lukewarm believers.   
The experiential and the theoretical side of conciliar apologetics will provide a 
holistic approach to Catholic defense which is surely more effective than using one 
procedure in dialogue with all persons in every situation.  Undoubtedly one method 
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should be privileged for a particular audience.  But this would not mean that it should 
become the only method in the arsenal of the evangelist/apologist.  So, in the post-
conciliar era, we must recognize the importance of integrative apologetics systems.  The 
integrative apologetic system of the Council might be conveniently called 
combinationalism.     
       
Models of Catholic Apologetics in a Postconciliar Church 
 Throughout Church history, different apologetics systems have emerged in 
response to the various challenges posed to Catholic doctrine.
122
  Though there has never 
been a consensus on which way to categorize the approaches, they have all been used by 
different Christians who represent different denominations for various purposes and 
audiences (and/or critics).  The advocates of each system have often castigated one 
another for the sake of demonstrating the superiority of their own method.  At times, each 
approach has overlapped with the others.  Nonetheless, there are some generally 
understood terms which can be used in a meaningful way to understand each of them as 
distinct approaches.  We will elaborate on four individual systems: classical apologetics, 
evidentialism, experiential apologetics, and presuppositionalism.      
 Classical apologetics is a step-by-step method of defending Catholicism.  This 
tradition is prominent among Catholic thinkers and reaches back to the early Church 
Fathers.
123
  Following Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, classical apologists 
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maintain that each step builds and presupposes more general preconditions necessary for 
the rational possibility of faith.  A classical apologist establishes the existence of God 
before they present evidence for the deity of Christ.  For them, it would not make sense to 
argue for the Son of God unless there is a God who can have a Son who can institute a 
certain kind of Church.   
 They claim that God‘s existence can be proven apart from the influence of faith.  
The next step in this method is to show that miracles are possible.  After demonstrating 
the likelihood of miracles, the New Testament writings are then shown to be 
fundamentally historically trustworthy.  From the time of the Reformation Catholic 
apologists then strenuously argued that the Catholic Church is the Church which best fits 
the four ecclesial attributes of the Church as expressed in the ancient creeds.  This final 
step was used to demonstrate that Protestants could not be the one, holy, catholic and 
apostolic Church because none of them could sufficiently characterize the four marks.   
 One of the indispensable strengths of classical apologetics is the focus on 
common ground between believers and unbelievers.  Hence it reaffirms the universal 
importance of natural theology and the importance of reason.  Post-conciliar advocates 
might include Peter Kreeft, Ronald Tacelli, Benedict Ashley, Robert Spitzer, Brian 
Davies, and John E. Wippel.
124
  Richard Swinburne epitomizes the best work in 
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contemporary classical apologetics in the postconciliar era.
125
  Protestants such as 
William Lane Craig, Norman Geisler, R.C. Sproul, and J.P. Moreland have also appealed 
to this method in their published works.
126
   
 One of the pitfalls of classical apologetics is that it does not necessarily make 
Christianity applicable to real life scenarios.  Truth is not always a guarantee of 
relevance.  However, Christianity is not merely about what happened two thousand years 
ago in the person of Christ; it is also about what God is doing today in salvation history.  
Thus the classical method seems like an impersonal method of Catholic defense.  The 
facticity of Christianity is not automatically connected to the value of Christian faith to 
persons living in the here and now.  This shortcoming is precisely one of the reasons why 
it has been so sharply criticized in recent years.  Second, its emphasis on the mind makes 
it unattractive to many people.  Fundamentally, classical apologists rely on reason to 
defend the claims of Christ.  Most people are not convinced to believe in Christianity 
because of reasoned arguments.  Thirdly, it has a difficult time exposing the fallacies of 
other perspectives.  Instead, classical apologists merely seek to overwhelm other secular 
and religious claims by providing positive arguments in Christianity‘s favor.  Thus it is 
generally lacking in the ability to expose fallacious views in other positions except by 
default (or, indirectly).   
 Other apologists have challenged the overly propositional understanding of 
theology that classical apologists have relied on (e.g., Søren Kierkegaard, Rudolph 
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Bultmann, and Karl Barth).  For them, classical apologists do not adequately regard the 
mysteries of faith as paradoxical, going beyond the propositional mode of understanding.  
An incomprehensible God simply cannot be put into a box and defended with reasoned 
arguments.  God is a mystery capable of being apprehended, but he could never be 
comprehended.  Seen in this way, God can be known, but is also forever unknown.  
Unfortunately many classical apologists overlook this crucial distinction, and turn the 
notion of Catholic defense into a matter of winning a debate.              
 There is long and reputable tradition of evidential apologetics in the Church. 
Instead of stressing reason, evidentialists would rather use facts.  In this view of 
apologetics there is no specific procedure as in the classical apologetics; there is no 
logically prior and necessary step before one proceeds to the other pre-conditions for 
faith.  For evidentialists, anyone can perceive that Christianity is true if they simply look 
at the relevant evidence with an open mind.  The evidentialist stresses the need to 
establish scientific, archaeological, sociological, psychological, historical, and even 
experiential evidence in any combination of ways that might be profitable in the case for 
faith.  Evidence is one of many strands in the overall web of argument.  One of the 
strengths of this method over classical apologetics is that it can use negative evidence to 
refute (or make less probable) the claims of other worldviews.  It overlaps with classical 
apologetics by using evidence, but it tends to overlook the classicalist‘s use of the prior 
philosophical framework.   
 Instead of speaking in terms of proof or demonstration, evidentialists often 
propose cumulative case and/or inductive arguments.
127
  This realistic perspective is one 
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of the strengths of evidentialism.  Most of the time arguments are counted as 
probabilistic, not conclusive.  In contrast to experientialism, evidentialists stress the 
importance of using facts.  Noted evidentialist approaches are offered by the scientist-
theologians Arthur Peacocke, Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne, John Haught and Kenneth 
R. Miller.
128
  Wolfhart Pannenberg, N.T. Wright and John Warwick Montgomery are 
contemporary representatives of historical evidentialists.
129
     
 Like classical apologetics, evidentialism suffers some crucial setbacks.  First, it 
cannot make Christianity true for any person.  It cannot show that Christianity is true for 
today.  Second, most people are suspicious of evidences for faith.  Furthermore, 
evidentialists presume that unbelievers are interested and willing to examine the evidence 
for Christ.  Moreover, the use of hard evidence (from, say, science or history) is not 
exactly the warmest way to win over the hearts of many people.   
 Classical apologists quickly point out against the evidentialist that there is no such 
thing as bare facts to be assessed.  As Norman Geisler states: ―facts and events have 
ultimate meaning only within and by virtue of the context of the world view in which 
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they are conceived.‖130  He adds: ―evidence gains its meaning only by its immediate and 
overall context; and evidence as such cannot, without begging the question, be used to 
establish the overall context by which it obtains its very meaning as evidence. . . . it is a 
vicious circle to argue that a given fact (say, the resuscitation of Christ‘s body) is 
evidence of a certain truth claim (say, Christ‘s claim to be God), unless it can be 
established that the event comes in the context of a theistic universe.‖131   
 Thus meaning is always derived from within an interpretive context.  Other 
apologists representing other defense systems rightly insist that Christian evidentialists 
must assume a theistic worldview as they provide the data in support of Christian faith.
132
  
One simply cannot argue from the data unless there is an implicit philosophical 
framework already in place.  As Sproul, Lindsey, and Gerstner explain: ―Miracles cannot 
prove God.  God, as a matter of fact, alone can prove miracles.  That is, only on the prior 
evidence that God exists is a miracle even possible.‖133                                 
 Experientialists appeal to human experiences of God and the Christian 
community.  Unlike classical apologetics and evidentialism, this apologetic system is 
practical and more personally oriented.  The experientialist is acutely aware that the 
problems which prevent individuals from embracing the Gospel are often deep and 
psychological, not just intellectual.  Apologists must confront these issues and address 
them as well.  Thus, one salient aspect to experientialism is an emphasis on human 
                                                             
 130 Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 85 
131 Ibid., 95.    
 132 W. Stanford Reid, ―Subjectivity or Objectivity,‖ in E.R. Geehan (ed.), Jerusalem and Athens: 
Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian 
and Reformed, 1993), 409. Cf. Mark M. Hanna, Crucial Questions in Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 1981), 100; Carl Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6 vol. (Waco: Word Press, 1976-1983), 
1:231.     
 133 Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, Classical Apologetics, 146.   
46 
 
holiness and the development of the entire person.  One of the strengths of 
experientialism is that it takes the limits of reason seriously.   
 Experiential approaches are numerous in contemporary Catholicism and generally 
follow the line of thought in John Henry Newman and Maurice Blondel.
134
  Postconciliar 
Catholic experientialists might include René Latourelle and Hans Urs Van Balthasar.
135
  
Although these apologists should not be considered experientialists in the strict sense of 
the word, they certainly do stress the importance of human experience over rational 
approaches to Catholic defense.  The strength of experientialism lies in its popular appeal 
and is the most common means by which most people come to faith (it is also the most 
pronounced apologetic model of the Council).  Unlike the intellectualism of classical 
apologetics and evidentialism, the stress is on the heart and lived experience within the 
community of believers.   
 Other experientialists testify to the way in which God has worked in their life to 
persuade either themselves or outsiders unto faith.  Existential experiences are also 
reported as unmediated, self-authenticating experiences of God, and they vindicate 
Christianity to those who have them.  Some experiential apologists literally depreciate the 
use of rational argument for apologetic purposes; they often scorn evidentialist and/or 
                                                             
 134 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame, 1992); Maurice Blondel, Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984); idem, The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, 
trans. Alexander Dru and Illtyd Trethowan (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995).  
135 René Latourelle, Christ and the Church: Signs of Salvation, trans. Sr. Dominic Parker (New 
York: Alba House, 1972), idem, Theology of Revelation (New York: Alba House, 1966); Hans Urs Van 
Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2005).  For other experiential approaches, see 
Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty and Art (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 1999): idem, Theology and the Arts: Encountering God Through Music, Art, and Rhetoric 
(Mahwah: Paulist, 2000); John Saward, The Beauty of Holiness and the Holiness of Beauty: Art, Sanctity, 
and the Truth of Catholicism (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1997); Thomas Dubay, The Evidential Power of 
Beauty: Science and Theology Meet (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1999); Victoria S. Harrison, The Apologetic 
Value of Human Holiness: Von Balthasar's Christocentric Philosophical Anthropology (New York: 
Springer, 2000).      
47 
 
classical apologetics.  These experientialists include Søren Kierkegaard, Rudolph 
Bultmann, and Karl Barth.  Experiential arguments can certainly be used by 
evidentialists, but the experientialist wants to use experiential arguments alone.  The 
experiential apologist is not as concerned with building a systematic, gradual case as in 
classical apologetics as much as they want to persuade others by speaking with them 
about their experiences.   
 For all of this method‘s strengths, it is necessarily shortsighted in many respects 
(and possibly harmful in others).  In and of itself, experientialism downplays the use of 
objective evidence and the propositional mode of understanding.  Though propositional 
knowledge may be a poor substitute for knowledge of God, it can still serve as a means to 
foster a personal relationship with God and others.  Without the use of propositional 
understanding, one could never adequately interpret their experience.  Hence, in the 
absence of hard evidences, experientialism (construed as an apologetic method that 
denies the validity of the other apologetic models) remains an inadequate model of 
apologetics.  Experiences are never self-authenticating, and they must be interpreted 
through some other philosophical means.   
 Experiences are often unverifiable and must be taken on faith alone by outsiders.  
In this way, the hardheaded skeptic is unlikely to be persuaded by hearing the testimony 
of believers and how they came to believe in Christianity.  Many skeptics will quickly 
dismiss the warm experience of the Church by dismissing them with naturalistic 
explanations.  Lastly, radical proponents of experientialism often overlook the primary 
sources of Christian theology (e.g., Scripture and Tradition) for the sake of their unique 
experiences.                                            
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 Protestants who are sympathetic to apologetics tend to embrace some form of 
experientialism or are presuppositional apologists (or, as described in this dissertation, 
theological apologists).  Some theological presuppositionalists include Gordon Clark, 
Carl Henry, and Cornelius Van Til.
136
  In this view one must begin with the 
presupposition of Scripture and the Church‘s teachings to expose the errors of 
Christianity‘s critics.  The assumption is that life, the universe, language, and history 
cannot make sense apart from the assumed postulate of Christianity.  Christian faith 
therefore demonstrates itself to be true because it is the only world and life view that is 
coherent and livable.  It is the only religion which embraces and incorporates the truth of 
revelation which broadens and intensifies our understanding of humanity and the world.  
These apologists argue transcendentally by showing that all meaning and human thought 
presupposes the truth of Christian faith.  As one theological presuppositionalist puts it: 
―[We] should present the biblical God, not merely as the conclusion to an argument, but 
as the one who makes argument possible.‖137   
 All the known facts must be taken into account when comparing and contrasting 
worldviews.  Since Christianity is true from the start in this view, theological 
presuppositionalists hope to find contradictions in other competing views.  And in so 
doing, they want to show the superiority of Catholicism by default.  One of the strengths 
of theological apologetics is the recognition that we must begin with presuppositions.  
There is certainly no such thing as a view from nowhere.   Some advocates of this method 
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have no problem including livability as one of the criteria for determining truth claims.  
This point nicely coalesces with experiential approaches.            
 Presuppositionalists often clash with advocates of classical apologetics, 
evidentialism, and experientialism.  Undoubtedly this has to do with the doctrine of total 
depravity which its advocates often endorse.  They accuse traditional rhetoricians for 
being too confident of what reason can demonstrate apart from the influence of divine 
revelation.  Thus presuppositionalists are a certain type of fideist and are sometimes 
unafraid to be labeled as such.  While some Catholics might think this makes 
presuppositionalism incompatible with Catholic theology, it can be utilized if understood 
in a certain way.  As Avery Dulles rightly observed: ―. . . something analogous to this 
method may be found among Catholics who follow Augustine and Anselm, speaking of 
‗faith seeking understanding‘.  Many recent and contemporary Catholic apologists take 
over from Rouselot the idea that the credibility of the Christian religion, which 
apologetics seeks to demonstrate, can be seen only from within the posture of faith. . . 
.Vatican II seems to endorse this style of argument.‖138         
 Unlike classical apologetics, which is often framed in terms of positive argument, 
presuppositionalists are limited to refuting attacks and exposing errors within these 
criticisms.  Therefore, it can only show what is false, not what is true.  The idea that 
Christianity is true by default does not seem like a convincing apologetic to those willing 
to think through the logic of this position.  As one critic of this method remarks:  ―As 
commonly understood, presuppositionalism is guilty of a logical howler; it commits the 
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informal fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, for it advocates 
presupposing the truth of Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism.‖139   
 What is more, it is difficult to know whether the dialogue partners have all the 
necessary data in order to make a proper assessment between worldviews.  How could 
one ever know whether they have all the needed evidence to make an adequate 
assessment?  Theological presuppositionalists seems to stymie intelligible discourse since 
it is presupposed that there is no common ground between its proponents and unbelievers.  
Advocates of rational apologetics supplement the use of presuppositionalism because it 
can provide common points of reference with those who do not share Catholic beliefs.
140
           
 In conclusion, we have seen that proponents of one method of apologetics can 
provide legitimate critiques of the others.  Perhaps a combinatorial approach might be a 
good candidate to replace these often isolated methods.  Vatican II endorses the 
distinctive elements of each model.  This strongly suggests that each model is inadequate 
and that a holistic approach to Catholic defense should be welcomed.  Stephen Bevans 
and Jeffrey Gross recommend that ―Scholars of the Second Vatican Council point out 
that it is not enough simply to consult any of its texts that deal directly with a specific 
theme—e.g., church, revelation, liturgy—in order to understand how that theme was 
developed by the council.  Rather, they say, one needs to see how an individual theme is 
expressed throughout all sixteen council documents.  This is particularly true in terms of 
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. . . ‗evangelization‘ or ‗mission‘ . . . because in many ways it is a theme that is at the 
heart of what the council was about.‖141   
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DOES POSTMODERN RELATIVISM DEFEAT APOLOGETICS? 
 
The traditional conception of truth as an absolute, objective, and universal 
description of reality has undergone a radical reinterpretation in the West.  Truth is no 
longer seen as a goal that all persons are obligated to know and pursue as an end in and of 
itself, but is rather understood as something completely inseparable from politics, culture, 
psychology, biology, race, and gender.  In this postmodern view of truth, reality is 
determined by individuals, not discovered by them.  As Richard Rorty puts it: ―Truth is 
made rather than found.‖142  Although it is difficult to define postmodernism, the 
movement is usually characterized by (1) the affirmation of radical and irreducible 
pluralism; (2) the rejection of unifying metaphysical or religious claims; and (3) 
suspicion toward binary categories that characterizes different regions of thought or 
ontological realities.
143
        
Negatively speaking, postmodernism is sometimes considered a type of 
relativism.  In this understanding of postmodernism, all metaphysical truths, including 
linguistic meaning, moral values, and human nature no longer have a stable meaning.  I 
will discuss some representative postmodern relativistic views in this chapter.  Since 
there is no overarching story to guide individuals with this type of relativism in the 
background, some strands of postmodernism is also characterized, in the words of Jean 
François Lyotard, by ―incredulity toward meta-narratives.‖144  The most radical 
understandings of pluralism makes it difficult to have a unified view of the world under 
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the banner of Catholic Christianity.  Some Catholic theologians seem to have absorbed 
this same understanding of truth in their reflections on divine revelation.  As Avery 
Dulles seems to suggest: ―Theology, for its part, all too often evades the challenge of 
truth.  Falling into fideism or sheer positivism, many theologians limit themselves to 
sociological, linguistic, and historical studies of the Bible and Church teaching.‖145     
As a result of the paradigmatic shift from modernism to postmodernism, the 
unifying claims of the Church can no longer be seen as true and thus binding on persons.  
So, what is sorely needed in the post-conciliar apologetics literature is a robust response 
to some of the extreme views of postmodern relativism and its impact on retrieving the 
discipline of apologetics.  A response to the relativistic mentality of postmodernism will 
also help theologians to reformulate arguments that may be more effective.    
Many apologists simply evade the question of truth, settling for other 
transcendental means of persuasion such as moral goodness.  Other apologists simply 
resort to arguments that assume that truth is correspondence with reality.  Hence, in this 
chapter I will address the challenge of anti-realism, showing its incoherence in order to 
argue for the importance of a rational or reasonable apologetics.  For it would not make 
sense for apologists to make arguments and present evidence for the faith unless the 
doctrinal positions they at least think are provable or ―more probable than not‖ are 
construed as legitimate claims to truth in the first place.     
 
The Demise of Truth 
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Professor Allan Bloom is no stranger to our current cultural malaise.  Surveying 
the landscape of higher education in the 1980s, Bloom wrote that  
There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering 
the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative.  If this belief is put to the 
test, one can count on the students‘ reaction: they will be uncomprehending. . . . The 
danger they have been taught to fear from absolutism is not error but intolerance.  
Relativism is necessary to openness; and this is the virtue, the only virtue, which all 
primary education for more than fifty years has dedicated itself to inculcating.  
Openness—and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of 
various claims to truth and various ways of life and kinds of human beings—is the great 
insight of our times. . . . The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was 
made in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, 
slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism.  The point is not to correct the mistakes 
and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all. 146 
 
Bloom‘s book has lost hardly any of its relevance in today‘s cultural milieu.  The decline 
of truth is not only occurring in the academy, it is found everywhere in popular culture.  
The denial of objective truth is usually assumed rather than argued for by the ordinary 
person.  Cheap slogans such as ―true for you, but not for me!‖ run rampant in certain 
quarters of postmodernity.      
Like most revolutions in human thinking, the emergence of postmodernism did 
not creep into Western culture overnight, but can be traced back to the fact/value split of 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
147
  He combined 
complete skepticism about metaphysical knowledge along with an overly optimistic 
outlook which held that universal, necessary (a priori) knowledge of the conditions of 
experience was possible.  This severance of fact from meaning made it easier for persons 
to be leery of truth claims, especially metaphysical claims.  Whether these claims are 
pronounced in the name of religion or not, however, objective truths are generally 
relegated with suspicion and are interpreted as expressions of subjective preference.  As 
John Caputo writes: ―Each thing has its own drive or local force—its ‗perspective‘—and 
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the world is a multiplicity of competing perspectives.  Ideas have not ‗truth‘ but ‗value,‘ 
that is, an effectiveness that is measured by their capacity to enhance life.‖148   
The Kantian divorce of fact and meaning eventually culminated in the philosophy 
of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900),
149
 a forerunner and prophet of postmodernism.  In 
his words: ―What then is truth?  A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced 
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem 
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people; truths are illusions about which one has 
forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous 
power; coins which have lost their picture and now matter only as metal, no longer as 
coins.‖150  Indeed, for Nietzsche, ―There are no facts, only interpretations.‖151  In 
reference to Nietzsche‘s denial of universals, Michel Foucault explains the origins of 
Nietzsche‘s idea: ―Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (Ursprung) . . . 
?  First, because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, . . . because this 
search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the eternal world of 
accident and succession. . . . However, . . . there is ‗something altogether different‘ 
behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no 
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essence‖ (emphasis mine).152  For Nietzsche, the universal naming of objects does not 
arise out of recognizing actual essences in reality.       
As an extension of Kant‘s distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal 
worlds, Foucault then maintained that human judgments about the world are first filtered 
through psychological, cultural and historical contingencies, leaving little room for 
metaphysics.
153
  Thus it becomes impossible to achieve knowledge of the world as it is.  
In reference to the idea that persons must refer to human nature in order to make ethical 
judgments (i.e., natural law morality), for example, Richard Rorty claims: ―there is 
nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that 
we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is 
not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our 
own conventions.‖154   
The postmodern rejection of universals also has an impact on the possibility of 
interpersonal communication.  Because words do not have corresponding referents, 
language loses its power to make definitive statements and is no longer capable of 
persuading others.  Written texts no longer refer to reality when metaphysical truths (such 
as human nature) are illusory.
155
  Some thinkers such as Ferdinand de Saussure and 
Roman Jakobsen claim that texts must be released from an objective message that readers 
can somehow discover for themselves.  Here, every text can be shown to be ambiguous.  
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The original meaning the author placed in her or his writing does not limit the reader‘s 
understanding of what is written.  Therefore, every reader imposes their own meaning 
onto the text.  In Jacques Derrida‘s words: ―Those who wish to ground solidarity in 
objectivity . . . have to construe truth as correspondence to reality. . . . By contrast, those 
who wish to reduce objectivity to solidarity . . . view truth as, in William James' phrase, 
what is good for us to believe.  So they do not need an account of a relation between 
beliefs and objects called ‗correspondence‘.‖156    
The second principal way that postmodernists have attacked the nature and 
knowability of truth is derived from yet another angle of Nietzsche‘s philosophy.  Truth 
is not correspondence with reality, but is reduced to the function of power 
relationships.
157
  By suppressing the weak in society, the powerful exert their voice over 
the weak to guarantee that their voice will be heard to influence the world.  In this 
perspective, truth is seen as that which favors the powerful.  As Foucault once said: ―I 
think that, instead of trying to find out what truth, as opposed to error, it might be more 
interesting to take up the program posed by Nietzsche: how is it that, in our societies, ―the 
truth‖ has been given this value, thus placing us absolutely under its thrall.‖158   
One of the negative impacts of postmodernism is that human understanding is so 
conditioned by historical and cultural contingencies that it becomes impossible of 
knowing objective truths.  Not all postmodern philosophies are hostile to Christian truth 
claims.  Other postmodernists contend that truth is the product of the human drive for 
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power, not reality as such.  No matter which conception is proffered, both of them are 
relevant for Catholics because it undermines the idea that Christianity is true for 
everyone, independently if anyone‘s belief in it.  And if Christianity is not true, then why 
should believers seek to evangelize others (and not proselytize!) to believe in it?  The 
denial of objective truth therefore undercuts the impetus for participating in the Great 
Commission.  What means of persuasion could be given if Christianity is merely one of 
many opinions in the marketplace of ideas?  Of course, the negative side to 
postmodernism militates against rational apologetics, whose practitioners firmly believe 
that the principal reason why anyone should believe in Christianity is because it is true 
for everyone.             
 
 
Postmodern Relativism and the Need for Apologetics 
 Traditionally Catholic apologists assumed that truth is objective, exclusive, and 
absolute.  The knowability of objective truth was not a concern for them.  Rather, they 
began with establishing God‘s existence, the human need for God, and then they argued 
for the historical credibility for Jesus‘ divinity.  All of this culminated in an assessment of 
which Church best fits the four attributes of the Church (i.e., one, holy, catholic, and 
apostolic).
159
  This step-by-step method made good sense, for it did not seem reasonable 
for doubters of the faith to believe that Jesus is the Son of God unless there is a God who 
can have a Son who can institute a certain type of Church.   
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Older apologetical methods were often accompanied by a faulty epistemological 
outlook (Enlightenment rationalism), the situation in apologetic methodology must 
change today.  For the burning issue today is whether anything is objectively true, let 
alone that it can be known as such.  According to Pope Benedict XVI: ―Relativism has 
thus become the central problem for the faith at the present time. . . . The faith cannot be 
liberated if reason itself does not open up again.  If the door to metaphysical cognition 
remains closed, if the limits of human knowledge set by Kant are impassable, faith is 
destined to atrophy: It simply lacks air to breathe.‖160  A refurbished method of classical 
apologetics must not only evade the older epistemological error commonly known as 
―evidentialism,‖ it must also begin with the nature of truth, for apologetical arguments 
and other related evidence assumes the knowability of first principles. 
While many forms of postconciliar apologetics have appealed to beauty or 
goodness as a means of persuasion,
161
 these should not become an exclusive means for 
the apologist.  Emphasizing truth without beauty and goodness can lead to dogmatism 
(which was part of the problem with pre-conciliar classical apologetics).  An approach 
that appeals to beauty at the expense of the other transcendentals can lead to hedonism.  
And goodness without truth and beauty can lead to legalism.  Thus, what is sorely needed 
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is an emphasis that provides evidence which leads to all the transcendentals, not one over 
the others.  For all the transcendentals are formal descriptions of God himself.
162
   
Other approaches can and must complement the rational approach.  In reaction to 
neo-scholasticism, then, which was heavily concerned with the truth of Christian faith, 
theologians must now emphasize the beauty, goodness, truth, and relationality of the 
Godhead.  When individuals stress truth at the expense of other transcendentals, then this 
can lead persons down the path of rationalism which can make one combative, 
triumphalistic, and, in the worst case scenario, atheistic.  But then again, this should not 
become an excuse to give up on truth.  As one noteworthy commentator states: ―although 
Aquinas says that the Five Ways are arguments for the existence of God, they are not 
intended as an exhaustive defense of belief in God‘s existence.‖163    
Because the surrounding context must be taken into consideration when doing 
apologetics,
164
 some occasions are simply not conducive to engaging in rational 
apologetics, (which relies on the mind and the proper use of evidence).  But when the 
opportunity arises for such an interaction, the first place to begin might be with the nature 
and knowability of truth, especially if one‘s dialogue partner is skeptical of objective 
truth in the first place.  The success of the evidence for Jesus of Nazareth and the positive 
influence that Christianity has had upon the world all depend on the logical precondition 
of God‘s existence.  The arguments for God‘s existence all depend on first principles 
such as the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, and the law of the excluded 
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middle.
165
  And it is precisely the first principles of knowledge that postmodern relativists 
argue against. 
 On the contemporary scene, many Catholic apologetics publications do not touch 
upon the need for rational apologetics.  Undoubtedly one of the best published works in 
the apologetics literature is René Latourelle‘s Christ and the Church: Signs of 
Salvation.
166
  Latourelle takes great pains to stress the importance of the evidential power 
of human holiness.   
But it must be stressed that if one is holy, then they will use every means to reach 
unbelievers, not just ways that exclude the mind and verbal persuasion.  Holiness may be 
more than rational, but is certainly not less than rational.  Conversely, if one uses rational 
argument, then this can become a means by which one is sanctified.  Latourelle paints 
with beautiful, broad strokes in his otherwise excellent book by emphasizing the 
importance of holiness without elaborating too much further upon the need for rational 
apologetics.  Of course, rational apologetics is not always needed, and is dependent on 
the context of the discussion.
167
  Therefore correct readings of Vatican II will include the 
use of rational apologetics, but go beyond it as well.   
                                                             
 165 The following list of first principles might be set forth: (1) Being is (B is); this is known as the 
principle of existence. (2) Being is being (B is B); this principle can be called the principle of identity. (3) 
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Theologians such as Hans urs Van Balthasar contend that love must serve as the 
primary means of apologetic persuasion.
168
  As in the case with Latourelle, there is 
something right about this contention.  But, if one loves, then appeal can and should be 
made to reason (especially if the context and/or dialogue allows for it).  Like the other 
transcendentals, an apologetics of love simply cannot replace the enterprise of rational 
apologetics.  Love includes the use of verbal discussion and argument when the 
circumstances allow for it.   
Of course, not every published work in the post-conciliar era has appealed to 
beauty or goodness.  Every so often a good work of Catholic rational apologetics can be 
found.
169
  Benedict Ashley‘s Choosing a World-View and Value System: An Ecumenical 
Apologetics
170
 is one of the few published works in the mainstream which is unafraid to 
engage central issues of credibility with reason and hard evidence.  Like these other 
works in rational apologetics (e.g., works by Hugo Meynell, John Martinelli and Richard 
Purtill), Ashley successfully avoids the pitfalls of Enlightenment rationalism, comparing 
and contrasting different conceptions of deity.  Unfortunately, however, there is no 
engagement with first principles which make the project of natural theology and the 
demonstratio christiana coherent and thus reasonable to engage in.  Correlatively, there is 
no substantial engagement with postmodern relativism in these works.  Undoubtedly one 
of the main reasons why individuals under the influence of postmodernism will resist 
                                                             
168 Hans Urs Van Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2005).   
169 Other post-conciliar works in rational apologetics include Hugo A. Meynell, God and the 
World (London: SPCK, 1971); idem, Is Christianity True? (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of 
America, 1994); John Martinelli, Reasons to Believe Today (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1996); 
Richard R. Purtill, Reason to Believe: Why Faith Makes Sense (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2009).     
 170 Benedict Ashley, Choosing a World-View and Value System: An Ecumenical Apologetics (New 
York: Alba House, 2000). 
63 
 
these books is that there is no such thing as objective truth, let alone that it could be 
known as such.   
Perhaps a more dominant tradition of rational apologetics after Vatican II has 
come from the school of Thomism known as the ―Transcendental Thomists.‖171  Even so, 
neither do these theologians see an urgent need to explicate and defend the nature and 
knowability of truth for the purposes of reinvigorating the discipline of apologetics.  A 
great reference work is the Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, which has dozens of 
very fine articles on issues of credibility.
172
  Yet hardly any of the contributors discuss the 
postmodern critique and the ramifications this has on Catholic apologetics and/or 
evangelization.  Avery Dulles‘ standard work on the history of apologetics barely 
mentions the influence of rational apologetics in Catholic circles after Vatican II.
173
  
Though he commends a handful of lay apologists for their enthusiasm in using evidence 
for faith, Catholics scholars working in the mainstream have yet to make their presence 
felt.   
Because the primary lens through which many individuals interpret the world is 
relativistic, apologists can and should begin with truth.  Still many theologians resist 
anything that resembles a reasoned defense of the faith, claiming that it smacks of 
modernism where the canons of reason are upheld at the expense of other forms of 
knowing.  But I believe this is a serious misreading of Enlightenment rationalism and its 
relationship to rational apologetics.  To this we must now turn.      
                                                             
 171 Richard Viladesau, The Reason for Our Hope: A Theological Anthropology (New York: 
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Rational Apologetics and Enlightenment Rationalism 
 Cartesian foundationalism (which emanates from the philosophy of René 
Descartes, 1596-1650) is an epistemological outlook which insists that unless knowledge 
is self-evident or incorrigible, one does not have true knowledge.  As a reaction to 
modernism, postmodernists have dealt a heavy blow to Descartes‘ version of 
foundationalism.  The latter is self-refuting.  As a result, his epistemological theory has 
been almost universally rejected by philosophers.   
But this does not mean all foundationalisms are incoherent.  While the 
postmodern critique has been widely accepted, it does not successfully apply to modified 
versions of foundationalism which have been gaining in momentum since the mid-
1970‘s.  These versions are more modest, making it difficult for the postmodernist 
critique to succeed.  As philosopher Tim Triplett recognizes: ―It is not clear that the 
standard arguments against foundationalism will work against these newer, more modest 
theories.  Indeed, these theories were by and large designed with the purpose of 
overcoming standard objections.‖174  Indeed, without some version of foundationalism, 
the common ground that is needed for effective communication would be lost.  As Pope 
John Paul II declared:      
Although times change and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a core of 
philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider, for example, the 
principles of non-contradiction, finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person 
as a free and intelligent subject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness. 
Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are 
among the indications that, beyond different schools of thought, there exists a body of 
knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity. It is as if we 
had come upon an implicit philosophy, as a result of which all feel that they possess these 
principles, albeit in a general and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some 
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measure by all, this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the different 
philosophical schools. Once reason successfully intuits and formulates the first universal 
principles of being and correctly draws from them conclusions which are coherent both 
logically and ethically, then it may be called right reason or, as the ancients called it, 
orthós logos, recta ratio.175                    
     
Like Cartesian foundationalism, the Pope maintains that some principles are universally 
applicable to human knowers and are inherent to reality itself.  Otherwise, nothing could 
be known by anyone at any time or place.  First principles are either undeniable or are 
reducible to the undeniable.
176
  According to philosophical proponents of 
foundationalism, nothing at all could be known with first principles.  Unlike Cartesian 
foundationalism, however, epistemological foundations in the modified version are 
necessary for knowledge, but they are not totally absolute.  Let us call this modified 
version ―soft foundationalism,‖ or ―fallibilist foundationalism.‖  This difference is the 
first way in which fallibilism differs from classical foundationalism.  Thus the kind of 
foundationalism that is necessary for Catholic apologists to understand, articulate and 
defend does not have to be Cartesian.  Rather, a modified version can be defended—one 
that may be defended from the postmodern critique.   
The self-evident principles of foundationalism are true by their very nature.
177
  To 
deny them one must engage in self-stultifying statements.  In a sense, then, individuals 
must use them.
178
  Consequently, one of the increasingly evident objections to anti-realist 
views of truth is the problem of auto-referentiality: the incapability of postmodern 
relativism to apply its own tenets to its own conceptions of truth.  According to Catholic 
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philosophies which endorse soft versions of foundationalism, first principles are intrinsic 
to the nature of God (the first universal) and each person, all of which have been created 
in the image of God (second universal).  Other modes of understanding (ones that are not 
on the same foundational level as first principles) are not known with logical certainty, 
but are still held with certainty on a more tentative level.   
The second principal argument for first principles is that there must be an ultimate 
basis for truth claims, otherwise there would be an infinite regress of reasons for 
justifying knowledge (which is impossible).
179
  Thirdly, unlike classical foundationalism, 
the relationship between secondary propositions (i.e., propositions that are known with 
less certainty than indubitable first principles
180
) and indubitable first principles is an 
inductive one, not a deductive one.  Secondary propositions are somehow derived from 
these other first principles, but they are not derived deductively from them.  So the 
problem with classical foundationalism did not consist in its endorsement of first 
principles, but in its restrained definition of what could count as a first principle.  Soft 
versions of foundationalism acknowledge that first principles exceed what reason can 
discover.  
In Cartesian foundationalism, knowledge must be reduced to self-evident or 
incorrigible beliefs.  Under fallibilism, human experience (e.g., beliefs related to memory 
and sense perception), and even faith in the Christian God can count as true knowledge.  
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Within these parameters, modified versions allow for the possibility that persons can err 
and misinterpret what is at least thought to be true in the process of acquiring knowledge.   
Even from the standpoint of faith, then, a type of fallibilism can be practiced.  
Take the Chalcedonian definition on the two natures of Christ.  One can be certain 
through faith that Christ is true God and true man, but there would still be room for 
additional exploration and more intense understandings of the incarnation within the 
parameters officially set by Chalcedon.  As Walter Kasper explains, ―Revelation is 
‗supra-rational,‘ not irrational or antirational.  It represents the enrichment of reason, not 
a spurning or constriction of it.‖181  For every kataphatic statement of theology, there is a 
corresponding apophatic element.  From the standpoint of the apologist, the evidence and 
arguments for faith can never be logically certain (though first principles and what they 
can demonstrate is actually undeniable), but is more probabilistic and thus tentative in 
nature.  Beginning from the ―ground up,‖ apologists begin with first principles; beginning 
from the ―top down,‖ they seek resonance with what is already believed about revelation.            
Some postmodernists present their views not as mere expressions of feeling, but 
as viewpoints that their readers will comprehend and accept what they have to say.  They 
also hold that their viewpoints are preferable to competing positions, and that there are 
correct and incorrect interpretations of their positions.  As a case in point, Derrida 
smuggled in a realist conception of truth when he made it evident that one of his 
detractors misunderstood what he was saying (in a long, ninety-three page article!).
182
            
                                                             
 181 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O‘Connell (New York: Crossroad, 
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Understanding the shift from classical foundationalism to fallibilism is hugely 
important for reinstating the use of rational apologetics in a post-conciliar Church.  The 
history of apologetics strongly suggests that when apologists absorb Cartesian 
foundationalism (and its direct corollary, evidentialism), it becomes easy for atheism to 
follow shortly thereafter.  For it was not until Descartes and Kant that the rational 
arguments for God‘s existence became the foundation upon which theologians sought to 
show the credibility of Christianity.  The upshot of this development was that theologians 
began to think of religion primarily in terms of reason alone.  The effect of their approach 
was that revelation became relegated to a lower, less important role.  Deism flourished, 
and then atheism followed shortly thereafter.
183
  As Michael Buckley explains: ―the 
strategies of theism or religious apologetics in early modernity had led theologians to 
bracket whatever was of specific religious character or warrant and to rely upon the new 
and prospering sciences for ‗the first foundations of religion.‘  The implicit but 
unrecognized premise in such a strategy, building upon the new mechanics, was that the 
uniquely religious―in all of its experiential, traditional, institutional, and social 
forms―was cognitively empty.‖184  The truths of the faith should never be seen as a 
stepping stone building on top of the conclusions of reason.  That procedure would be 
guilty of the evidentialist challenge.   
According to evidentialists, beliefs are rational if and only if one has reasons to 
ground one‘s belief.  As W. K. Clifford memorably put it: ―It is wrong always, 
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everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.‖185  Thus 
one should not believe in God or in Christianity unless one has good reasons to believe in 
it.  But the Church insists that although one might have evidence to make faith 
reasonable, such evidence is not necessary for all believers to have ready in defense of 
the faith.
186
  Only those believers endowed with certain virtues and/or callings are called 
to do rational apologetics.  Instead, the ground upon which our faith rests is found in 
God‘s revelation to humanity.   
As the Catechism of the Catholic Church plainly states: ―What moves us to 
believe is not the fact that revealed truths appear as true and intelligible in the light of our 
natural reason: we believe ‗because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, 
who can neither deceive nor be deceived‘.‖187  The bishops add: ―Faith is certain. It is 
more certain than all human knowledge because it is founded on the very word of God 
who cannot lie.‖188  Therefore, arguments may help to confirm one‘s belief in 
Christianity, and it may serve as a means of providing signs to unbelievers, but the 
arguments themselves do not constitute the ground upon which faith stands (or falls).  
Believing in Christ provides one with certainty of the truth of Christianity, but the 
reasons for this faith has more of a provisional character.  Aquinas holds that Catholic 
faith can be known with as much certainty as first principles such as the law of non-
contradiction!
189
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 Aware of the dangers of evidentialism, some theologians seem to be unaware of 
the distinction between the classical and modified versions of foundationalism, and they 
prematurely reject the enterprise of rational apologetics altogether.  For them, it is 
reminiscent of the parasitical origins of atheism upon the apologist‘s attempts to defend 
Christianity.  Accepting the widespread rejection of classical foundationalism, some of 
these theologians obviously do not recognize that fallibilist foundationalism is defensible, 
and that it includes first principles.       
So, it is one thing to say there is such a thing as objective truth (which is possible 
because of first principles).  But it is quite another to maintain that fallible human 
knowers can understand the truth absolutely (we are therefore endorsing a critical realism 
within the parameters set by fallibilist foundationalism, not a naïve realism on the one 
hand or an  epistemological skepticism on the other).  As Alister McGrath explains:  
. . . these conclusions must be treated with caution.  While there is a proper place for a 
critique of the Enlightenment‘s unrealistic aspirations to total objectivity of judgment, 
postmodernity must be seen as representing an ultimately indefensible alternative.  A 
critical attitude to the Enlightenment on this specific issue does not lead to the 
problematic conclusion that no degree of objectivity is possible at all, so that all beliefs or 
interpretations can be held with equal merit.  The proper response to the Enlightenment‘s 
unrealistic aspirations to objectivity is not to abandon any attempt at critical evaluation of 
interpretive possibilities, but to encourage a realistic and cautious attempt to determine 
which of the various interpretations of nature may be regarded as the ‗best explanation,‘ 
as judged by criteria such as parsimony, elegance, or explanatory power.190            
     
First principles are not restricted to self-evident or incorrigible truths.  They can be 
derived from history, culture, and other social contingencies, providing individuals with 
true understandings of the world.    
 Critiquing a method of discovering the truth is surely a different enterprise from 
defining what truth is.  Thus the Cartesian epistemological tradition had it right when 
they understood truth as correspondence with reality―universal, objective, absolute, and 
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exclusive.  The nature of truth had been accepted from the time of Plato and Aristotle and 
was not new at the time of the Enlightenment.  Where Descartes may have erred was in 
the idea that knowing the truth must be relegated to reason alone.  For there is a 
significant difference between the nature of truth and the means that are used to discover 
it.  Catholics can agree with the entire previous western philosophical tradition with 
respect to the nature of truth, not with the latter which emanated from Descartes.  Our 
knowledge of the truth (an  epistemological issue) is influenced by culture, biology, 
political environment, upbringing, economics, gender, and so on, not whether truth itself 
(a metaphysical reality) is absolute, universal, objective, exclusive, eternally engaging, 
systematic, and one.    
  
Postmodernism and the Prospects for Apologetics 
The Thomistic arguments for God‘s existence all depend on first principles.191  If 
the Council Fathers at Vatican I had Aquinas‘s proofs for God‘s existence in mind,192 
then it would not mean that classical foundationalism was being upheld by the Church.  
Rather, it means that a certain type of foundationalism was seen as valid.  What the 
Council must be saying, in one way or another, is that some knowledge is universally 
known.  Certainty in scholastic terminology allows for different degrees of conviction: 
logical certainty, moral certainty, virtual certainty, and so on.
193
  ―As a lifelong student of 
Aristotle,‖ Ralph McInerney urges, ―Thomas was convinced that there are sound and 
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cogent proofs of God‘s existence. For Thomas, natural theology is not a possibility. It is a 
fact. It is the achievement of pagan philosophy. Ab esse ad posse valet illatio.‖194  Thus 
Aquinas‘s proofs capture an undeniable existential insight (nothing less, and nothing 
more).  With fallibilist foundationalism in mind, Catholic apologists now might argue 
that any worldview that contradicts the fundamental claims of Church cannot be true (and 
so should be rejected).   
Representatives of anti-apologism may retort: ―Only the Holy Spirit will bring 
unbelievers to Christ, not human arguments.‖  Now all of this is certainly true, but a 
couple of things must be kept in mind.  First, the Spirit can work through humans who 
use arguments for evangelical purposes.  It is not an either-or approach.  It is not the Holy 
Spirit or human reason.  It can be both.  A rational God can use people to reach those 
who need evidence to believe in something.  One can bring a horse to water, but no one 
can make him drink except by surrendering to the Spirit.  God can work through the 
intellect to lend credibility to the decision of faith.  And anything less would be fideistic.  
In the words of Brian Hebblethwaite,  
it is surely a mistake to regard the logic of theological rationality as something wholly 
internal to the perspective of faith.  Torrence, and Barth too, are entirely persuasive in 
their insistence on theological rationality being responsive to the unique nature of 
theology‘s object.  But the supposition that theological thinking has its own logic only 
available within the relation of grace and faith, has the same effect on Lonergan‘s 
insistence on conversion.  It makes theology, natural or revealed, undiscussable, immune 
to criticism, and unsusceptible of being pondered hypothetically. 195   
Many theologians are correct when they claim that faith has its own unique 
rationality that is unavailable to unbelievers.  But this would not mean that theological 
claims should not be evaluated by Christians and their opponents.  Nobody believes in 
anything unless they know that it is first believable.  Faith, to be sure, is not a blind leap 
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in the dark without evidence.  Neither will evidence demand faith, for unbelievers will 
always come up with different excuses as to why the Catholic faith is false or irrelevant.  
When considering the relevant reasons for faith, apologists must never give the 
impression that faith is based on the conclusions of reason.  Rather, the Christian faith is 
based on the saving work of Jesus Christ.  Faith, however, can be supported and 
reinforced by reason.      
As a result of the modification from classical to fallibilist foundationalism, 
Catholic apologists will now have to resort, for the most part, to a cumulative case for 
Catholic faith, not apodictic demonstration (though God‘s existence can still be proven in 
the non-mathematical sense of the term if one is Thomistic in their philosophy).  Apart 
from the preambula fidei, apologists work with probabilistic arguments in support of 
Christianity, which is predicated upon marshalling the best evidence we currently have 
in, say, science, history and philosophy.  Though apologists argue for the plausibility of 
Catholic doctrines, they cannot defend these as objectively true unless they are willing to 
presuppose first principles which are not limited or relative to cultural, historical, or other 
social contingencies in the first place.
196
  Unless first principles exist and can be known 
by all, the Catholic world and life view would remain insulated and we must then resort 
to fideism which holds that there is no reason why anyone should believe in anything at 
all.   
Christian doctrine can be seen as an explanatory hypothesis that accounts for a 
wide variety of features, including history, the cosmos, and the nature of humanity.  
Christian scholars are now beginning to utilize newer approach to apologetics in contrast 
to the evidentialist challenge.  As a reaction to modernism, postmodernism accords well 
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with the provisional nature of knowledge advanced by fallibilism.  John Polkinghorne 
holds that believers can retain their presuppositions when comparing and contrasting their 
views with other competing claims.  The final assessment is predicated on whose 
Weltanschauung resonates and makes the most sense out of the agreed upon evidence.
197
   
Though there is no consensus on which criteria should be used, apologists can 
learn from professional scientists who are used to evaluating their theories through 
multiple lines of criteria.
198
  George Ellis argues that scientific theories are assessed in 
light of four standards: simplicity, beauty, accuracy in prediction and verifiability, and 
explanatory power―a capacity for giving the most adequate account of problematic 
data.
199
  Philosopher of science Ernan McMullin offers six criteria: predictive accuracy, 
internal coherence, external consistency, unifying power, fertility, and simplicity.
200
  
Other notable scientists, such as Howard J. Van Till, Ian Barbour, and Francisco Ayala, 
offer another distinctive set of criteria to test their scientific theories.
201
  
 
In Defense of a Primitive Correspondence Theory of Truth 
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Until the middle of the nineteenth century almost every mainstream philosopher 
in the West held to some form of the correspondence theory of truth.  In the 
correspondence view (or, as others might call it, a ―realist conception of truth‖), minds 
are either knowing or ignorant; propositions are either true or false; and reality is either 
real or imaginary.  Truth pertains to those properties of a proposition which refers to 
reality.
202
  So when a proposition (i.e., a belief, thought, statement, or any other mode of 
representation) accurately represents reality, then the proposition is said to be true.  When 
the proposition does not correspond to reality, then the proposition is said to be false (or, 
depending on the content of the proposition, it may be partially true or false).  When a 
mind assents to a true proposition, then the person is said to have knowledge of the truth.   
A proposition, moreover, needs to be distinguished from a sentence.  A 
proposition is what a sentence either affirms or denies.  Another way to understand this is 
that a proposition is what a sentence means.  Questions, imperatives, exclamations, 
requests, and entreaties are not propositions, but presuppose the truth of at least one 
proposition which successfully refers to reality.  For example, the imperative command, 
―do not allow abortions!,‖ is not a proposition as such, but presupposes the proposition 
that ―abortion is wrong.‖  The proposition ―abortion is wrong‖ corresponds to the reality 
of the moral realm.   
Propositions, moreover, can be controversial, trivial, obscure, frightening, or 
comforting.  Yet none of these features of propositions would refute a primitive 
correspondence theory of truth.  Although the significance or subjective effect of a 
proposition might be person relative, this would not mean the truth or falsity of the 
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proposition (or the correspondence theory itself) should be cast into doubt.  Hence, the 
nature of a proposition needs to be distinguished from the effects it has on persons.  
God‘s revelation is propositional, but it comes to persons in various forms, and it has 
many different effects on individuals and/or communities.  Thus the purpose of the 
propositional model is to ensure that one Mind is communicating with human minds.  
Without a propositional view, the cognitive content that is necessary for interpersonal 
communication is rendered impossible.   
Similarly, a proposition is not the same thing as a perspective.  Everyone has 
perspectives about what they think is the truth.  Perspectives can be biased, prejudiced, 
ignorant, and uninformed, but this is not the same thing as saying that truth itself is 
relative.  Rather, a perspective is always a perspective on or about something, or 
someone, independent and outside of the percipient‘s viewpoint.  Perspectives are either 
successful or unsuccessful in their attempt to capture reality.  Taken to the extreme, 
perspectivalism is self-stultifying, for it assumes that perspectivalism is true—and that all 
other views in competition with it must be false.  Hence truth must be distinguished from 
what is true, how one arrives at the truth, and the effects that truth has on persons.  In no 
way is metaphysical objectivity incompatible with epistemological subjectivity.  Our 
epistemological thrust toward the truth is loaded with all sorts of factors which influence 
us as limited knowers—level of intelligence, background beliefs, education, gender, 
motivation, personal interests, upbringing, genetics, etc.                                             
All true propositions have a few common characteristics.  First, truth is exclusive 
and antithetical.  For every article of faith that is pronounced as true, any other viewpoint 
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which is in opposition to it will necessarily be false.  In this way, truth is, by definition, 
antithetical.  Anything that opposes the truth is incorrect.  Moreover, truth is specific.   
The Council expresses this concern from a theological standpoint about doctrine 
in Gaudium et Spes 21 and Dei Verbum 1.  Truth, moreover, is absolute (truth applies to 
everyone, at all times and everywhere) and objective (if something is true then it is true 
for everyone regardless if anyone believes in it or knows it or not).  Not to be overlooked, 
truth is also eternally engaging (it can never be exhausted).  Truth is unified and 
systematic (truth is one; truth will never contradict another truth).  It is always an end in 
and of itself; it is never a mere means to an end.   
There are at least two positive arguments in support of a primitive correspondence 
view of truth.  First, the theory has commonsense appeal.  Before one comes to the 
philosophical task of understanding the world, one already has a common-sense notion of 
what truth is.  At least one form of the correspondence theory of truth seems to capture 
both common-sense appeal.  Therefore its pre-analytic justification gives individuals 
something with which to start.  When most people speak of truth, they are usually 
referring to ―what is the case.‖  Second, those who endorse arguments against the 
correspondence theory seem to presuppose it in their presentations.  In short, the 
correspondence theory of truth seems rationally inescapable.  To say that ―truth does not 
correspond to reality‖ one must implicitly hold that this describes a true state of affairs.    
Aquinas, for instance, holds that there is no disjunction between the rational and 
the real.  Aquinas is a realist.  First principles, in Aquinas‘ view, are both metaphysical 
and epistemological.  Thus individuals have no choice but to use them.   Because 
Catholic theology holds that human beings are made in the image of God, it recognizes 
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that knowledge is possible (i.e., one Timeless Mind is capable of creating other minds; 
the Timeless Mind is also capable of communicating--and guaranteeing that 
communication takes place--with those other minds).  How does the apologist know 
truth?  Because the Catholic apologist begins with the lived experience of Catholic truth, 
she or he is allowed to know truth in a way that is not possible without the influence of 
God‘s grace. 
 If someone holds to the correspondence theory of truth and claims to believe in 
Jesus Christ, this would not mean that she has unlimited or perfect knowledge of God (or 
any other doctrine believed by Christians).  For every kataphatic statement of theology 
there is an apophatic element.  Hence, to deny that absolute truth can be known not only 
gets something wrong about philosophy, but it also gets something wrong about the 
nature of faith.  Having faith does not stretch the shape of truth in a direction that is 
unnatural to reason, but strengthens and clarifies what persons naturally desire to know.  
Advocates of critical realism recognize that we are always in the process of trying to 
achieve a truer perspective about the truth.  Nor would belief in the universal lordship of 
Jesus Christ entail that we can prove the truth of the Catholic Church to anyone at will.  
Mentioned earlier, verifying Christian faith and positing it as the truth are two very 
different things.  When someone believes in the absolute truth of Christianity, this would 
not preclude one from participating in the give and take of argument and evidence both 
for and against faith.  For genuine respect for the mystery of faith will seek to understand 
more fully that which is believed.  Of course, the process of trying to understand the faith 
will include vigorous intellectual striving and therefore be an attempt to reach people 
with good arguments for the Gospel.  Nor would the belief that Catholicism is true mean 
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that everything that we believe as Catholics must be held definitively or that we are 
always inerrant in our understanding of the truth.                        
 
Addressing Critics 
In this section we are going to address arguments against a primitive 
correspondence theory of truth from within the standpoint of philosophical theology.  The 
reason for addressing these objections is that they are often used to undercut the need for 
rational apologetics.        
The first objection is that the correspondence theory is not found in the Bible or in 
Church teaching.  Now, it has never been the primary intention of the Church to 
enunciate a particular theory of truth.  When the Church pronounces on certain 
theological matters, she assumes that her doctrines are true.  This does not mean that the 
Scriptural writers did not unthematically presuppose the soundness of a particular theory 
of truth (namely, truth as correspondence with reality).
203
  The biblical terms for truth are 
emet and aletheia.  Though these terms are broadly understood and multifaceted, the 
biblical writers assumed that the actions they referred to when using these terms were 
actions of reality: faithfulness, or rectitude, etc.  Clearly, the Scriptural writers assumed 
that what they were saying in regard to salvation depended upon metaphysical realities 
and held to other similar assumptions.
204
  As one commentator puts it: ―In tradition, in 
addition to the use of the notion of truth derived from Greek philosophy [i.e., truth as 
correspondence], we find in some of the fathers and in the liturgy a resumption and 
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development of the biblical conception of truth, but sometimes with a stronger emphasis 
on its doctrinal aspect.  Generally speaking, truth designates the Christian faith, i.e., the 
divine revelation as it has been handed down in the church.‖205      
The next objection is that the correspondence theory is unable to account for the 
mysteries of faith.  These objectors are often influenced by Eastern religious thought.  In 
this view, all religions are seen as inadequate pointers to what is ultimately inexpressible.  
This ultimate mystery exceeds the use of human logic.   
The project of rational apologetics will certainly be undercut if believers are 
unable to give a reason for their hope.  There might as well be no apologetic mandate at 
all if God cannot be spoken of.  For there would be no common points of contact with 
persons who do not share our common faith convictions.  And if there are no common 
points of contact with doubters and outsiders, then how could anyone be held accountable 
for rejecting the Christian God?  
Christians must learn how to understand the incomprehensibility of God in such a 
way that still preserves some knowledge of the divine.  It is not under dispute that 
Catholic truth is deeper than conceptual and linguistic categories of speech.  Truth is 
more than rational; it is personal, moral, dynamic, and life changing.  There is always 
room to explore the fullness of truth even more fully.  Just because there is absolute truth, 
this would not mean that our understanding of it is absolute.  Although truth goes above 
reason, it is definitely not irrational.  There is a sense in which the ―otherness‖ of God 
evades both cognitive and linguistic categories, but this would not mean all language is 
incapable of adequately referring to God.  One cannot say that language does not apply to 
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God unless one is capable of successfully applying certain concepts to God in the first 
place.  Take the statement ―no linguistic categories or conceptions can apply 
meaningfully to God.‖  One would have to know something meaningful about God in 
order to know that ‗nothing‘ linguistic or conceptual applies to him; theologians cannot 
know what God is not unless one already knows what God is.
206
   
To say God is not a creature, one must have some previous understanding of God.  
Thus, one must know something about the term ‗God‘ in order to employ the via 
negativa.  Otherwise one could not distinguish God from created entities.  Thus the issue 
is not whether we can apply certain concepts to God, but how we pour meaning into those 
concepts.  The way meaning is poured into these concepts has traditionally been negative.   
Some postmodernists might respond by noting that first principles are merely 
expressions of Aristotelian logic―constructions of Western thought which are not 
applicable to other times and cultures (or religious understanding).  Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith is representative of this outlook: ―Modern Western logic, I myself am pretty sure, 
though serviceable for computers, is in other ways inept and is particularly ill-suited, it 
seems, for thinking about spiritual matters.‖207  Not only does Smith smuggle in an 
―objection from mystery‖ (objection 2) here, but he also challenges the universality of 
first principles by affirming that they are conditioned.  
A few things could be said in response to this.  Smith seems to be confusing the 
nature of propositions with the linguistic style and/or thought patterns used to express a 
proposition.  According to philosophers William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland:  
In his Summa Theologiae, Thomas used a literary style in which his prose explicitly 
follows strict logical form and syllogistic presentation.  By contrast, an isolated culture in 
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the mountains of Brazil may use a poetic form of oral tradition, their sentences may not 
follow an explicit, tidy subject-predicate form, and they may reach tribal conclusions in 
ways quite foreign to Western culture.  But none of this has anything to do with the deep 
logical structure that underlies their claims or with the conformance of their individual 
assertions to the three laws of logic, and it is simply a mistake to think otherwise.  We 
invite the reader to present any declarative utterance in any culture, including the 
assertion that ‗Western logic,‘ is culturally relative, that does not conform to Aristotle‘s 
three laws of logic.  Any such assertion, to the degree that it is meaningful or asserted as 
true or false, will conform to the three laws of logic.  Any alleged counterexample will 
either be self-refuting or meaningless.  After all, Aristotle did not invent these laws any 
more than Columbus invented the New World.  Aristotle may have been a Western 
thinker and he may have discovered these laws, but that does not imply that the laws 
themselves are Western constructions.208   
 
Thus, there is a difference between cultural expressions and the underlying logic which 
undergirds every person‘s thinking.209  Mentioned earlier, a proposition is not the same 
thing as a sentence.  John Searle points out: ―From the fact that a description can only be 
made relative to a set of linguistic categories, it does not follow that the facts/states of 
affairs, etc., described can only exist relative to a set of categories.‖210  The relativity of 
sentences would not count as a refutation of the correspondence theory.  How our 
language applies terms is often relative, but this would not mean that some other theory 
of truth should be preferred over the correspondence theory.  Says Searle: ―We arbitrarily 
define the word ‗cat‘ in such and such a way; and only relative to such and such 
definitions can we say, ‗That‘s a cat.‘  But once we have made the definitions and once 
we have applied the concepts relative to the system of definitions, whether or not 
something satisfies our definition is no longer arbitrary or relative.  That we use the word 
‗cat‘ the way we do is up to us; that there is an object that exists independently of that 
use, and satisfies that use, is a plain matter of (absolute, intrinsic, mind independent) 
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fact.‖211  In effect, the idea that the relative selection of terms should prevent persons 
from saying that anything can be objectively true makes no more sense than saying that 
one cannot satisfy their craving for a dessert because there are many kinds of desserts.   
A rejection of the correspondence theory is certainly no substitute for actually 
refuting it.    Saying that ―first principles are merely expressions of Aristotelian logic‖ is 
tantamount to excluding other propositions that implicitly affirm the first principles.  So 
if the objection is true, then it must be false.  And if it is false, then it is false as well.  
Further justification of the assertion that ―first principles are merely the expressions of 
Aristotelian logic‖ would, in one way or another, have to employ first principles in the 
first place.        
Still other critics complain that truth is uninformative and uninteresting in the 
correspondence theory.
212
  Objective truth is static, abstract, cold, and impersonal.  Thus 
Smith says that truth is not to be found in propositions, but in persons alone: ―Truth, I 
submit, is a humane, not an objective, concept.  It does not lie in propositions.‖213  At this 
point in the paper we should set aside the obviously self-refuting nature of Smith‘s 
contention and demonstrate that even if the point is granted, this would still not count as 
an argument against the correspondence theory.  Rather, it serves as an argument against 
the possibility of knowing what the truth is.  Truth is formally distinct from what is true.  
In the case of the Catholic apologist, there are truths that are already assumed.     
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There are two basic avenues the apologist can take which seem to make this 
objection irrelevant.  On the one hand, one can make arguments from the ―bottom up‖ on 
the basis of first principles and arrive to some undeniable conclusions, namely, that truth 
is objective, that God exists, that human beings are more than just material stuff.  These 
truths are based upon first principles.  This approach is confident about our mutually 
shared assumptions (human nature and self-evident first principles).  This was a more 
traditional apologetic methodology.  Perhaps the truth that something exists is 
uninformative and abstract, but we can also know with certainty that God exists, and that 
an anti-realist view of truth is false.  Perhaps these truths are ―uninteresting,‖ but then 
again this is clearly person relative and thus does not apply to everyone!    
On the other hand, it is perfectly acceptable to begin with Christian truth claims 
and then compare and contrast them with competing perspectives.  From the outset 
apologists claim that some things are true, and then attempts to rationally argue for these 
truths.  Everyone must begin somewhere; all people interpret reality in a way that is 
consistent with their underlying presuppositions.  No Catholic who holds to the 
correspondence theory of truth is left with a floating, uninformative conception of truth, 
but presupposes the truths of Catholic Christianity.  There is no reason to suppose that 
because Christian truth is absolute and unchanging that it cannot be a channel by which 
individuals come to better understand and experience God.
214
  Personal encounter with 
the divine simply cannot take place in a cognitive vacuum, but assumes that some things 
are absolutely true.     
The final assessment in this newer, ―top-down‖ approach is predicated on whose 
worldview and value system resonates and thus makes the most sense out of the agreed 
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upon evidence.  Even if this approach begins with a Catholic worldview, this would not 
have to mean that the Good News is irrational (or that the evidence in favor of the 
Catholic faith cannot be trusted).  Perhaps the Gospel is true and the evidence is 
trustworthy.  As C.S. Lewis wrote: ―I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has 
risen—not only because I see it, but because of it, I see everything else.‖215  Catholic 
apologists can begin with their presuppositions.  This is no different for anyone else 
coming at the debate from within their perspectives of the world.  It is possible that 
Christians know the truth about God because of faith.  What is needed to help persons to 
determine the truth would still be the careful weighing and assessing of the accepted 
evidence from the various sides and perspectives to the best of our God given abilities in 
the dialogue and/or debate.         
Absolute truth prevents inculturation and human individuality.  However, there is 
a difference between the nature of truth and the various ways in which individuals and 
groups of people arrive at the truth and express it.  There is a difference between the 
nature of truth and the effect it has on individuals.  Truth, as we have seen, is not 
parochial, partial, and it is not provincial.  It allows for creative cultural expression and 
individuality so long as the Catholic worldview is believed and faithfully lived out.  
Conversely, certain cultures can make the Gospel message more conducive for reception 
within that particular culture.  Receiving God‘s truth does not flatten us out in blind 
obedience to Christ, but liberates persons to become who they were meant to be.  
Affirming the objective truth of Catholicism carves out space for the development of 
individual spiritual gifts, callings, and personality types in the risen Christ.   
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Apologists now might argue that we would expect the one true faith to be able to 
affect all people, regardless of the culture they inhabit.  When missionaries endeavor to 
present the timeless truths of the Gospel to persons who have been unaffected by the 
Catholic world and life view, they are not starting from nothing, but are convinced that 
because every human being is made in the image of God, there are many things 
(including the Gospel itself) that all persons can understand.  Listen to John Paul II: ―In 
proclaiming Christ to non-Christians, the missionary is convinced that through the 
working of the Spirit, there already exists in individuals and peoples an expectation, even 
if an unconscious one, of knowing the truth about God, about man, and about how we are 
to be set free from sin and death.  The missionary‘s enthusiasm in proclaiming Christ 
comes from the conviction that he is responding to that expectation, and so he does not 
become discouraged or cease his witness even when he is called to manifest his faith in 
an environment that is hostile or indifferent.‖216  
If the Gospel message is true, then we would expect the message to be capable of 
resonance with persons—no matter when they live or where they are from.  As the 
framers of Gaudium et Spes state: ―Moreover, since in virtue of her mission and nature 
she is bound to no particular form of human culture, nor to any political, economic, or 
social system, the Church by her very universality can be a very close bond between 
diverse human communities and nations, provided these trust her and truly acknowledge 
her right to true freedom in fulfilling her mission.‖217  Although human minds are subject 
to the fluidity of semantics and the syntax of numerous languages and thought patterns, 
there are some structural constants―such as first principles, fallibilist foundationalism, 
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and the referential nature of propositions.  It is noteworthy that Vatican II says that the 
Church should be more focused on what unites us as a human race to generate a sense of 
unity instead of considering the particularities that are becoming increasingly apparent as 
of late.
218
     
Apologists will now want to emphasize the success of missionary activity across 
the many cultures of the world (to bolster their claims about Christ).  For if Christianity 
true, then it will make sense to more than one limited group of persons.  Relevant is the 
Catechism: ―Only faith can recognize that the Church possesses these properties from her 
divine source.  But their historical manifestations are signs that also speak clearly to 
human reason. As the First Vatican Council noted, the ‗Church herself, with her 
marvelous propagation, eminent holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in everything 
good, her catholic unity and invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of 
credibility and an irrefutable witness of her divine mission‘.‖219  The catholicity of the 
Church testifies to the fact that people from different cultural and religious backgrounds 
can come to understand the same basic Gospel message, and that it changes individuals 
and even whole societies for the better.
220
   
 Lastly, some claim that either/or thinking can lead to violence.
221
  Aside from the 
fact that either/or thinking is rationally inescapable (i.e., the law of non-contradiction), it 
must be stressed that first principles do not lead persons to become violent, but that 
certain understandings and applications of what is thought to be true can steer persons 
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down the path of violence.  Well-meaning Christians who believe that everything should 
be conceived in one shade of black and white may unknowingly harbor bad attitudes to 
justify violence that is opposed to healthy forms of faith and evangelism.   
So I am not saying that we should renounce hard truth claims, but that certain 
(shortsighted) interpretations of them need to be jettisoned.  In a rigid view of truth it 
becomes easy for Christians to view outsiders as enemies who deserve to be punished 
because they think differently than believers.  As Charles Kimball points out: ―When 
particular understandings become rigidly fixed, and uncritically appropriated as absolute 
truths, well-meaning people can and often do paint themselves into a corner from which 
they must assume a defensive or even offensive posture.‖222  Catholic thinking does not 
do away with absolutes, but allows for a variety of interpretations within an orthodox 
spectrum.  Truth leads to a symphony of voices in unity, not stagnant uniformity.  Part of 
the post-conciliar apologetic approach is one that will include goodness, relationality, 
beauty and truth.  If there is one good thing that postmodernists have taught us, it is that 
the quest for human understanding cannot be reduced to reason alone.  In this very way, 
postmodernism serves as a corrective to Enlightenment rationalism.   
 A reason alone approach to faith can incite individuals to rationalism and then 
combativeness.  But on the other hand, I submit that when Christians limit the intellectual 
engagement of faith, then this can make them prone to become violent as well.  For 
example, it is a known fact that David Koresh and Jim Jones ordered the women in their 
groups to have sex with them.  These women completely bypassed the voice of common 
sense and conscience and, in blind faith, did what they were told—all in the name of 
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―faith.‖  Thus when reason and faith are divorced from one another, then this can lead 
persons to become violent.  Healthy Catholic faith affects all of a person‘s nature, 
including the mind.  It can begin by having adequate evidence, continuing in the proper 
disciplining of the emotions which culminates in virtuous conduct in cooperation with 
God‘s will.  Catholic faith is all about responsible thinking, personal freedom, and 
common sense.  Faith is a rational step into the light, demanding responsible thinking; it 
is not a credulous leap in the dark.  Reasons can be given for faith; and no truth of reason 
will ever contradict the truths of faith.   
It should be stressed that the specificity of accepting Catholic Christianity 
involves high stakes in the life of discipleship; it demands that we become tactfully 
confrontational with all kinds of evil in the world (cf. 1 John 2:15-17).  Catholics simply 
cannot rest content in a world streaming with error and many forms of injustice.  
Apologists must still remain person sensitive and culturally aware within the confines of 
her truth centered dialogue and debate with those who do not share our beliefs.  
According to Vatican II, the study of other world religions should help Catholics to learn 
how to refute the errors in other faiths: ―Let them also be introduced to a knowledge of 
other religions which are more widespread in individual regions, so that they may 
acknowledge more correctly what truth and goodness these religions, in God's 
providence, possess, and so that they may learn to refute their errors and be able to 
communicate the full light of truth to those who do not have it.‖223  In Ad Gentes, the 
Fathers of the faith state: ―Moreover let them take care that apostolic activity be not 
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limited to those only who have already been converted. A fair proportion of personnel 
and funds should be assigned to the evangelization of non-Christians.‖224  
 
Conclusion 
Many postmodernists do not see truth as an objective description of reality.  As a 
result of this paradigmatic shift, the Church‘s central claims are no longer seen as binding 
on all persons.  Rather, the Catholic worldview is reinterpreted in terms of opinion.  
Indirectly this shift makes rational apologetics unfashionable.  Because theologians have 
been relatively silent in addressing this most salient challenge to faith, the need to 
reinstate the project of rational arguments has been neglected.  Philosophical, historical, 
aesthetic, and experiential evidence may be plausible in making the beliefs of Catholics 
more credible than competing claims, but for the hardheaded skeptic who is willing to 
think through the reasons for and against the Church, this form of apologetics remains 
indispensable for the purposes of Christian evangelization.   
C.S. Lewis once captured this insight in the Screwtape Letters.  In the story the 
senior demon of hell, Screwtape, instructs a lower ranking demon on how to dissuade 
persons‘ from seriously taking the role of reason and evidence in the life of Christian 
faith.  For in so doing, skeptics and other lukewarm believers will be less convinced of 
Christianity.  After all, says Screwtape to his disciple in training: ―Your man has been 
accustomed, ever since he was a boy, to have a dozen incompatible philosophies dancing 
about together inside his head.  He doesn‘t think of doctrines as primarily ‗true‘ or 
‗false,‘ but as ‗academic‘ or ‗practical,‘ ‗outworn‘ or ‗contemporary,‘ ‗conventional‘ or 
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‗ruthless.‘  Jargon, not argument, is your best ally in keeping him from the Church.‖225  
Indeed, Screwtape knew that clear thinking was on the side of the Church. 
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A TEST CASE IN CLASSICAL (SCHOLASTIC) APOLOGETICS 
   
 
 One of the traditional hallmarks of Thomistic philosophy is that God‘s existence 
can be known with certainty apart from the influence of authoritative, divine revelation.  
This longstanding belief in the church reached somewhat of a high point at the First 
Vatican Council on April 24, 1870 when, in response to the prevailing trends of 
traditionalism, rationalism, and fideism, the Council Fathers steered a middle course in 
response to these extreme positions, declaring that God‘s existence can be known with 
certainty through the natural light of human reason.
226
   
 Though criticisms advanced by Hume and Kant are occasionally addressed by 
Thomists, this essay brings contemporary atheism face to face with Aquinas and his 
interpreters.  This issue in apologetic theology is always necessary, for as Kasper writes:  
Modern atheism [which stems from the philosophies of the Enlightenment] has put 
theology in a difficult position. Of particular importance here is mass atheism, a 
phenomenon unparalleled in past history; it regards the practical, if not theoretical denial 
of God or at least indifference to belief in God as being by far the most plausible attitude 
to take. As a result, theology has been stripped of its power to speak to people and to 
communicate with them. There are now no generally accepted images, symbols, 
concepts, or categories with which it can make itself understood. The crisis in the 
presuppositions for understanding talk about God is the real crisis of present day 
theology. To put the matter in more Scholastic terms; the crisis of contemporary theology 
arises from the loss of the preambula fidei, that is, of the presuppositions which faith 
needs if it is to be possible as faith and if it is to be able to make itself intelligible as faith. 
                                                             
226 Bernard Lonergan, ―Natural Knowledge of God,‖ A Second Collection, (Philadelphia, 
Westminster, 1974), 118, 133, rightly says that natural knowledge of God can be achieved by some 
persons, but is not achievable by everyone.  I agree with this contention.  Not everyone is called to present 
the arguments of natural theology, and not everyone will be (or can be) receptive to these arguments either.  
Lonergan lays out some of the factors that might prevent individuals from achieving a natural knowledge of 
God: ―In the present instance men must exist.  They must be healthy and enjoy considerable leisure.  They 
must have attained a sufficient differentiation of consciousness to think philosophically.  They must have 
succeeded in avoiding all the pitfalls in which so many philosophers have been entrapped.  They must resist 
their personal evil tendencies and not be seduced by the bad examples others.  Such are just a few very 
general conditions of someone actually grasping a valid argument for God‘s existence.‖        
Thus the person relative approach (on whether to present arguments for God‘s existence) is 
precisely the main point I am driving home in my dissertation.  Not to be overlooked, the fact that natural 
theology is not always effective is not a legitimate excuse to reject the enterprise either.  Both common 
sense and the Vatican Councils endorse the importance of reasoned defenses of Christianity, including the 
importance of natural theology.   
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The quandary becomes clear when we consider the various ways in which theology 
comes to grips with modern atheism. 227 
 
 This chapter is not so much a critical work in Thomistic philosophy as much as it 
seeks to highlight the contemporary trends in atheist criticism of Aquinas‘ arguments for 
God‘s existence.  We will focus in particular on Aquinas‘ intellectus essentiae argument 
for God‘s existence as the representative piece of natural theology.  In order to highlight 
these atheistic trends, I will also discuss how Thomists have generally responded back to 
them.  The purpose of this essay is to help theologians and Christian philosophers to be 
alert of the major atheistic critiques of Thomistic natural theology and to understand the 
different responses currently being given to them.   
 Hopefully the chapter of this dissertation will restore the possibility of a 
philosophical apologetics in a post-conciliar church.  This chapter will exploit the 
soundness of Thomist natural theology, and it also admits the insufficiency of the 
classical approach, at least in terms of recognizing the truth of Christian faith.  In this 
way, the combinational model of the Council might be upheld, reinstating the importance 
of combinationalism.        
 
Knowing That God Exists 
Thomistic philosophers agree that natural knowledge of God is not necessarily 
philosophical.  It is (and can be) pre-philosophical.  Thus professional philosophers are 
not at an advantage over the ordinary person when it comes to knowing that there is a 
God.  As Walter Kasper explains: ―Thomas says the same thing in a more substantive 
way. . . This element of the unconditioned in the conditioned is not first brought home to 
                                                             
227 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O‘Connell, (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing, 1984), 47.  
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us by a complicated proof; it is grasped unthematically in every knowledge of the 
conditioned as conditioned.  When thus understood, the cosmological argument is in the 
final analysis simply reflecting this primordial knowledge; it is an explanation of the 
astonishment felt at the wonder of being.‖228   
The ordinary person does not have the time, energy, or resources to study the 
arguments for and against God‘s existence.  But this does not prevent them from knowing 
that there is a God.  And this is why, at the end of each of the Five Ways, Aquinas says 
with confidence: ―and this is the God that all people speak of.‖    
Let us now spell out this pre-philosophical intuition in the form of a philosophical 
argument for God‘s existence.  Many scholars maintain that behind the Five Ways there 
is one basic form of argument.  Each of the Ways begins with a different starting point 
(i.e., change, causality, contingency, perfection, and final causality), but they all 
presuppose the existence/essence distinction spelled out in one of Aquinas‘ earlier and 
more influential tracts, the De Ente et Essentia.
229
  Commonly known as the intellectus 
essentiae argument for God, I will elaborate and defend a contemporary version in this 
chapter.  One of the argument‘s strengths is that it establishes a being whose essence and 
existence are identical.  Its essence is to exist.  While each of the Five Ways, as 
arguments simpliciter, do not entail all the traditional attributes of God, within their 
broader philosophical context they lead to nothing else.  That metaphysical context is 
provided in a more immediate sense in the De Ente.   
                                                             
 228 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O‘Connell (New York: Crossroad, 
1984), 103.  
229 See chapter 4 of Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans. Joseph Bobik, (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1988).   
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Although many atheists are unwilling to grant the truth of most premises in 
Thomas‘ arguments, some of them maintain that his proofs remain one of the best 
resources for justifying theistic belief.  At the very least, they argue, the cosmological 
argument has epistemic value for theism.  It may fail as a proof, but theists are given 
ample reason for still holding that there is a God.
230
         
Premise 1: At least one potential being exists.  It is impossible to deny that 
something exists without implicitly conceding to the truth of the premise in the process of 
denying it.  If someone denies that something exists, then it should be admitted that they 
are saying is something significant.  Otherwise, why listen to the person?  Hence the 
proposition ‗nothing exists‘ is self-defeating.  While it is logically possible that nothing 
exists, it is actually undeniable that something exists.  Because the proposition ―at least 
one potential being exists‖ is not logically compelling, the argument does not proceed on 
the assumption that we are proving logically the existence of God.   
When Aquinas speaks of demonstrating God‘s existence, he does not speak of 
proving God in the logical sense of a proof.  It is logically possible that nothing ever 
existed,—including the universe and God,—but it still remains undeniable that something 
exists.  Logic cannot show that something exists, only that it is possible for something to 
exist.  When I say that a potential being exists, I mean that a being exists that does not 
have to exist.  It is possible that these beings do not have to exist.  This is an undeniable 
fact of experience.  A potential being is a being that did not have to come into existence, 
but nevertheless still exists without ultimate necessity.   
                                                             
230 J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University, 1982), 89; William L. Rowe, 
The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton University, 1975), 249-269.  Cf. Antony Flew, God and 
Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1966), 102.     
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We will now argue for the existence of potential beings.  First, beings must either 
be necessary, possible (potential) or impossible.  Philosophically speaking, this exhausts 
all of our options.  We can set aside the existence of an impossible being, for an 
impossible being is not.  Neither is the being that currently exists a necessary being.  A 
necessary being is a being that cannot fail to exist.  The nonexistence of a necessary 
being is a contradiction in terms.  If there is a necessary being, then it exists out of 
necessity.  A necessary being, moreover, is equivalent to a purely actual being with no 
potential.  An actual being with no potential must have many attributes: immutability (not 
able to be changed), simplicity (not divisible), eternality (not in time), infinity (not 
limited), etc.  The beings that currently exist, however, are beings in space and time. 
As a simple being, a necessary being cannot be partly anything.  Nor can there be 
more than one actual being.  For if there were more than one, then there would have to be 
something which distinguishes the one from the other.  There would have to be 
something that the one has which the other lacks, but this cannot be the case if each of 
them is unlimited.  More importantly, an actual being must be uncaused.  It is undeniable 
in light of these attributes (of a purely actual existent) that the beings that do exist are not 
actual beings with no potential.  Those things that exist are changing, moving in space 
and time, and have the capacity for additional causal change.  They are not wholly 
simple, immaterial and immutable.   
Potential beings are undeniable fact of sensory existence.  Atheists do not dispute 
the first premise.
231
  As Richard M. Gale notes, ―These are commonplace observational 
                                                             
231 Further support can be found in J.J.C. Smart and John Haldane, Atheism and Theism, 2d. ed. 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 2003), 35.  Cf. Peter Angeles, The Problem of God (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 
1974), 23, 27.     
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facts that only a complete skeptic about our senses would want to challenge.‖232  Graham 
Oppy agrees: ―the first premise in the argument seems unproblematic: there are many 
beings that are ‗contingent‘.‖233   
Premise 2: The existence of every potential being is actualized by another.  
Whatever has the potential for nonexistence is not a purely actual being.  Because a 
potential being is not a purely actual being, the former must be caused or preserved in 
existence by something other than itself.  No potentiality can actualize itself.  Therefore, 
there must be some actuality apart from it that can account for its existence.  Likewise, 
every potential being needs a cause, not just ―some‖ potential beings.234  For if any 
potential being exists, then it does not have to exist.  When I speak of the actualization of 
potential beings, I am referring to the transition that takes place in a being from 
potentiality to actuality (all the while retaining its potential for additional change).  The 
change that takes place is referring to a sustaining cause, not a cause in the temporal 
sense of becoming.  Jordan Howard Sobel accepts the causal premise of Aquinas: 
―Whatever else they would be, sustaining causes would be necessary for the existence of 
things they sustained.  But that is not all they would be, for they would be sustaining 
these things and so engaged in ‗activity‘ somehow sufficient for their existence.‖235   
Nicholas Everitt agrees: ―in all our experiences of series of events, we have never 
                                                             
232 Richard M. Gale, ―The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments,‖ in Michael Martin, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Atheism (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), 90.    
233 Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006), 104.   
234 Cf. Jordan Howard Sobel, Logic and Theism (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004), 170, 
171. 
235 Ibid., 180. 
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experienced an event which did not depend on a predecessor, and if we try to think of 
what an event might depend on other than a predecessor, no answer comes to mind.‖236   
The second premise is evident given the aforementioned definition of change.  
Change means to pass from a state of potentiality to a state of actually having it.  
Although rocks do not have the potential to express emotion, persons have that potential.  
When this potential is actualized in people, then they change in feeling.  A being that 
changes must have some potential for that change.  Otherwise this change could never 
become actualized.  No potential for being a certain way can actualize itself.  For 
potentiality is not actual.  The essence, form, or quiddity of a potential object cannot be 
what brings it into existence, for considered in itself, potentiality is the mere essence of 
something, not an actuality.  Thus potentiality cannot cause anything.   
But when an actual being has potential, then it must be caused by something other 
than itself.  As Peter Angeles rightly states: ―If the thing were not prior to itself in order 
to cause its existence, then something else must have been in existence to bring it into 
existence—and such a happening is not self-causation.‖237  The sheer potential to be 
something cannot account for why something might achieve that potential.  The 
possibility for existence does not account for existence.  Sheer potentiality (essence) is 
not the same as actuality (existence).   
Only something that actually exists can account for the existence of something 
else.  As John Shook admits, ―Premise {2} and variations on its theme (such as ‗every 
effect must have a cause‘) appear to make sound common sense.  Intellectual curiosity 
and scientific methodology spring form this basic theme, which appears to be essential to 
                                                             
236 Nicholas Everitt, The Non-Existence of God (New York: Routledge, 2004), 67. Cf. Peter 
Angeles, The Problem of God, 74, 75. 
237 Peter Angeles, The Problem of God, 31. 
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the normal functioning of our brains. . . if something unusual catches our attention, or if 
we just focus our attention, we can ask and often answer the ‗why?‘ question which our 
mind so easily arouses.‖238   
Conversely, out of nothing, nothing comes.  Likewise, if a potential being is not 
preserved in existence by another, then it would immediately go out of existence.  No 
matter how many potential beings there might be, all of them are unable to remain in 
existence without something actualizing them.  To say that potential beings can exist 
without a cause is equivalent to holding that potential beings can come into existence out 
of nothing without a cause.  But nothing is the complete absence of being; nothing has no 
causal power.   
Every potential being is either self-caused, caused to exist by another, or 
uncaused.  This tri-polar classification exhausts all of our options.  Potential beings 
cannot cause themselves; they would have to precede themselves which is impossible.  
Neither can potential beings be uncaused.  If they are uncaused, then they would be the 
ultimate ground of actual being.  Nothing, however, can produce something.  Hence we 
conclude that all potential beings must be caused by another.  The type of causality 
involved in this view is conserving causality.  It is concerned with the causes in the here-
and-now, not with originating causes in the temporal sense of origination.   
Premise 3: An infinite amount of potential beings (which have been caused by 
another) is not possible.  A chain of causes where every potential being is preserved in 
existence by an actually infinite amount of other potential beings is impossible.  Either 
the series of all potential beings is sufficient to account for itself or it is not.  But the 
                                                             
238 John R. Shook, The God Debates: A 21st Century Guide for Atheists and Believers (and 
Everyone in Between) (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 134.  
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series cannot account for itself.  For if each being in the series of caused beings is itself 
caused, then adding all of them together will not alter the fact that each of them are still 
in need of a cause.  If each part in the entire series of potential beings is potential, then 
the entire sum of these beings will still remain potential.  If someone chooses to make the 
series longer, this will not make the sum of potential beings as a fully actual set of beings 
(or that they are able to account for themselves).   
By saying that a potential being can account for some other potential existent is 
tantamount to saying that one paratrooper whose parachute does not open can prevent 
another paratrooper from falling to the ground (i.e., a paratrooper whose chute does not 
open either).  When one adds paratroopers by grabbing ahold of other falling paratroopers 
(whose parachutes will also not open), this will only compound the problem, not lesson 
it.  If there were no first cause then there would be no final effect.  But there is an effect; 
therefore there cannot be an infinite regress. 
No effect has within itself the power to cause something else.  Rather, it is an 
actual being working in and through each potential being which causes them to be what 
they are.
239
  Arguing that an infinite amount of causes is possible is tantamount to saying 
that every single potential being has come from nothing, for not a single potential being 
has any real ground for its own existence, but depends on something else to account for 
it.  The only being that can actualize another in a state of potentiality and actuality must 
be an actual being without potential.  Only a being of pure actuality with no potential is 
capable of causing the existence of another.   
                                                             
239 Rowe misunderstands the Thomist cosmological argument by thinking there are intermediate 
causes.  William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument, 4. 
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Conclusion: The only being which can cause a potential being in existence is an 
actual being.  Therefore, at least one first actualizer exists.  The first actualizer’s essence 
is to exist.  It is therefore uncaused.  This conclusion follows logically and inescapably 
on the basis of each premise.  We know that if something exists, then it must exist 
necessarily or it depends on something else for its existence.  Something exists.  This 
being is not a necessary existent.  Its nonexistence is a real possibility.  Its nonexistence, 
moreover, has already been (say, before it existed in the form it which it now appears).  
Conversely, an actual, necessary being has no potential for nonexistence; it cannot fail to 
exist.  Because a potential being‘s nonexistence is a possibility, it exists potentially as a 
metaphysical composite of act and potency.  It remains actual because it is.  And it has 
potential for additional change.  And we see it changing.  Every being that is a composite 
of actuality and potentiality is caused to exist by another.  So long as the regress does not 
immediately terminate in the existence of a purely actual being, we are left with a limited 
regress of causes.  Therefore, a first actualizer must be responsible for sustaining each 
and every potential being in existence in the here and now.
240
  The nature of the first 
actualizer is different from all potential beings.      
2d Conclusion: The nature of a first actualizer must be necessary, one, good, 
eternal, infinite, immaterial, simple, immutable, omnipresent, and omnipotent.  Given the 
nature of the first actualizer, there cannot be more than one of them.  The nature of this 
being is what all people mean when they speak of God.  We might also add that this being 
is not sensible, for potential beings are known through human sense and the first 
                                                             
240 Douglas Krueger mistakenly believes that Aquinas is arguing for God‘s existence in the 
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argument.  See Douglas E. Krueger, What is Atheism? (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1998), 147.  See also Peter 
Angeles, The Problem of God, 43. 
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actualizer is only known by negating what is already known about potential beings.  This 
conclusion, says Aquinas, is what all people mean when they speak of God.  Since a 
purely actual being has no potential, it cannot change; it is immutable.   
Moreover, the necessary uncaused cause must be nonspatial (infinite) and 
atemporal (eternal).  Since time and space involve a change of position and time, an 
actual being cannot exist in space or time.  It lies beyond spacetime and thus properly 
transcends both of them.  According to Graham Oppy, ―If the existence of the physical 
universe depends upon something else, then—at the very least—there are possible worlds 
in which there is no physical universe because that something else is different in some 
way.  Moreover, if there is neither space nor time ‗beyond‘ the physical universe, then the 
‗something else‘ upon which the existence of the physical universe depends can be 
neither spatial nor temporal.‖241  Though Oppy invokes a necessary existent as 
responsible for the preservation of potential beings, he does not think it is God.  
Nonetheless, his point is well taken.  Everitt seems to agree: ―The only way in which the 
resort to a creator will block an infinite regress of super-creator, super-super-creator, and 
so on, is if the creator can have a different kind of existence from the universe.‖242   
A necessary being must also be indivisible, or simple.  If the necessary, 
unchanging, timeless, and spaceless being were composed of parts, then it would be 
capable of decomposition.  But an actual existent does not have any potential for 
anything, including decomposition.  We conclude: a pure, actual being must be utterly 
simple.  A being that is pure actuality must also be infinite in power.  Having the power 
to keep things in a state of potential existence, it can have no limitation in any respect.  
                                                             
241 Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods, 106.    
242 Nicholas Everitt, The Non-Existence of God, 71.   
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Therefore the actual being must be infinite in power.  A necessary existent is uncaused; 
its essence is to exist.  The fact that essence and existence converge also provides support 
for its simplicity.  All other beings (i.e., potential beings) have existence.  They must 
therefore participate in the existence of the actual being.  Without the actual being, all 
potential beings could not exist and be what they currently are.   
Lastly, an actual existent must be good.  Nonexistence is not good or evil, for it is 
not.  But if something exists, then it is good.
243
  Goodness and existence are convertible 
categories in Thomistic metaphysics.  If something exists, then this is a good quality, not 
an evil one.  In this way, existence is a good and nonexistence cannot be classified as 
anything.  So it does not make sense to say that if an actual being without potential exists, 
then it might be, as Stephen Law puts it, an evil being.
244
  Oppy is also incorrect when he 
says that the most that could be concluded about the argument is that a first actualizer 
exists―a first cause that is ―not itself in a process of change.‖245   
Let us turn to the most salient atheist criticisms (and provide a brief response to 
each of them from the post-Vatican II Thomist literature).  Again, the point is to highlight 
the atheist criticisms and discuss the responses currently given by Thomistic theists.  One 
might interpret the following section as a bibliographical appraisal of the theism-atheism 
debate from a Thomist perspective.       
 
Thomas Aquinas Models Reality Arbitrarily 
                                                             
243 For more on this, see D.J. Hawkins, ―Value and Value Judgments,‖ in Being and Becoming, 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1954); Scott MacDonald, ed., Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in 
Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1990).        
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Some have argued that the way Thomists model reality is arbitrary, a loaded 
metaphysics which is not necessary.  Reality can be explained and described from other 
legitimate perspectives.  George Smith, for instance, claims that the categories of 
contingent and necessary are arbitrary (thus the Thomistic argument are ―drenched in 
medieval metaphysics,‖ as he puts it) and so must be successfully argued for if the 
argument is to succeed.
246
  Be that as it may, Thomists argue that the object which exists 
must either be a potential being or an actual being.  Philosophically speaking, this 
exhausts all of our options.  As Jacques Maritain once put it:  
in order to recognize in the philosophic proofs of the existence of God, notably in the five 
ways of St. Thomas, their full demonstrative value, it is not necessary to be a philosopher 
trained in the school of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, nor even to be a philosopher by 
profession.  What is prerequisite is to perceive and adhere firmly to the primary truths 
which Thomist philosophy attempts more successfully than any other to justify. . .But in 
the East as in the West it is by no means the only philosophy to recognize and to cultivate 
these primary truths.  Indeed, the very fact of their primacy prevents them from being the 
monopoly of any one system; they precede every system.  They are part and parcel of 
what has been called the natural philosophy of the human intelligence. . . They are 
grasped by common sense before being the object of philosophic consideration.247                      
 
There is no third category of being other than a potential or actual being. Neither is there 
such a thing as sheer potentiality.  Sheer potentiality is not actual, but is the mere capacity 
for something to actually exist in a certain way.   Only potential beings and an actual 
being exist.  Or, just an actual being exists.  There is no other option.
248
  This model is 
derived from undeniable human experience.  We do not superimpose the categories of 
potentiality and actuality onto reality.  These categories describe the world in the way it 
really exists.         
                                                             
246 George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God (Amherst: Prometheus, 1989), 251.  See also 
Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), 91.   
247 Jacques Maritain, Approaches to God, trans. Peter O‘Reilly (New York: Harpers & Brothers, 
1954), 16-18.  See also 18 ff.     
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 Benedict M. Ashley, The Way Toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural 
Introduction to Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2009); W. Norris Clarke, The One 
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Petitio Principii and the First Premise  
Another response to the first premise (and/or second premise) is that it begs the 
question in favor of God‘s existence.249  But this argument is philosophically naïve.  If 
such an objection implies intuitively that if something exists then God must exist, then 
the objector recognizes the soundness of the proof, and it would be a quick short-cut 
through the argument.  Such an intuition would make the point of the argument without 
going through the sequence of each premise.   
But if the objector means that the argument cannot be made unless the natural 
theologian was already convinced in her mind that there is a God before she even sits 
down to lay out the premises of the argument, then we must admit that this is 
psychologically true.  Nobody formulates an argument unless they intend on 
demonstrating the likelihood of a conclusion.  But this should not be considered a case of 
circular reasoning because nowhere in the first and/or second premise does it state that 
God exists.              
 
Potential Beings Can Exist Uncaused 
Atheists argue that there is no reason to exclude the possibility that potential 
beings always exist.  Potential beings are sometimes uncaused.  This kind of reasoning is 
widespread in the atheist literature.
250
  Writing boldly on behalf of the atheist community, 
                                                             
249 B.C. Johnson, The Atheist Debator’s Handbook (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1981), 62; Peter 
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J.L. Mackie wrote: ―Why, for example, might there not be a permanent stock of matter 
whose essence did not involve existence but which did not derive its existence from 
anything else?‖251   
With respect to the possibility that uncaused contingent beings might exist 
because they are at least ―conceivable,‖252 a few responses have been recently given.  
John Shepherd illuminates various ways in which contingency can be understood, and 
concludes that the term does not function as a proposition, but as a statement about 
existence.
253
  Bruce Reichenbach agrees with him, noting that the conception of a 
causeless, potential being is empty.
254
   
In some sense it is at least conceivable that married bachelors or square circles 
exist, but this conception cannot be a substitute for the actual reality of such things.  Can 
square circles actually exist?  Atheists need to answer these questions successfully.  
Though it may be possible to psychologically conceive of an uncaused potential existent, 
it remains metaphysically impossible for potential beings to exist without a cause.  Norris 
Clarke contends that in order for beings to be potential and actual, they would have to 
exist and not exist in the same time in the same sense.  Of course, this is impossible.
255
  
Stephen Davis argues that it may be possible in the Thomist argument for potential 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Cosmological Argument, 42, 45; Houston Craighead, ―The Cosmological Argument: Assessment of a 
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beings to exist forever in the past (and into the future), but this would not mean that an 
actual being (without potential) is not ultimately responsible for currently causing them to 
exist.
256
   
Aquinas himself addresses this criticism when he describes the nature of potential 
beings.  Whatever changes from a state of potential for the change in question to the new 
state in which it becomes must have an external cause that precedes it in being (not in 
temporal succession).  All potential beings have act (existence) and potential (essence).  
Existence as such is unlimited.  If potential beings did not have act and potency, then they 
would have to be annihilated and then recreated from nothing, which would be 
impossible without a cause.  No potential in limited, potential beings can actualize itself 
any more than the potential for cotton to become a t-shirt can actualize itself into that t-
shirt without an external cause.  An actual existent with no potential does not have 
limited qualities, for it has no potential for anything.  If it had potential for something, 
then it would be, by definition, limited.  Thus a potential being must be caused by 
another.        
 
The Causal Principle is an Illusion 
The next criticism is a recurring atheist criticism.  Although Michael Martin 
accepts the threefold categorization concerning existential causality (i.e., potential beings 
are either caused by another, uncaused, or self-caused), he quickly adds that the principle 
might be an illusion: ―One can look upon the causal principle not as metaphysical truth to 
be believed but as a principle of inquiry that is useful to follow.  On this view, if we act 
as if the principle is true whether we believe in it or not, then if there is a cause to be 
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discovered we have a chance of discovering it.  On the other hand, if we do not so act, we 
stand no chance.‖257  He thus insists that the principal is assumed—and so must be 
rejected until proven otherwise.   
Yet Thomas‘ argument is not based on empirical observation, but on metaphysical 
necessity.
258
  Causality is not based on conceptual (or definitional) necessity as in the 
Leibnizian cosmological argument, which is based on the principle of sufficient reason, 
but is based on the undeniable existential insight that nothing cannot bring something into 
existence without a cause.
259
  As atheist philosopher J.J.C. Smart rightly acknowledges, 
the Humean critique of causality has no relevance to the Thomist argument.
260
  Non-
being has no potential for anything.  Out of nothing, nothing comes.  If a potential being 
exists, then it must be caused to exist by another.  The only kind of being that is not 
caused by another is an uncaused being.  Since an actual being is not the same thing as a 
potential being, the latter must have a cause.    
Some atheists do not dispute the Thomistic approach of existential causality.  No 
less a critic of theism than Graham Oppy says: ―it seems quite uncontroversial to accept 
that some things have causes.‖261  Despite J.L. Mackie‘s other misgivings, he agrees that 
the principal of existential causality ―has some plausibility, in that it is constantly 
confirmed in our experience (and also used, reasonably, in interpreting our 
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experience).‖262  Conversely, it might be argued that if the causal premise were not true, 
then we would expect to see objects pop into existence from nothing and then vanish 
back to nothing without a cause.
263
   
Still others maintain that Thomists need to explain how the purely actual being 
causes potential beings, not merely assert that the former is causally responsible for 
them.
264
  Since we cannot grasp what an actual being (i.e., an actual existent without 
potential) is, but only what it is not, we must admit that we cannot know how it might 
cause/preserve potential being.  However, there is something right and wrong about this 
objection.  We know that the cause has certain attributes, but we cannot comprehend how 
he exists, let alone how it actualizes potential beings.  Yet we know that this must be the 
case.   
How does created reality remain in existence through the power of pure act?  
Such a question seems impossible to answer in any comprehensible manner.  We can 
apprehend the change in causality, but not comprehend it.  Because the preservation of 
created realities is a spaceless and timeless act, the actual being‘s relation with the world 
is utterly unique.  Thus we are unable to think of any adequate analogies by which to 
suggest how it sustains potential being.  If the sustainable universe is the result of the 
Actualizer‘s continuously free decision, then his act cannot be subject to the same kind of 
determinacy that potential beings are subject to.  The asymmetric character of the relation 
between the Actualizer and potential being simply cannot be emphasized enough. 
 
Potential Beings Can Come From Nothing 
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Some atheists have argued that potential beings can pop into being from nothing 
without a cause.
265
  Michael Martin urges that scientific notions might account for this 
phenomenon:
266
 ―The supposition that . . . that there could not be something brought into 
existence by nothing is by no means self-evident.  At least, given the biblical authority of 
the book of Genesis, where God created the world out of nothing, it should not have 
seemed so to Aquinas.  For if God could create the world out of nothing, one might 
suppose that something could be spontaneously generated out of nothing without God‘s 
help.‖267  One way to think of something coming from nothing is by understanding the 
role of quantum mechanics.
268
  Although these criticisms are often directed against the 
Kalām argument, they are sometimes cast against the Thomist version as well.        
However, the sub-atomic world is not equivalent to nothing, but is something—a 
vibrant field of sub-atomic energy.  Moreover, Martin‘s suggestion that God creates ―by 
nothing‖‘ is multiply confused.  The phrase ―creation out of nothing‖ is not meant to 
convey that something can be created by nothing, but that something can be created after 
nothing.  After nothing, a state of something exists.  Things can be created (i.e., 
preserved) out of nothing, which is reliant on an efficient cause, but not by nothing.  
Creation out of nothing simply denotes a movement of a state of nothingness to a state of 
something.  It does not imply that nothing is a state of existence out of which God creates 
(de nihilo ipso); God does not start things off (or keeps things in existence) by 
manipulating a peculiar kind of stuff known as ―nothing.‖   
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Moreover, the ―something‖ at the quantum field level is operated by some kind of 
regulative law.  Even if all possiblities can be realized in a chance world, there would 
have to be some deeper law under which quantum particles can fluctuate or further 
actualize themselves.  At this level we are doing metaphysics, however, not science.  
Physicists, moreover, have typically used the word ―nothing‖ in a variety of ways. 
Sometimes the word is used in the sense of non-being.  When they speak about ―nothing‖ 
in this sense, then they pour the same meaning into the word that Thomists do.   
Absolute nothingness has no potential for anything, let alone for some-thing.  No-
thing is not some-thing.  To argue that something can remain into existence from nothing 
without a cause requires a denial of the law of non-contradiction (A cannot be A and non-
A at the same time and in the same relationship).  For something to come from nothing it 
must precede and then create itself.  But this is logically impossible.  In order for 
something to come from nothing without a cause, the potential being would have to exist 
before it exists.  But this is clearly impossible; there must be a cause.         
 
“Chance” Explains the Second Premise 
Still other atheists claim the causal premise is dubious because there are ―chancy 
processes‖269  at work.  Chance can refer to an event which is incapable of being 
predicted by persons in advance.  Events of this sort are due to ignorance of all causal 
factors involved.  A tsunami that kills millions of people might seem like a chance event 
to innocent bystanders, but if scientists had all the relevant knowledge required to predict 
its occurrence, then we would indeed be able to save lives before the tragedy happens.  A 
second meaning of chance stems from the intersecting lines of different causal chains.  
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Sometimes when two forces collide an unforeseen consequence occurs and we call it a 
chance event.  This is precisely what happens in natural selection.  Third, we can also 
speak of chance in quantum physics.  At this level, scientists speak in cautious terms, 
usually in terms of probabilities rather than strict cause-effect relations.  
 None of these of these examples overthrow the truth of existential causality.  In 
each case there are antecedent causes needed for an effect.  Some take chance as that 
which happens spontaneously without a cause, but it is impossible to ascribe chance with 
a power to do anything.  There is simply no such thing as a chance cause.  ―Chance‖ is 
merely a word to cover up our ignorance.
270
  To say otherwise is to invoke magic.  Even 
in the case of quantum indeterminacy, a cause is still at work.  As R.J. Russell avers: ―We 
speak of this kind of chance when we do not know, or prefer to ignore, the underlying 
causal factors—while believing they are there in principle.  We could in principle give a 
complete causal—i.e., deterministic—description of natural processes from the cells to 
galaxies; we chose a statistical description merely out of convenience.‖271  Indeed, these 
scientific disputations simply have no bearing on Aquinas‘ natural theology.    
 
Thomistic Natural Theology is Based on Outdated (Medieval) Science 
Some Thomists have been accused of presupposing an antiquated scientific view 
of the world.  As Anthony Kenny memorably said, Aquinas‘ arguments depend on his 
false medieval view of the world.
272
  As such, Aquinas‘ arguments cannot be trusted 
because of this obvious flaw.  Others have assumed the same stance as Kenny.  Mortimer 
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Adler explained that the soundness of Thomist arguments depends on Aquinas‘ faulty 
medievalism.
273
 Of course, Mackie picked up on this line of criticism and also claimed 
that the argument rests on a false scientific view of the world.
274
  For him this explains 
why the argument is not of interest to theologians anymore.   
Many Thomists contend that such disputations are irrelevant to Aquinas‘ 
argument.  Robert Koons argues that no scientific paradigm―that is, the indeterminism 
of the wave collapse, the Bell inequality theorems, or other features of quantum 
mechanics―can serve to undercut the causal principle of most cosmological 
arguments.
275
  According to Brian Davies, Thomas‘ argument is a metaphysical 
argument, not a scientific one.
276
  For him the success of the argument does not depend 
on any scientific picture of the world.
277
  William Rowe, who has been a critic of theism 
for years, agrees with Davies about the science issue.
278
  Fogelin responds directly to 
Kenny and argues that until arguments are presented (and not assertions), Aquinas‘ 
arguments can continue to be endorsed.
279
   
The science only applies in the case of Aquinas‘ use of illustrations, not in the 
arguments per se.  Science does not determine the truth of the premises, and Aquinas was 
well aware of this.  Thus the ―argument from bad science‖ can now be laid to rest; for it 
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does not understand the point of Aquinas‘ argument.  The use of erroneous scientific 
illustrations simply does not detract from what is first and foremost a metaphysical 
argument.  As Antony Flew himself once said: ―Once it is appreciated, with some 
difficulty, that none of this is even supposed to apply to causes in the ordinary temporal 
succession it will become clear that this argument . . . is safely beyond the reach of 
science.‖280  Indeed, the idea that the Thomist argument is based on an outdated scientific 
picture of the world seems to smacks of a soft ad hominum attack on theists.                      
 
Issues Related to Infinite Regresses 
B.C. Johnson offers a criticism of the third premise: ―Compare a row of dominoes 
endlessly long . . . which has always been toppling a domino at a time.  One could ask 
what began the dominoes‘ movement in the first place.  But this is just to assume that 
there was a first place.‖281  Thus atheists argue that theists assume the first member of the 
causal series.   
However, the argument does not depend on a question begging argument in 
support of limited regresses.  Aquinas‘ allows for the possibility of an infinite regress in 
the temporal sense of becoming, but this would not become an excuse to ask about why 
the series itself exists.  In this way, says Brian Davies, objectors miss the point of the 
argument.
282
  There can be no chain of intermediary causes in between the ultimate 
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causer and potential beings.  Hence, it is unnecessary to claim that theists beg the 
question in support of a finite regress.     
More atheists would rather argue for the possibility of an infinite regress.
283
  
Mackie uses an illustration where an infinite regress would be possible: endless motion 
around a circle.
284
   
Now, this illustration might give insight into the nature of what an infinite 
regresses actually is, but it is no substitute for philosophical argument.  The circle must 
have already been drawn or created within a contingent universe to begin with.  So it does 
not help the atheist to posit these illustrations when they are dis-analogous to the 
metaphysical problem at hand. 
Hence pseudo-examples of infinities can at most count as a potential infinite, not 
an actual infinity in the hierarchical structure of the real, concrete world.  Some anti-
theists respond: mathematics is known to have actual infinities.  Two distinctions need to 
be made in response to this challenge.  First, there is a difference between mathematical 
and concrete infinities.  The former is theoretical and has no place in the real, concrete 
world; but actual infinities cannot exist in the real world.  Second, there is a difference 
between actual infinities and potential infinities.  Potential infinities are always reaching 
toward actual infinity, but never able to actually reach it.  An actually infinite existence 
cannot be added to or subtracted from.    
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No matter which way potential beings come in and out of existence, the series 
must come to a stop in the here-and-now.
285
  Thomas refers to essentially ordered causes 
of potential beings, not change as such.  The only kind of being that can keep the series of 
hierarchical, concurrent causes going is a purely actual being that has no potential for 
change and, by extension, for nonexistence.  Since each member of the series is caused to 
be, the entire series must have a cause.  It is in the very nature of the case that if all of the 
members in the series are caused, then each one of them needs to be caused.
286
  However, 
Aquinas allows for the possibility of per accidens infinite regresses, not a causal series 
per se.
287
  All potential beings are caused beings by nature; but they are not causing 
beings.  Because their own existence is received by another, they have no existence to 
give to another.  Thus the need for a first cause follows from the fact that each member in 
the series, composed by definition of potency and act, has no causal power.  Extending 
the series backward in the here-and-now would not alter the fact that an uncaused cause 
is needed to preserve each of them in existence.  We need to be careful about what kind 
of series is being exploited.   
  ―In all our experience,‖ Everitt concedes, ―chains are always of finite length, and 
if they are suspended vertically, they are always supported by something that is not itself 
a chain or another link in a chain.  A chain might be hanging from a nail in the wall, it 
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might be held aloft by a person, and so on.‖288  Whereas common sense leads one to 
accept a limited amount of potential beings, infinite regresses are counterintuitive.  Until 
atheists can argue for the infinite regress (and not merely provide an psychologically 
based illustrations), then it does not seem that the infinite regress should be accepted.  For 
them the infinite series is, counterintuitively speaking, a ―brute fact.‖289  
 
The Universe is the First Actualizer 
Still other atheists argue that even if certain beings are potential, the fundamental 
elements of the universe are necessary.  ―For all we know,‖ says Johnson, ―the ultimate 
sub-atomic particles which compose the universe just exist, being dependent on 
nothing.‖290   
Notice that there is no denial of a first uncaused actualizer in his claim.  In fact it 
is endorsed by Johnson.  As Douglas Krueger rightly points out, Aquinas‘ argument leads 
one to accept that a first actualizer exists (though he believes that the first actualizer is the 
universe).
291
  More importantly, the first cause exists outside the sphere of potential 
beings; it alone is responsible for the here-and-now existence of potential beings.  
Therefore the first actualizer is not another potential being.  While accepting each of the 
previous premises, they conclude that the actual being is the universe itself.   To be 
shown in the second part of the conclusion of the argument, the attributes of the first 
actualizer resemble God more than physical reality.         
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Other atheists, such as Wallace Matson,
292
 Peter Angeles,
293
 and Robin Le 
Poidevin,
294
 argue differently.  For them a cause only applies within the sphere of time 
and space.  They argue: if ‗God‘ is considered the cause of all potential beings, then he 
must be another spatiotemporal existent.  And if this is what the Thomist argument 
amounts to, then obviously God is no different than any potential being within the 
universe.  Despite the commonsense appeal of Aquinas, Everitt evades the problem and 
concludes that deeper reality is unknowable: ―Our background expectations about the 
nature of physical chains of links are therefore very different from our background 
assumptions about causes in general, and we cannot assume that what seems obvious 
with the former will also apply to the latter.‖295   
But these objections do not amount to much; for they do not apply to Aquinas‘ 
natural theology.  As Robert Koons states, the premises and the conclusion use the 
concept of cause within the time-space continuum, but at the conclusion they are negated.  
Because an actually infinite amount of essentially hierarchical, sustaining causes is 
impossible, we have no choice but to resort to a cause that is itself uncaused.  Otherwise 
we are left with another limited being.  Or, we are left with every potential thing coming 
into existence from nothing sans a cause.    
 
What Caused God? 
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Richard Dawkins holds that Aquinas ―makes the entirely unwarranted assumption 
that God himself is immune to the regress.‖296   
But the never-ending question of asking ―who or what caused God?‖ is surely 
guided by either the atheist‘s refusal to accept the impossibility of an infinite regress or 
because of a false understanding of existential causality.  Unlike the Leibnizian principle 
of sufficient reason, the causal principle of Aquinas is not that ―everything must have a 
cause.‖  Rather, every potential being must have a cause (or, every finite, limited, 
changing being must have a cause).  As Angeles rightly said: ―If God is eternal, then He 
is uncaused.  It would be silly then to ask ‗What caused God‘?‖297   
What is more, the question ―Who made God?‖ commits what might be called the 
―category fallacy.‖  It eliminates from the outset any possibility that the ultimate 
explanation of potential beings might be an actual being, or a theistic God.  It is like 
asking ―who caused the being who is, by definition, uncaused?‖  As a result, Thomistic 
theists have not given much attention to this objection.       
 
Premise Three Commits the Compositional Fallacy 
Peter Angeles
298
  and Michael Martin have argued that although a finite, changing 
being might need a cause, it would be fallacious to then argue that all potential taken as a 
whole would need a cause:  ―the argument seems to commit the fallacy of composition.  
Just because each thing is capable of not existing, it is not obvious that the totality would 
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be capable of not existing.‖299  Thus they charge Thomistic theists with committing the 
fallacy of composition.  Just because each potential being is caused, they say, it would 
not follow that all of them together would need a cause.
 300
  In this fallacy one illicitly 
argues that each part will also apply to the collection of the whole.   
The compositional fallacy is an informal fallacy.  That means that the fallacy does 
not always apply in every scenario.  Sometimes square tiles will not always make a 
square shaped floor.  Sometimes it will be rectangular instead.  But sometimes each of 
the tiles will be a large square shaped floor.  Hence, the fallacy needs to be considered on 
a case-by-case basis.
301
  Atheists allege that when Thomists argue that since every 
potential existent is caused, therefore the universe is caused, they are committing this 
fallacy.   
Now Thomists might say that although many potential objects exist, this remains 
irrelevant to the success of the argument.  The existence of one potential being is 
sufficient condition for demonstrating the existence of God (regardless if there are other 
potential beings or not).  So long as one accepts Aquinas‘ essence-existence distinction, 
then one does not need to entertain the atheists‘ allegations about the compositional 
fallacy.  Perhaps the discussion at this point should turn to the legitimacy of the essence-
existence distinction instead.  Against George Smith,
302
 John Haldane points out that 
because Thomas‘ arguments are not concerned about temporal succession (meaning that 
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Aquinas is not so concerned to show that if we had enough time, all potential beings 
would eventually disappear).  Time only functions within the greater context of 
contingency.
303
   
Aquinas is not so much concerned with arguing for the cause of the entire whole 
in the sense of becoming, but for the cause of any potential being.
304
  He is not saying 
that because one potential being exists, the whole universe must be potential.  The point 
is that as long as there is one potential being, then there must be a unique being whose 
essence is to exist.  The aggregate collection of potential beings does not leave the critic 
with saying Thomas commits the compositional fallacy, and it also misses the thrust of 
the argument altogether.       
 
Premise Four Commits the Quantifier Shift Fallacy 
 Antony Flew once said that the quantifier shift fallacy ―is committed more than 
once in the Five Ways.‖305  His reasoning is as follows.  The second premise holds that 
potential beings are preserved/caused by another.  But the conclusion says that there is a 
First Cause of potential beings.  The quantifier shift fallacy says that going from things 
being caused to a cause of things is fallacious.  Just because each potential being has a 
cause, it does not follow that there is a single cause of all potential beings.   
Several things have been said in response to this criticism.  When the Five Ways 
are understood within the underlying existence-essence distinction, the unity of the cause 
inevitably follows.  The first actualizer cannot be limited by potentiality.  If it was limited 
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by potentiality, then it would need a cause too.  For every existent that is limited by 
potentiality is, by definition, caused by another.   
Second, Thomas' argument does not suggest that each thing has a cause in the 
same exact way.  Taking the cause in one sense, Thomas is not actually arguing for the 
conclusion in the same exact sense of the second premise.  Once the conclusion is 
reached, the attributes are discovered through a different form of argument: negation.  
Thus the term ―cause‖ does not necessarily mean finite or infinite cause.  It means a 
necessary and sufficient condition needed for the existence of potential existents.  Thus 
there is no equivocation in the term ―cause‖ in the premises and in the conclusion.  The 
conclusion is a necessary inference given the nature of the argument.   The via negativa 
does not leave us with absolute nothingness.  The first actualizer is demanded given the 
nature of what a potential being is.                            
 
Not Enough Attributes of the First Actualizer to Consider it “God” 
Atheists have argued that even if theologians could prove a first actual being, this 
would not mean it is God.
306
  Atheists insist that unless most or all or most the divine 
attributes can be demonstrated, then the first actualizer cannot be equated with a theistic 
God. 
In response to this challenge, Thomists have relied on the distinction between the 
formal and material objects of knowledge.  Persons can recognize the same object in 
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different formal respects.  The philosopher‘s God is the same God as the God worshipped 
by Christians, but the philosopher‘s God cannot be known as the God of Christianity 
until she begins to have faith in Christ.   Philosophy can only bring one to accept some 
(or even most) of the attributes of God.     
Notwithstanding the familiar distinction between faith and reason, many attributes 
flow directly from Aquinas‘ argument.  The attributes come cascading down one after 
another once a being of pure act is shown to exist.  Since existence as such is unlimited 
unless conjoined with a limiting essence, then a being whose essence is existence will 
exemplify all perfections infinitely.  God will be infinite in his goodness, knowledge and 
power, as well as other attributes.   
Once the essence of the argument is understood, the final conclusion can be 
extended by additional arguments to demonstrate that it must be one, simple, immaterial, 
immutable, omnipotent, etc.  Shepherd concludes that a ―Cosmic-Explaining-Being‖307 is 
the cause of Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments.  By extension he demonstrates that by 
definition it must have additional properties: perfection, creator, sustainer, etc.  If the first 
cause‘s essence is to exist, then it contains all the perfections that there can be.  As 
Thomas goes on to say very soon after the Five Ways, ―All perfections existing in 
creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly.‖308     
George Smith retorts: ―the concept of causality makes sense only within the 
context of the natural universe, and to demand a cause of the universe is nonsensical.‖309  
In one sense Smith is right: the first actual being lies outside the purview sense 
experience.  When one examines the nature of the first actualizer, it is evident that the 
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physical universe does not match that description (for some of the attributes include 
infinity, eternality, and omnipotence, which would imply immateriality).         
Sobel claims that although finite, limited beings would need a cause, it would be a 
mistake to infer that their intermediate causes would again needs a cause.  For an 
intermediate cause would be beyond the realm of sensible experience.
310
  Since Aquinas‘ 
argument draws on sense experience, Sobel charges him with committing the ―post hoc 
fallacy.‖  Though on the level of experience it can be difficult to pinpoint what is doing 
the causing, this would not mean that potential beings can continue in existence without a 
first actualizing cause.  By no means is Sobel‘s argument a refutation of existential 
causality; rather, it is concerned with knowing positively the nature of the cause.  As 
Keith Ward recognizes, ―we cannot rule out the existence of causal influences that are 
undetectable by us, and which may be non-computable.  We can never be sure that we 
have specified all causally relevant properties exhaustively.‖311  Sobel is not saying there 
is no cause.  He is merely exploiting the fact that we cannot know the nature of the 
―intermediate cause.‖   
Again, there is something right and wrong about Sobel‘s contention.  In the De 
Ente argument, there are no intermediate potential beings that serve as causes.  If a 
potential being exists, then an actual being exists.  It is working in and through each 
potential being in an essentially ordered series (not an accidental series) of causes.  In the 
absence of such a being, there could be no potential beings.  When we try to understand 
the nature of the actual existent, then we realize that human language can only make valid 
predications of its essence, not express it fully.     
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Other atheists maintain that the universe should be considered the first actualizer 
because that would be a simpler explanation than invoking God to explain it.  As Krueger 
puts it: ―This explanation is simpler than the explanation that god and the universe exist.  
The simpler view is more likely to be true than its rival since the ―universe only‖ model 
assumes less than the other model.‖312  Whenever it is possible we should use the 
principle of parsimony to get rid of unnecessary explanations.  Otherwise we would be 
left with a more difficult phenomenon to explain, one that begs for explanation: potential 
beings which cannot be explained by an infinite regress of causes.  In point of fact, God 
and the universe is the simplest answer to the phenomena under scrutiny.   
 
The First Actualizer Has Contradictory Attributes 
Other atheists argue that the divine attributes are incompatible with one another: 
―The most telling objection that can be lodged against the cosmological argument is that 
it is impossible for such a being to exist, thereby showing that this argument‘s conclusion 
is necessarily false.‖313  Many atheists have argued in this way to show that no matter 
how compelling Aquinas‘ argument might seem to be, its conclusion cannot be true.314  
The properties of the first actualizer are contradictory to one another.  Until the theist can 
provide an internally consistent definition of God, ―the concept is rightly considered 
incoherent and explanatorily impotent.‖315  The very concept of a purely actual being is 
either self-contradictory or meaningless.
316
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But this objection is fallacious for a variety of reasons.
317
  On the face of it, there 
is nothing logically contradictory with the existence of an actual being.  Since we know 
what a potential being is, we can just as easily conceptualize a non-potential being.  We 
know what an actual being is not.  Necessity denotes that it is not dependent on anything 
else for its existence; immutability is another way of saying that it does not change.  All 
the attributes stem from experiencing the nature of the world and drawing conclusions 
based upon what is entailed from that nature.  Knowledge of God is derived from 
negating what is already known about potential beings.  The negative terms used to speak 
about God does not mean that we are left with nothing.  Positive information about God 
is derived from applying the principle of causality.  He is a being because all potential 
beings depend on him for their existence.  He is pure actuality because he is the first 
cause of lesser actualities.  We can prove that pure act exists, but we will never be able to 
grasp what he is.   
Although many distinct characteristics are being attributed to God‘s nature, they 
are only being said of one being whose essence is to exist.  He is one being, but many 
things are being said about him.  All of the attributes are referring to the same being.  
There is only being about which these attributes can be mentioned.       
  
There Might Be Many First Actualizers 
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But what if there are many actual beings, each of which is uncaused?
318
  
However, even if the argument is granted, it would not be a favorable conclusion for 
atheism.  Surely the atheist does not want many Gods!  Nonetheless, Thomists have 
always had the resources to combat this problem.
319
  There cannot be two or more actual 
beings (an actual being which is simple, good, eternal, infinite, immutable, and 
omnipotent).  As Norris Clarke said: ―This is a quick and easy step, admitted by just 
about all metaphysicians, I believe, once the existence of an absolutely infinite being is 
granted.‖320   
If there were more than one actual, unlimited being, then there would have to be 
something that distinguishes the one from the others.  But there is no way for an infinite 
being to differ from another infinite being unless there is some potential for 
differentiation inherent in each of them.  In order to distinguish between two beings, there 
must be something that is different about them.  Otherwise, one could never differentiate 
between them to identify either of them.  But actual being has not limitations.  Because 
an actual being has no potential for differentiation, there can only be one of them. 
 
The New Atheism and the Arguments of Aquinas 
 The release of several major books on atheism has put the God question on the 
front lines of current cultural conversation.  This movement is commonly known as the 
―New Atheism.‖  Unfortunately these critics have failed to interact in any significant way 
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with Aquinas‘ natural theology.321  Richard Dawkins is the only one who entertains 
Aquinas‘ arguments.322  Sometimes the lack of dialogue with the most formidable 
arguments for God‘s existence can give innocent bystanders the impression that God‘s 
nonexistence is ‗more probable than not‘ or even proven.  Worse, Aquinas is rarely 
mentioned by the New Atheists, and this might suggest that he is irrelevant.  Some 
Thomists have written published responses to Dawkins‘ case, but they have yet to be 
seriously considered by any of the New Atheists.
323
   
 
Interlude  
 While most of the attention surrounding Vatican I is dedicated to papal primacy 
and infallibility, many Catholic theologians forget about the vital statements pronounced 
in the Constitution on faith and reason.  Most Catholic theologians and philosophers 
vigorously defended the Council‘s teaching well into the middle of the twentieth century.  
But almost immediately after the Second Vatican Council, theologians began to neglect 
it, and, in some cases, argued that it was irrelevant or even problematic for faith.  As 
Hans Küng observed: ―Against the exaggerations of a natural theology that assumes that 
it is possible to prove by pure reason the existence of God and even the attributes of his 
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nature, objections have increased enormously.‖324  Not only did many theologians 
depreciate the conciliar teaching on faith and reason, but many atheists continue to 
challenge it.  However, such a view cannot be squared with the teaching of Vatican II.        
 The most salient contemporary atheistic critiques of Aquinas‘ natural theology 
were presented and briefly discussed in this chapter.  Theologians now might gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the recent trends in atheist criticism.  It will also help 
theists understand how Thomistic theologians have responded back to them in a 
postconciliar church in the relevant literature.  Neither side of the debate shows any signs 
of weariness, but Thomists continue to have the philosophical capital that is needed to 
answer these criticisms and show the inherent weaknesses in atheistic critiques of 
Aquinas‘s arguments for God.  With a solid argument being made in favor of a theistic 
God existing, we should ask whether this God is likely to communicate with the human 
race in a special way.  For example, Christianity claims that God has revealed himself in 
the person of Jesus.  Islam claims that Muhammad received a special message from the 
angel Gabriel.  These conclusions will establish a philosophical framework for the 
evidentalist approach in the next chapter. 
 
Why God is Likely to Communicate With the Human Race 
All three monotheistic religions teach that God's existence can be known through 
the natural light of human reason (Psalm 19:1; Rom. 1:18–20; Sura 17:44). Whether this 
bland understanding of God is accessible to persons by an internal intuition or by 
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philosophical reasoning is insignificant to the Scriptural writers. They do appeal to 
reasoning at least of a common sense kind that is accessible to all persons.  
Statistics indicate that the majority of the world's population, whether they are 
religious or not, believe in some sort of God. Atheism has never been a popular world 
and life view. Although most of the world's religions tend toward monotheism, their 
understanding of God is formulated in different ways.  
The deist conception of the natural knowledge of God remains unstable (deists 
hold that God exists, but that he remains aloof from the world, unable or unwilling to 
disclose himself to humanity). Theists, on the other hand, maintain that a transcendent 
God exists, but that he is active, purposive, and caring for the human race. In this view, 
God seeks communion with human beings. It is easy to see why deists typically deny the 
possibility of miracles. Considering that they emphasize that a perfect God will 
necessarily create a perfect universe, there would be no subsequent need for this kind of 
God to ―interfere‖ or ―tune it up‖ again by performing a miracle on behalf of the creature. 
A perfectly created universe ought to run on its own steam without any form of divine-
human communication.  But this seems contrary to some deists‘ belief that God is 
personal.  The idea that a personal God would want to communicate with humanity 
seems not only possible, but likely with this premise in mind. What personal being would 
not want to respond to other persons who are in need of personal attention? 
For some deists to argue that God would not want to communicate with the 
human race because creation must have been perfectly created seems to diminish the 
perfect nature of the Deity – not enhance it. If a perfect, personal God had enough reason 
and love to create humanity in the first place, then it seems that he would want to address 
131 
 
and help persons with their most vexing problems. As Avery Cardinal Dulles states, ―If 
God were so cold and detached, it is impossible to conceive why He would have made 
the world in the first place.‖325 God would try to help those persons that he is responsible 
for creating to help them become good. Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne notes, 
―Good people seek to share what they have with others and to cooperate with others in all 
these activities. Good people forgive those who make reparation and ask for forgiveness. 
But also, … good people may sometimes to a limited extent and for a limited period 
allow those for whom they are responsible to suffer … if only by so doing can some good 
purpose be achieved.‖326 The Dionysian principle still rings true: a good person does not 
remain enclosed within him or herself, but diffuses her goodness outward for the 
betterment of others. 
Some of the deepest questions that most, if not all, persons ask during their lives 
include the following: where have we come from (origins)?; why do we suffer?; what 
makes life worth living (questions about meaning or purpose)?; what is right and wrong 
(morality)?; who are we (identity)?; and what awaits us at death (destiny)?
327
 These 
common questions stem from our natural inclinations. Thomistic natural law theorists 
propose at least five natural inclinations which are common to all normally functioning 
persons: the inclination to the good; the inclination to preserve life, including sexual 
union and the rearing of offspring, the inclination to have knowledge of the truth, and to 
live in society.
328
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Therefore it makes sense that a perfectly good and personal God would want 
persons to have insight into the nature of the answers to these questions. A theistic God 
will intervene in human history (and not disclose himself to impersonal creatures) to not 
only identify with his personal creations, but to show them that they have intrinsic dignity 
(for God acts in history for their own sake) and that he cares about them. God will 
probably concern himself with giving personal creatures some theoretical answers and 
practical solutions to questions like these in order to make life more bearable. Although 
the common person on the street can know that God exists, it makes good sense to 
suppose that God will bring this vague knowledge of his existence to an even greater 
fulfillment by revealing himself more clearly to persons. 
The existence of so many theologies and ways of speaking about God in the 
world's great religions strongly suggests that humans are not content with knowing that 
God exists, but that they have a longing to know God in the best way that they can. The 
fact of so many theologies in so many of the world's religions strongly attests to this 
point. Humans ceaselessly search for answers to their problems in the light of the divine. 
Seen within this light, it seems cruel that God would refrain from providing some sort of 
human fulfillment that goes beyond the bland knowledge of his existence. Real needs can 
probably be satisfied. If there is a real need for food, then food probably exists. If there is 
a real need for camaraderie, then friendship can be attained. The same principle holds 
true about human needs with respect to ultimate concerns. 
In conclusion, the existence and nature of God and the human race provides us 
with compelling reasons to hope for at least one divine disclosure at one point in human 
history. Human action requires some sort of architectonic principle that has the capability 
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of specifically organizing human life around it. As Charles Morerod explains: ―As it is 
impossible to build a house if all workers just keep moving without any global purpose, it 
is impossible to live a somehow efficient life without a main organizing principle.‖329   
God created us with these desires to begin with. Says Morerod: ―To know the 
final end matters supremely for all human actions. As long as we do not know it, we can 
make different kinds of mistakes, that is, substitute the final end with partial ends (a kind 
of idolatry), or choose the wrong means to reach the final end, or simply refuse God to be 
our final end.‖330 A divine revelation will be able to help persons to focus on their final 
end in order to help them live life in the way it was meant to be lived. Although it is not 
necessary for God to reveal himself to humanity, there are nevertheless good reasons to 
think he would do such a thing in light of his nature, along with some of the intrinsic 
needs of humanity. 
 
The Number and Mode of Revelation(s) 
I will now address some additional questions that are much more tedious than 
what was said in the last section.  The questions that will guide this section will be the 
following: How many revelations should we expect from a theistic God?  What form will 
this revelation take?  What is the time and place it will occur? These questions must be 
answered before we embark on the evidential apologetics component of the dissertation. 
If human persons are to develop their characters (which seems like a good thing 
for all persons to do), then they will need a certain amount of epistemic distance between 
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themselves and God.
331
 If God were to make his presence immediately known to all 
persons at once, then in all likelihood persons would not learn to perform good actions 
because of their inherent goodness. In this respect, God stands back from human affairs 
in order for us to develop character in ourselves and in others. The Creator gives us a 
significant amount of responsibility so that we will learn how to exercise our freedom in 
the proper way. 
Like any good parent, one of the greatest tactics in parenting is to stand back and 
let the child learn what it means to be responsible for their actions (and to be responsible 
for others). On the face of it, this notion makes the likelihood of many divine revelations 
unlikely. Many revelations will not necessarily make persons flourish and become the 
persons they were meant to be. As in the case of any loving, personal caregiver, God will 
give persons what they need, not an excessive amount of guidance that will probably 
prevent persons from learning what it means to develop a good character. Too much 
divine interference could make us too dependent on these disclosures and less concerned 
with the good things in life for goodness sake. 
Many revelations would deprive persons of the responsibility to tell others about 
the answers and solutions that would be given by few revelations. Given the 
communitarian nature of humanity, we can safely assume that if someone receives the 
revelatory message that God has given to them that they will want others to know and 
accept it (for it is good that humans should build one another up with the truth that was 
given to them from God). Numerous amounts of revelations would prevent persons from 
fostering human relationships because there would be no need for persons to tell one 
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another about them. A large amount of revelations could impede God's purposes for 
renewing humanity. We should expect these revelations to be ―less‖ rather than ―more.‖  
Further, the number of revelations should be very few in number if God will 
ensure through his general providence that those who learn or believe in his disclosures to 
humanity will share these messages with as many people as possible. Because the 
strengthening of the communion of persons seems like an inevitable result of the purpose 
of God giving a revelation in the first place, it is likely that we should expect very few 
revelations if persons have the capability of spreading it effectively to majority of the 
human population. Although we could never know how many revelations to expect from 
God (after all, some persons might expect a dozen of them, for that seems like a ―small 
number‘ to them), we can safely surmise that there will be a direct correlation between 
the number of revelations and the intrinsic capabilities of persons to bring this message to 
others. If the human race as a collective whole is capable of bringing the message of a 
single revelation from God to the majority of the population across the ages of human 
civilization, then of course there will be no need for God to provide more than one of 
them. 
Turning to another concern, we would expect this revelation to meet us on our 
grounds so that we can sufficiently understand it. The message will not take the form of a 
language or some other communicative means that persons are incapable of learning (or 
believing, or what have you). Considering that human persons are made up of body and 
soul, we would expect this revelation to meet us in material and spiritual forms. If this 
revelation does not manifest itself in or through these forms, then we would have good 
reason to question whether it is an adequate enough revelation. 
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But what about the time and place of revelation?  Here we can say a few things as 
well. On the one hand, it seems highly probable that a divine revelation will have to occur 
when human persons are able to understand and absorb its contents.  So, it will not occur 
at an exceedingly early stage in evolutionary history when the human brain is still 
undeveloped. On the other hand, it is likely that a revelation will occur at a time and 
place that will enable the original witnesses of the revelation to successfully bring the 
message out to others. Thus there will have to be an adequate communication system into 
the surrounding region where the revelation occurred in order to allow the original 
recipients of the revelation to keep the message and its following going. The revelatory 
message will be given at a time and place where humans have the capability of 
successfully spreading the message to as many people as possible within the short span of 
time that the human race will have to live their lives on the earth. A perfect God will 
want as many people as possible to hear his answers to their most profound questions and 
concerns. 
Perhaps there will be a reliable oral and written tradition process in the culture 
where the revelation will occur. The transmission of this revelation in either written or 
oral forms will be able to satisfy every subsequent generation's questions about it. To 
boot, the original recording of the event ought to be able to withstand critical scrutiny by 
modern epistemological standards. For example, if the revelation occurred thousands of 
years ago in a very obscure part of the world, then we as modern Westerners would 
expect to have a convincing amount of evidence for the event that will satisfy the rigors 
of modern scientific standards (and other reliable means of attaining knowledge). 
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Let us draw some conclusions about the probability of certain types of divine 
revelation(s). First, we know that it is likely that a theistic God will disclose himself to 
humanity. Second, these revelations will be ―few‖ in number.  A miracle is, by definition, 
something that does not happen very often.  It is possible that there could be only one 
revelation, but we simply cannot know for sure how many there will be.  God is the only 
one who knows whether persons are capable of bringing the message to the majority of 
people who will ever live. With this foreknowledge, he determines how many times that 
he will provide a message.  
Third, they will occur in a form that is conducive to human understanding. Lastly, 
a revelation will occur at a time and place that is culturally and technologically conducive 
for humans to propagate the message successfully. When I say ―successfully,‖ I also 
mean that subsequent generations who are exposed to the message will be intellectually 
satisfied by the evidence for the event. 
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A TEST CASE IN EVIDENTIAL APOLOGETICS 
   
 Many Catholics have been hesitant to affirm and defend the resurrection of Jesus 
as an historical event. This hesitation stems, in part, from the abuses of neo-scholastic 
resurrection apologetics that prevailed roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century 
up to the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). According to these scholars, the neo-
scholastic approach all too easily interpreted Jesus‘ resurrection as a mere resuscitation or 
reanimation of a corpse, not allowing it to be seen as a central mystery of the Christian 
faith.
332
   
As a result, many postconciliar theologians have said that the resurrection a 
―meta-historical‖ or ―trans-historical‖ occurrence, not an event within history.333  They 
recognize genuine continuity between the earthly body of Jesus and his glorious, 
incorruptible body in an other-worldly realm of existence, but this transition should not 
be affirmed as historical in any proper sense of that term.
334
  This shift away from the 
historical understanding of Jesus‘ resurrection may be partly responsible for some writers 
simply denying the bodily nature of Jesus‘ resurrection.335 
But there are many reasons why the resurrection should not be interpreted as a 
sheer meta-historical event, not to say that the appellation itself is self-contradictory.
336
  
First, this interpretation of the resurrection is difficult to square with Catholic teaching. 
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theologians, see Bernard P. Prusak, ―Bodily Resurrection in Catholic Perspectives,‖ Theological Studies 61 
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The Catechism of the Catholic Church remarks: ―Christ‘s Resurrection cannot be 
interpreted as something outside the physical order, and it is impossible not to 
acknowledge it as an historical fact.‖337  Pope John Paul II described the resurrection as, 
―in the first place, an historical event.  It took place in a precise context of time and 
place.‖  He went on to note that ―while the resurrection is an event determined according 
to time and place, nevertheless it transcends and stands above history … Christ's 
Resurrection is the greatest Event in the history of salvation, and indeed, we can say in 
the history of humanity, since it gives definitive meaning to the world. The whole world 
revolves around the Cross, but only in the Resurrection does the cross reach its full 
significance of salvific Event.‖338  While speaking of the resurrection as transcending 
history, it remains an event ―in the history of humanity‖ and is ―an event determined 
according to time and space.‖  If more nuanced, the late Pope seems in substantial accord 
with the Catechism. 
Second, the meta-historical view can hardly claim much precedent in the history 
of Jewish and Christian thought.  N.T. Wright has shown that the ahistorical view of 
Jesus‘ resurrection, which tends to reduce it to exaltation, is the product of modern 
theology: ―the idea that there was originally no difference for the earliest Christians 
between resurrection and exaltation/ascension is a twentieth century fiction, based on a 
misreading of Paul.‖339  Skeptical scholar Peter Carnley agrees with Wright: ―For many 
centuries the accepted and, indeed, quite unchallenged way of understanding the 
resurrection of Jesus … was to regard it as an historical event …. Regardless of whether 
                                                             
337 Catechism of the Catholic Church, N. 643.  
338 Pope John Paul II, Weekly Catechesis, March 1, 1989, 24; from Talks of John Paul II, 13 (Pro 
Ecclesia, 509 Madison Ave. New York 10022) 15 (1989).  
339 N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 625. 
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one relied on an authoritatively-backed, transmitted tradition or a more scientifically 
based reconstruction, supported by evidence and rational inference from it, the assertion 
that the resurrection of Jesus was an historical event of the past has been offered to men 
and women as the distinctive substance of Christian belief.‖340   
Furthermore, the meta-historical view involves, in the words of William Lane 
Craig, ―a patent misreading of the gospel narratives, not to speak of Jewish texts.‖  
Scholars who deny the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, in effect, turn it into ―Jesus‘ 
translation into heaven on the pattern of Enoch and Elijah, a quite different category than 
resurrection of the dead.‖341 
Third, even if the corpse of Jesus disappeared into an otherworldly state of 
incorruptible existence, this would not mean we should refrain from recognizing a 
historical transition. As Craig argues: 
Transitional events like stopping, exiting, and dying do not occur at any single spacetime 
point. That the sorites paradoxes are, indeed, the culprit here, and not the nature of the 
resurrection, is evident from the fact that even if the resurrection were conceived as a 
transformation wholly within space and time, one could not specify a single spacetime 
point at which it happened. Nevertheless, just as it is perfectly acceptable to say that the 
shopper exited the building, say, through the front door rather than the rear entrance, so 
Jesus' transformation to his glorified state can be similarly located in the sense that one 
can specify the spacetime point at which his corruptible existence ended. So just as the 
historian can determine where someone exited a building or when someone died, there is 
no in principle objection to the historian's determining where and when Jesus' 
resurrection occurred. It would be very much like determining on the basis of testimony 
and evidence where and when the children in C.S. Lewis' tale first stepped from this 
world into Narnia.342 
 
Thus proponents of the ahistorical view are hard put to escape from an historical 
understanding of Jesus‘ resurrection. 
                                                             
340 Peter Carnley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief, 29, 30. 
341 William Lane Craig's response to the metahistorical view of the resurrection, see his  ―‗Noli Me 
Tangere:‘ Why John Meier Won't Touch the Risen Lord‘, Heythrop Journal 50.1 (2009): 94. 
342 Ibid., 95. 
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Undoubtedly the newest quest for the historical Jesus has ushered in a strong 
wave of apologetic writings defending the historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection.  The main 
evidence considered usually consists of the post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, 
and the origin of the earliest disciples‘ belief in the Risen Christ, along with earliest 
Christians‘ worship practices despite their every predisposition to the contrary.  Apologist 
Gary Habermas has developed what is called the ―minimal facts approach‖343 to 
defending the resurrection.  According to him there are twelve widely accepted facts that 
have been furnished by the majority of New Testament scholars:   
 (1) Jesus died due to the rigors of crucifixion and (2) was buried. (3) Jesus‘ death caused 
the disciples to despair and lose hope.  (4) Although not as frequently recognized, many 
scholars hold that Jesus was buried in a tomb that was discovered to be empty just a few 
days later.   
Critical scholars even agree that (5) at this time the disciples had real experiences 
that they believed were literal appearances of the risen Jesus.  Because of these 
experiences, (6) the disciples were transformed from doubters who were afraid to identify 
themselves with Jesus to bold proclaimers of his death and resurrection, even being 
willing to die for this belief.  (7) This message was central in the early church preaching 
and (8) was especially proclaimed in Jerusalem, where Jesus had died shortly before. 
As a result of this message, (9) the church was born and grew, (10) with Sunday as 
the primary day of worship.  (11) James, the brother of Jesus and a skeptic, was 
converted to the faith when he also believed he saw the resurrected Jesus.  (12) A few 
years later Paul the persecutor of Christians was also converted by an experience that he, 
similarly, believed to be an appearance of the risen Jesus.344            
 
Habermas wants scholars to begin with the conclusions set by the scholarly consensus: 
―one of my interests is to ascertain if we can detect some widespread directions in the 
contemporary discussions—where are most recent scholars heading on these issues?  Of 
                                                             
343 For representative texts of Habermas, see The Historical Jesus: Ancient Evidence for the Life of 
Christ (Joplin: College Press, 1996); The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003); ―Explaining Away Jesus‘ Resurrection: The Recent Revival of Hallucination Theories,‖ Christian 
Research Journal, 23 (2001): 26-31; ―Experiences of the Risen Jesus: The Foundational Historical Issue in 
the Early Proclamation of the Resurrection,‖ Dialog: A Journal of Theology, 45.3 (Fall 2006): 288-297.  
344 Gary R. Habermas and Antony G.N. Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?: The Resurrection 
Debate, Terry L. Miethe, (ed) (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 19, 20.  
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course, the best way to do this is to comb through the literature and attempt to provide an 
accurate assessment.‖345   
The consensus is known from the conclusions set by most scholars who study the 
subject, including conservative and liberal scholars.  He explains how he is able to 
determine what counts as the consensus in his article: ―Resurrection Research from 1975 
to the Present: What are Critical Scholars Saying?‖  Says Habermas: ―Since 1975, more 
than 1400 scholarly publications on the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus have 
appeared. Over the last five years, I have tracked these texts, which were written in 
German, French, and English. Well over 100 subtopics are addressed in the literature, 
almost all of which I have examined in detail.‖346  By cataloguing the major trends in the 
field, Habermas wants everyone in the dialogue and/or debate to begin with the same 
basic evidence.   As indicated by Habermas in his major study, unbelievers and skeptics 
of Christianity have taken these reported facts seriously and try to account for them in 
purely naturalistic terms.
347
   
Let us turn now to the historical evidence for the resurrection before we assess the 
rival explanations of it.    
 
The Honorable Burial and Empty Tomb of Jesus 
Many scholars argue for the credibility of the honorable burial of Jesus. As Bart 
Ehrman writes: ―What I think we can say with confidence is that Jesus . . . probably was 
                                                             
345 Gary R. Habermas, ―Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical 
Scholars Saying?‖Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, 3.2 (January 2005): 135-153.  See also John 
M. G. Barclay, ―The Resurrection in Contemporary Biblical Scholarship,‖ in Gavin D‘Costa (ed.), 
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buried.‖348  Nowhere does Ehrman show signs of doubting the burial in his writings.  
Closely linked to the burial is the discovery of the empty tomb by a group of Jesus‘ 
women followers.  Ehrman says we have ―solid traditions‖ about the empty tomb, and 
that we can have ―some certainty‖ for its reliability.349   
Although the Gospels contain widely divergent portraits of Jesus, this would not 
mean that the historicity of certain central events reported in them are unreliable.
350
  All 
four Gospels agree that at least one woman discovered Jesus‘ empty tomb: ―It seems hard 
to believe that this just happened by a way of a fluke of storytelling.  It seems much more 
likely that, at least with the traditions involving the empty tomb, we are dealing with 
something actually rooted in history.‖351       
These conclusions are consistent with the judgment of many other scholars.
352
  
Usually cumulative case arguments are employed in support of the burial and/or empty 
tomb of Jesus.  While each piece of evidence may be individually suggestive, when 
combined together the case becomes all the more plausible.  Here I will briefly comb 
                                                             
348 Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 1999), 229.  Cf. 230.   
349 Bart D. Ehrman, ―From Jesus to Constantine: A History of Early Christianity,‖ Lecture 4, ―Oral 
and Written Traditions About Jesus,‖ (The Teaching Company, 2003).      
350 Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium, 232. 
351 Bart D. Ehrman, Peter, Paul and Mary Magdalene (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), p. 226.  
Cf. 227. 
352 See Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters 
(New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 332, 334; Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to New Testament 
Christology (Mahwah: Paulist, 1994), 170; William Lane Craig, in Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, 
(eds.), Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? (Downer‘s Grove: InterVarsity, 2003), 31-39; John Dominic 
Crossan, ―The Resurrection: Historical Event or Theological Explanation?: A Dialogue,‖ in Robert T. 
Stewart, (ed.), The Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright in Dialogue 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 33; also see his ―Bodily-Resurrection Faith,‖ 176; Gerald O‘Collins, 
Believing in the Resurrection: The Meaning and Promise of the Risen Jesus (Mahwah: Paulist, 2012), 80-
99; Pheme Perkins, ―The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,‖ in Bruce Chilton and Craig A. Evans, (eds.), 
Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluations of the State of Current Research (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 435-
437, 442; Geza Vermes, The Resurrection of Jesus: History and Myth (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 140, 
141; N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 321, 686-696, 709-
710 
144 
 
through the relevant literature to present the most common arguments used in support of 
these reported facts.  
The first prong of the argument in support of the empty tomb lies in establishing the 
burial of Jesus in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea.  If one recognizes the burial account, 
then the place of Jesus‘s tomb would have been known to Jew and Roman (and probably 
the women disciples).  By identifying the historicity of the burial, this creates a 
conundrum for those who deny the empty tomb because they must answer the question as 
to how the disciples preached the resurrection in the city of Jerusalem, the city where 
Jesus died and was buried.
353
  The enemies of the Christian faith could have easily gone 
to the tomb and paraded the body across the streets to subvert the new Christian heresy.  
Notice that the case for the burial and empty tomb is just as crude as the historicity of the 
crucifixion or the existence of Jesus himself.  Nothing is miraculous about these events.     
First, the burial is mentioned in the primitive confession of 1 Cor. 15:4, which can 
be traced back to within the earliest time after the crucifixion.  The passage is written by 
Paul to ensure and reinforce that Jesus truly died and was buried.  In this verse, we read: 
―For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died for our 
sins according to the scriptures, and that he was buried. . .‖  Dale Allison points out that 
―The Greek verb [in verse 4] means to ‗bury‘ and would hardly be used of the 
unceremonious dumping of a criminal into an unmarked trench as dog food; that was not 
burial but its denial.‖354   
Second, the burial account was in the source material used by Mark—and is 
probably very old.  As William Lane Craig comments, ―It is now universally 
                                                             
353 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkens and Duane A. Priebe, 2d 
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acknowledged that the burial account was part of that story, which was used as source 
material by Mark.  There is no break at all between Mark‘s description of Jesus‘ death 
(Mark 15:33-41) and his description of Jesus‘ burial (Mark 15:42-47).  It is a continuous 
narrative, and there is no reason to think that Mark‘s source ended abruptly with Jesus‘ 
death without telling of His burial.  That means that the burial account is very old and 
therefore probably historically reliable.‖355     
The third evidence for the burial comes from analyzing the role that Joseph of 
Arimathea played in the burial account.  As Wolfhart Pannenberg states, ―The burial itself 
is tied to the name of Joseph of Arimathea.  This can hardly have been invented 
secondarily, since the entire tradition about Jesus‘ burial hangs on this name.‖356   
Fourth, the tomb stories in the Gospels do not show signs of legendary traces and are 
written in a straightforward, factual way (Mark 15:42-47; John 19:38-42).  All four 
Gospels mention the burial story—a significant point given the criteria of multiple 
attestation: ―each contains additional traditions presupposing that Jesus was not thrown 
onto a pile for criminals but rather interred (Matt. 27:62-66; 28:11-15; Mark 14:8; 16:1-8; 
Luke 24:13-35; John 20:1-10, 11-18).‖357   
Fifth, considering the different kinds of tombs that archaeologists have furnished us 
with, it is evident that Jesus‘s tomb was probably an acrosolia tomb, or what is known as 
a ―bench tomb‖ (this tomb is consistent with someone with the status of Joseph of 
Arimathea).
358
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Sixth, the fact that women saw the burial place where Jesus was laid is highly 
probable, confirming the historicity of the burial.  ―The crucial point here,‖ says Stephen 
Davis, ―is that the Gospels all claim that the location of Jesus‘ tomb was known to the 
women and to the disciples (Mark 15:47; Matt. 27:61; Luke 23:55; John 20:1).  This claim 
is clearly embedded in the burial account of Jesus.‖359  The Jewish New Testament scholar 
Pinchas Lapide argues that ―The circumstances that the women wanted to anoint the dead 
Jesus shortly after his burial, as Jewish custom demanded, proves that basically none of 
the disciples nor the women themselves, . . . expected his resurrection (my emphasis 
added).‖360  Therefore it is implausible that Jesus was not buried or that the place of the 
tomb was unknown.  
Closely linked to the burial account are the traditional arguments for the empty 
tomb.   
First, the earliest Jewish polemic against the resurrection presupposes that the tomb 
was empty, or at least shifted elsewhere (Matt. 28:11-15; John 20:2, 13, 15).  As Gerald 
O‘Collins has stated, ―We have no early evidence that anyone, either Christian or non-
Christian, ever alleged that Jesus‘ tomb still contained his remains.‖361  Thus the earliest 
Jewish argument against the resurrection was not whether the tomb was empty, but who 
or what emptied it.   
Next, the relevant texts mentioning the empty tomb are not apologetical or creative 
in scope; they intend on giving historical fact (cf. Mark 16:1-8; John 20:1, 2, 11-18).  To 
appreciate how sober Mark‘s account is, for example, one ought to read the account of 
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the resurrection in the Gospel of Peter. This gospel describes Jesus‘ egress from the tomb 
with angels accompanying the risen body into the heavens.  A talking cross and a voice 
from heaven are heard in this magnificent scene.  The event is witnessed by the Roman 
guard, the Jews and a multitude of other people.  Unlike the Gospels, this kind of 
description is characteristic of a legendary account.   
Moreover, women are seen as the ones who discover the empty tomb.
362
  As 
illustrated by Lapide: ―in a purely fictional narrative one would have avoided making 
women the crown witnesses of the resurrection since they were considered in rabbinic 
Judaism as incapable of giving valid testimony (compare Luke 24:11).‖363  Legend 
makers do not usually invent positively unhelpful information.  Pinchas Lapide seems to 
attest to this point: ―nowhere in the most ancient reports is it asserted that the statements 
of the women brought anyone to faith in the resurrection.‖364   
The wording that Jesus was ‗buried and then raised‘ in 1 Cor. 15 implies the empty 
tomb.
365  
Even though the empty tomb is not explicitly mentioned in the creed, this would 
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not mean Paul did not know about it, or that we cannot infer that it was factual.
366
  
Commenting on these verses, N.T. Wright remarked,  
Early Christianity did not consist of a new spirituality or ethic.  It consisted of the 
announcement of things that had happened, whose significance lay precisely in their 
happenedness: specifically, the messiah‘s death, burial, and resurrection. . . The empty 
tomb, though not mentioned here, is presupposed.  It is we, not the early Christians, who 
have made the empty tomb a major focal point of discussion.  For Paul the Pharisee, 
saying ‗he was raised, leaving an empty tomb‘ would have been tautologous.367   
 
Raymond Brown concurs with Wright on these passages: ―It is not difficult to understand 
why this presupposition of an empty tomb may not have been articulated until later.  The 
early preachers were not giving continuous accounts of what happened but were 
proclaiming the risen Jesus.‖368       
Still other scholars proposed different reasons why Paul did not explicitly mention 
the empty tomb.  Perhaps he was disinclined to mention it because he has up to this point 
in the letter been at pains to persuade his readers that he is just as much as an apostle as 
James and the others (cf. 1 Cor. 9:1-5).  Maybe Paul knew that the Corinthians already 
knew about it and did not feel the need to mention it.  Maybe it was not as important as 
the appearances and/or salvation (cf. 1 Cor. 1:23).  It must be remembered that in the 
Jewish mindset the empty tomb would have been axiomatic given what was meant by 
resurrection.  Resurrection in Judaism, to be sure, included one‘s physical body.369                       
The notion of ―on the third day‖ in 1 Cor 15. counts as additional evidence for the 
empty tomb.
370
  As Craig concluded in his excellent article, ―the phrase ‗on the third day‘ 
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in the formula of 1 Cor. 15 is a time indicator for the events of Easter, including the 
empty tomb, employing language of the Old Testament concerning God‘s acts of 
deliverance and victory on the third day, perhaps with texts like Jonah 2.11 and Hos 6.2 
especially in mind.  The phrase is, in Liechtenstein‘s words, a fusion of historical facts 
plus theological tradition.‖371  The third day motif is not only found in Paul‘s letters, it 
can be found in other places in the New Testament.         
In addition, since the gravesite was not venerated by the early Christians, this 
connotes that it was empty; for there were no remains to be venerated (cf. Matt. 22:29).
372
  
As James Dunn puts it: ―This is indeed striking, because within contemporary Judaism, 
as in other religions, the desire to honour the memory of the revered dead by constructing 
appropriate tombs and (by implication) by veneration of the site is well attested.‖373  N.T. 
Wright fortifies this point by explaining why the disciples would have venerated the 
gravesite: ―The practice is usually thought to reflect a belief in resurrection, in that the 
bones of the individual person continued to matter.‖374    
Through the criteria of multiple attestation scholars have constructed arguments for 
the empty tomb.  Each of the Gospels, with indirect references in Acts and 1 Corinthians, 
provide an empty tomb scene (Matt. 28:1-8; Mark 16:1-8; Luke 24:1-12; John 20:1-8; 
Acts 2:27-29; 1 Cor. 15:4).  In each of the Gospels the tomb is vacated and confirmed by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1976), 146, 147; George Eldon Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1975), 109.          
371 William Lane Craig, ―The Historicity of the Empty Tomb of Jesus,‖ New Testament Studies, 31 
(1985): 39-67.  The ―third day‖ motif can be seen as a theological interpretation, but I think Craig‘s 
conclusions are  defensible.    
372 The Church of the Holy Sepulchre may stand on the original burial site, which would imply a 
living memory of venerating Jesus‘s grave.  But for authorities who think otherwise, see Dunn, Jesus 
Remembered, 837, 838; Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, 579.         
373 Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 837.   
374 Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, 579.   
150 
 
an angel who says Jesus is not there (cf. Matt. 28:6; Mark 16:6; Luke 24:6; John 
20:12).
375
  
Like the case for the burial account, the empty tomb is part of the pre-Markan 
Passion story.  In this part of Mark we do not see any kerygmatic coloring, prophecy 
citations from the Old Testament, and/or use of christological titles.  This has led some 
scholars into thinking that we are working with very old material.
376
   
Since the disciples preached the resurrection in Jerusalem, it is difficult to believe 
that the tomb, which would have been in an identifiable place, still contained the cadaver 
of Jesus.  Enemies of Easter faith could have gone to the tomb to prove that Jesus was not 
raised.
377
  Instead, we see no resistance from the Jews.  Apologist Stephen Davis 
concludes: ―We can infer, therefore, that the apostles‘ proclamation of the resurrection 
was successful precisely because (among other things) nobody was able to produce the 
corpse.‖378  In conclusion, the affirmation of the historicity of the burial and empty tomb 
are consistent with the cumulative case arguments provided by many scholars.  As Hans 
Freiherr von Campenhausen concluded: ―If one examines what there is to examine, one 
cannot avoid accepting as fact the news of the empty tomb itself and of its early 
discovery.  There is a great deal that is convincing and definite to be said for it and little 
to be said against it; it is, therefore, in all probability, historical.‖379  
 
The Historicity of the Post-Mortem Appearances of Jesus 
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Another significant piece of historical evidence for the resurrection is the earliest 
disciples‘ experience of what they at least thought were appearances of the risen Jesus.380  
These appearances occurred to different individuals, groups, and even enemies of Jesus 
and his closest followers: ―some of his disciples claimed to have seen him alive 
afterward.  Among those who made this claim, interestingly enough, was Jesus‘ own 
brother James. . . Paul claims that he himself saw Jesus after his death.‖381  Elsewhere, 
Ehrman says: ―There is little doubt, historically, about what converted Paul.  He had a 
vision of Jesus raised from the dead.  That is what he himself says, and it is recorded as 
one of the key incidents in the book of Acts.‖382    
Paul‘s experience of the risen Jesus was so strong that he sought to convert the 
Gentiles to faith in Jesus.  Unlike his previous convictions, Paul held that all people were 
meant to believe in Jesus.  Ehrman continues: ―The vision showed Paul beyond any 
reasonable doubt that Jesus—who had been crucified, dead, and buried—had come back 
to life.  There was only one possible explanation for Jesus coming back to life: God must 
have raised him from the dead.  And if God raised him form the dead—well, that changed 
everything.‖383  Paul‘s visual experience was so significant to him that almost all of his 
subsequent theology was centered around the truth of Jesus‘ death and resurrection.384       
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384 Ibid., 113. 
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Ehrman‘s historical conclusions about the appearances are supported by many 
lines of evidence.  First, the earliest and most reliable testimony that we have on the 
appearances is found in the ancient creed of 1 Cor. 15:3-8.
385
  Exegetically speaking, 
Raymond Brown, Pinchas Lapide and many others have demonstrated that the wording 
for ―received‖ and ―passed on‖ in verses 3-5 were technical standard terms for the 
handing down of sacred tradition in rabbinic Judaism.
386
  Paul is therefore trying to 
convince his readers in the most solemn way possible that Jesus appeared to them.
387
  
Ehrman writes that Paul‘s listing of percipients, coupled with the ―five hundred‖ in verse 
6, is written for apologetic purposes.
388
  Pannenberg also recognized this point: ―The 
appearance to the five hundred brethren at once cannot be a secondary construction to be 
explained by the development of the history of traditions, because Paul calls attention 
precisely here to the possibility of checking his assertion by saying that most of the five 
hundred are still alive.‖389  There is no reason for Paul to mention the 500 unless he 
expects his readers to question (challenge) them as witnesses.   
An analysis of these passages indicates the extramental, physical nature of the 
appearances.
390
  Ehrman himself agrees with this assessment.
391
  Any neutral observer, 
who did not have faith in Jesus, could see an appearance (e.g., Paul, James, etc.).
392
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According to Stephen Davis, ―The suggestion that only the eyes of faith could ‗see‘ the 
Risen Jesus seems a twentieth century import, quite foreign to New Testament 
tradition.‖393  This contention is bolstered by the fact that Jesus appeared to enemies and 
perhaps those who were indifferent to him during his earthly life.   
The prominence of women also lends credibility to the appearance traditions 
(Matt. 28; John 20).
394
  Because women were regarded as inferior to men at the time, they 
were, for all intents and purposes, unable to be counted as legal witnesses.  So if these 
stories were legendary accounts, then the writer would have made men rather than 
women as the original percipients of Jesus risen.         
The diverse reporting of the appearances does not give an impression that they 
were contrived or wholly fabricated either.  As James D.G. Dunn wrote, ―Particularly in 
Matthew, Luke, and John 21, there has been no real attempt to provide a sequence or 
structured listing.  Overall, the impression is given of a number of reported sightings 
which occurred on what might otherwise be called a random basis.‖  The writers (esp. 
Matthew) make hardly any attempt to pacify the doubts of the original percipients.  
Therefore, says Dunn, the appearances were most likely ―part of the original eyewitness 
testimony.‖395  Nowhere in the New Testament are the appearances described ―as a 
miracle, as an event of salvation, or as a deed of God, a fact which tends to support the 
plausibility of the report for the disinterested reader.‖396  Instead they were written with 
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the intention of relaying the bald fact that Jesus appeared to them.  The appearances, to be 
sure, ceased shortly after the crucifixion (John 20:29; 1 Pet. 1:8).    
 The final line of evidence stems from the multiple sources from which the 
appearance traditions originate.  All four Gospels give witness to them, even to the ones 
found in the Pauline corpus.  The appearance to Peter is independently attested to by Paul 
and Luke (1 Cor. 15:5; Luke 24:34); the appearance to the Twelve is mentioned by Paul, 
Luke, and John (1 Cor. 15:5; Luke 24:36-43; John 20:19, 20); and the appearances to the 
disciples in Galilee are mentioned in Mark, Matthew, and John (Mark 16:7; Matt. 28:16, 
17; John 21).  The Gospels take for granted that there were many different percipients 
who saw them at different times and places―and under different circumstances. 
To conclude: many scholars (if not a consensus) are convinced that after the 
crucifixion the risen Jesus made himself seen to friend and foe alike.
397
  In the words of 
the critical historian E.P. Sanders: ―That Jesus‘ followers (and later Paul) had resurrection 
experiences is, in my judgment, a fact.  What the reality was that gave rise to the 
experiences I do not know.‖  Says Sanders: ―Finally we know that after his death his 
followers experienced what they described as the ‗resurrection‘: the appearance of a 
living but transformed person who actually died.‖398  James Dunn adds: ―It is almost 
impossible to dispute that at the historical roots of Christianity lie some visionary 
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experiences of the first Christians, who understood them as appearances of Jesus, raised 
by God from the dead.‖399 
 
The Origins of Easter Faith 
But the empty tomb and appearances are not all we have.  As a result of these 
visual experiences, Ehrman writes that ―Historians, of course, have no difficulty speaking 
about belief in Jesus‘ resurrection, since this is a matter of public record.  It is a historical 
fact that some of Jesus‘ followers came to believe that he had been raised from the dead 
soon after his execution.  We know some of these believers by name; one of them, the 
apostle Paul, claims to have seen him alive after his death.‖400  Notice that no other view 
of the afterlife is affirmed and defended by the earliest Christians.  So strong was their 
belief in the resurrected Jesus that they proclaimed him as the ―Son of God,‖ the ―Jewish 
Messiah,‖ and ―Lord of All.‖401  Moreover, without these beliefs, ―the religious 
movement [Jesus] started would have died with him.  There never would have been a 
Christianity.‖402  Unlike Second Temple Judaism, the resurrection was at the front and 
center of the newly formed faith.     
Here too Ehrman is in agreement with many New Testament historians.
403
  
Indeed, whatever critics may think about the empty tomb and the appearances, the first 
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Christians for whom we have evidence for at least believed that Jesus had been raised 
from the dead (and not ascended, assumed, or immortalized to heaven).  This belief, 
moreover, was at the very heart of earliest Christianity.  N.T. Wright recognized that ―the 
historical study of early Christian practice and hope leaves us no choice but to conclude 
that this unfortunate belief was what all early Christians held.  Indeed, they professed that 
it was the very centre of their life.‖404  Not only is this belief ―unanimous‖ and 
―unambiguous,‖ but the sources we have are ―sober,‖ ―critical,‖ and ―reserved,‖ without a 
shred of ―extravagant enthusiasm‖ which we would expect to hear in legendary 
accounts.
405
   
Phrases referring to this belief are probably the oldest and most distinctive in 
early Christianity.
406
  Indicated by the Greek words egreirein, a transitive verb that means 
―to awaken‖ or ―to raise up,‖ and anastanai, which means ―to arise,‖ reference to belief 
in Jesus‘ resurrection is found in many places (Rom. 4:24, 25, 6:4, 7:4, 8:11; 1 Cor. 6:14, 
15:4, 12, 20; 1 Cor. 6:14, 2 Cor. 4;14, Gal. 1:1, Col. 2:12, 1 Thes. 1:10; Eph. 1:20; 2 Tim. 
2:8; Heb. 13:20; 1 Pet. 1:21; Acts 3:15, 4:10, 5:30, 10:40, 13:30, 37).  As Gerald 
O‘Collins rightly observes: ―The primary claim was not that Jesus‘ cause continued or 
that the disciples had been ―raised‖ to a new consciousness and the life of faith . . . , but 
that the crucified Jesus had been personally brought from the state of death to that of a 
new and lasting life.‖407   
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Other noteworthy factors accompanying the disciples‘ belief include the 
transformation of the first disciples from doubters to bold proclaimers of the resurrection 
(Acts 4, 5); the apostolic preaching, which was almost exclusively centered on the risen 
Jesus (Acts 2:22ff., 3:15, 26);
408
 the early and successful growth of the church (cf. Acts 
2:41, 47, 4:4, 6:1);
409
 the drastic change that took place in Jewish social structures; the 
origin of the Christian understanding of the eucharist;
410
 the new meaning poured into 
water baptism;
411
 the Sabbath being changed from Saturday to Sunday;
412
  the first 
disciples‘ willingness to die for their belief (cf. Acts 2:41-47, 4:1-4),413 including the 
resistance they showed against the Roman Empire;
414
 the fact that within a few months or 
years after Jesus‘ life they spoke about him in divine terms;415 they had a heightened 
respect for the physical world;
416
 the early conversion of Jewish priests (Acts 6:7) and 
other enemies of the faith (e.g., Paul: Phil. 3:4-6).
417
  Not to be overlooked, the listing of 
Peter as the first one to see an appearance (Luke 24:34; 1 Cor. 15:5) is significant, 
testifying to their Easter beliefs. 
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In order to appreciate the remarkable modification of earliest belief in Jesus‘ 
bodily resurrection, one should understand the prevailing views of the afterlife in Judaism 
at the time.
418
  Jews held that (1) all people, or a least a large group of the Jewish nation, 
would be raised from the dead together (not one individual apart from the rest); (2) the 
resurrection would occur at the eschaton, never in the middle of history (as in the case of 
Jesus); (3) none of the risen would play a role in the divine judgment (according to the 
Christians, however, the Risen One was the judge of all humankind); (4) the Messiah 
would not die, much less rise from the dead.  Nor did they think that (5) God, or YHWH, 
would be raised from the dead in human form (cf. 2 Clement 1:1).   
Conversely, the first Christians proclaimed specific things about Jesus‘ 
resurrection: (1) they believed in a resurrected and crucified rabbi, which was seen by 
Jews as a curse from God (cf. Deut 21:23); (2) they claimed that the general resurrection 
had somehow already begun (1 Cor. 15:20-23);  (3) they unanimously placed the 
resurrection at the center of their message, excluding all other views of the afterlife 
(unlike the Jews, whose resurrection doctrine was peripheral and even debatable among 
other eschatological beliefs); (4) the Christians argued that the resurrected body was 
―incorruptible‖ and ―imperishable‖ (unlike the Jews, who never commented on the nature 
of the risen body); (5) they spoke of God‘s Kingdom as having come—and still having to 
come—a very nuanced position to be in; (6) and they propagated the good news to all 
people, regardless of race, gender, or social status—something the Jews did not feel the 
need to do, either before and during the rise of Christianity.  All of these drastic changes 
should prompt historians to ask: what could have caused these major modifications?    
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The Significance of Earliest Christian Worship 
Another salient component of earliest Christianity is the church‘s worship and 
devotional life.  This phenomenon has been discussed by New Testament scholars such 
as Larry Hurtado, Richard Bauckham, and James Dunn.  Scholars working in early 
Christian worship rarely mention the antecedent causes that were responsible for bringing 
these practices into being, and their work has profound implications for resurrection 
apologetics.   
First, the New Testament writers presupposed Jewish monotheism (Rom. 3:28-30; 
1 Cor. 8:1-6; John 10:30), but the earliest Christians infused belief in one God with a 
definitive, new meaning at an exceptionally early date.  Says Bauckham: ―With the 
inclusion of Jesus in the unique identity of YHWH, the faith of the Shema is affirmed and 
maintained, but everything the Shema requires of God‘s people is now focused on Jesus.  
Exclusive devotion is now given to Jesus, but Jesus does not thereby replace or compete 
with God the Father, since he himself belongs to the unique divine identity.‖419  The 
highest Christology was accompanied by a particular pattern of liturgical worship.
420
  
Unlike Judaism, Christians held that redemption was not found through obedience 
to Torah.  Rather, all people, regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity, could find salvation 
by accepting Jesus.  ―The Torah is thereby shown not to be the basis of redemption, and 
so it cannot be made obligatory for Gentile Christians.‖421  Likewise, Hurtado lists six 
cultic actions in earliest Christian worship that distinguish it from Second-Temple Jewish 
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worship.  Although there is some precedent and analogy between the two, the earliest 
believers took worship one step further by giving Jesus cultic devotion—the best 
indication that Jesus was attributed with divinity.  These mutations, Hurtado‘s words, are 
―a direct outgrowth from, and indeed a variety of, the ancient Jewish tradition.  But an 
earlier stage it exhibited a sudden and significant difference in character from Jewish 
devotion.‖422   
These uncontroversial practices include the following:  (1) Prayer was offered to 
God through Jesus Christ (e.g., Rom 1:8); (2) In the Church‘s rituals, Jesus was invoked 
and confessed (this implies that Jesus was given a divine status); (3) Jesus‘ name was 
invoked in the ritual of baptism; (4) The association of Jesus with the Lord‘s Supper 
connotes that he was a living divine power who own the meal and presides over it.  This 
means that he was seen a as Lord of the entire Christian congregation.  This was striking 
at the time, especially considering that it was celebrated in contradistinction to the cult 
meals of the pagan gods in Roman religion; (5) In the early church‘s hymns, the 
Christians literally sang to Jesus by using Old Testament Psalms, interpreted 
Christologically; (6) The use of prophetic speech in the context of Christian worship was 
seen and experienced as the voice of the risen Jesus.
423
   
Noting that there is nothing compelling in Second Temple Judaism to compel the 
first Christians to fabricate these cultic actions (though Hurtado argues that the Jewish 
veneration of the patriarchs, heroic figures, principal angels, and personified attributes of 
God assisted the first believers with the conceptual categories necessary for verbally 
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articulating what happened to Jesus),
424
 Hurtado says early devotion was 
characteristically expressed in terms of Jesus‘ special relationship to God, and in 
conjunction with God‘s action in the world.425  In the earliest evidence we have (Paul‘s 
letters), Jesus holds a status of divinity, or at least participating in divinity.
426
  This is 
attested by Paul‘s belief in Jesus‘ pre-existence, which denotes the fact that Jesus‘ origin 
and meaning lie exclusively in God, and that his appearance in history corresponds to his 
role in the redemption of the human race.
427
 
Contending that there are two ways to interpret the pertinent evidence from the 
Second Temple Jewish era, Bauckham argues that the Christians‘ earliest beliefs about 
Jesus were not possible by ―applying to Jesus a Jewish category of semi-divine 
intermediary status, but by identifying Jesus directly with the one God of Israel, including 
Jesus in the unique identity of this one God.‖428   He analyzes biblical passages such as 
Deuteronomy 6:4-6 and the Decalogue. Second Temple Jews were strictly monotheistic 
well before the origins of the Christian movement.  Thus, the inclusion of Jesus along 
with God cries out for some sort of extraordinary explanation.   
At the time of Jesus, Jews understood God as the exclusive Creator and Ruler of 
the universe.  Thus, Bauckham: ―To our question, ‗In what did Second Temple Judaism 
consider the uniqueness of the one God to consist, what distinguished God as unique 
from all other reality, including beings worshipped as gods by Gentiles?,‘ the answer 
given again and again, in a wide variety of Second Temple Jewish literature, is that the 
only true God, YHWH, the God of Israel, is the sole Creator of all things and sole Ruler 
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of all things.‖429  As in the case of Hurtado, Jesus is suddenly seen as the creator along 
with God.
430
  As Bauckham rightly insists:  
if we attend carefully and accurately, on the one hand, to the ways in which Second 
Temple Judaism characterized the unique identity of the one and only God and, on the 
other hand, to what New Testament writers say about Jesus, it becomes abundantly clear 
that New Testament writers include Jesus in the unique identity of the one God.  They do 
so carefully, deliberately, consistently and comprehensively, by including Jesus in 
precisely those divine characteristics which for Second Temple Judaism distinguished the 
one God as unique.  All New Testament Christology is, in this sense, very high 
Christology, stated in the highest terms available in first-century Jewish theology.431 
   
On the one hand, Second Temple Jews viewed YHWH as the only sovereign being.  On 
the other hand, Christians saw the Exalted Jesus as sovereign.
432
  While Jews held that 
YHWH was higher than all angelic beings, the earliest Christians affirmed that Jesus was 
higher than all angels.
433
  While YHWH has a unique divine name in the Old Testament, 
so Christians also give Jesus the same unique name.  Lastly, Jews held that God was to 
receive exclusive worship, not worship alongside of other pagan deities.
434
  The first 
Christians exclusively worshipped Jesus.  No other gods in the Greco-Roman world 
deserved honorable worship alongside of him.   
But James Dunn is quick to add that the Scriptural witness in support of 
worshipping Jesus is unable to point us in any conclusive direction: ―the use of 
proskynein in the sense of offering worship to Jesus seems to be rather limited.‖435  With 
respect to the early church‘s prayer, hymns, sacred times, places, meals, and people, ―the 
data is more complex and the implications not so clearly drawn.‖436   
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For him the whole notion of worshipping Jesus is misleading.  The question is not 
so much ―Did the first Christians worship Jesus?‖ as much as it should be ―Was early 
worship possible without Jesus?‖  Worship, therefore, was not possible without including 
Jesus and God in the power of the Spirit: ―Worship of Jesus that is not worship of God 
through Jesus, or, more completely, worship of God through Jesus and in the Spirit, is not 
Christian worship.‖437  In Dunn‘s reading, then, the worship of Christ at the expense of 
including God the Father and the Holy Spirit is tantamount to committing ―Jesus-olatry.‖  
Although the first believers did not explicitly formulate a doctrine of the Trinity, it was 
this novel understanding that was hugely significant and complements the other 
modifications mentioned by Bauckham and Hurtado.   
Hence, the single biggest distinction in earliest Christianity was its insistence on 
worshipping a person who once walked the earth.  This in itself was a huge mutation and 
also has no parallel, let alone linguistic parallel, in Judaism.  They included the teachings 
of his earthly ministry.  This was probably based on their innovative theology of Jesus‘ 
resurrection body (i.e., the same body that died was the same body that rose from the 
grave).  The risen Jesus is the same Jesus that the disciples knew during his life: ―in what 
became the dominant view, Jesus‘ real human and historical reality remained as crucial as 
the heavenly glory that he was believed to share.‖438  Moreover, there is hardly any 
indication that there was ―any controversy or serious variance about this exalted place of 
Jesus among the various other Christian circles with which he was acquainted.‖439    
Indeed, Judaism forbade the apotheosis or the divinization of human persons.  
This makes Christian devotion all the more remarkable given that Christianity was seen 
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as an early sect of Judaism which also held that Jesus was divine.
440
  Bauckham here 
complements Hurtado: ―When New Testament Christology is read with this Jewish 
theological context in mind [i.e. a strictly monotheistic context], it becomes clear that, 
from the earliest post-Easter beginnings of Christology onwards, early Christians 
included Jesus, precisely and unambiguously, within the unique identity of the one true 
God of Israel.  They did so by including Jesus in the unique, defining characteristics by 
which Jewish monotheism identified God as unique.‖441   
Moreover, according to Bauckham, we can safely surmise that the Christology of 
the first Christians was already the highest Christology: ―one should note the most 
significant difference between earliest Christianity and other contemporary religious 
groups: the place of the exalted Jesus in the religious life, devotion, or piety of its 
adherents.‖442   
Worship of Jesus was not in competition for the devotion given to God, but both 
were included by believers.
443
 Although the first Christians considered themselves strict 
monotheists, what made them so different from the Jews was that they introduced a 
binitarian devotional pattern directed to God and Christ alone.  This was heretical in 
Judaism because it contravened the prayers, hymns, and devotion reserved for the God of 
biblical tradition.  There is simply no analogy in the Second-Temple period to 
accommodate this binitarian pattern of worship.   
In a similar vein, Christian devotion also placed strict demands on converts to 
renounce all forms of pagan worship, demanding an exclusivist devotion to Christ and 
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God.
444
  Thus Hurtado: ―We cannot appreciate early Christian worship, unless we keep 
before our eyes the fact that for Gentile Christians it represented a replacement cultus.  It 
was at one and the same time both a religious commitment and a renunciation, a stark and 
demanding devotional stance with profound repercussions.‖445  This exclusivist approach 
obligated converts to abandon certain aspects of common life, and in some cases this 
created tensions within their family life.
446
   
The sustenance of the Christian understanding monotheism in the face of the 
Roman religions was another striking feature of early worship.  The worship of one God 
was at clearly at odds with the polytheistic belief that the gods could be worshipped in 
any combination.  Pagans could not understand why they could not add worship to Jesus 
alongside the worship of other gods.
447
  Since Christianity was one religion competing in 
a marketplace of religions, and considering it had an exclusivist stance, there must have 
been some other feature that made it powerfully attractive to outsiders.
448
  Early worship 
attracted outsiders because of the way in which it changed its adherents.   
Another reason why it spread so quickly had to do with the adversarial encounter 
of other religions which drove and shaped the movement.
449
  Martyrdom was ―the most 
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vivid form in which devotion to Jesus was expressed in the earliest centuries.‖450  Dying 
for one‘s beliefs indicated to the public on a large scale that some Christians were willing 
to go to any length of penalty to remain faithful followers of Jesus.  Of course, this made 
outsiders curious and attracted them to investigate the newly found faith.      
Christ‘s followers made the radical claim that Jesus must be worshipped because 
he was Messiah—the mediator of cosmic redemption.451  This is truly remarkable given 
that Jesus‘ messianic titles and the worship given to him occurred only after he was 
crucified in a Greco-Roman cultural and religious milieu.  Another important aspect is 
that the earliest Christian tradition of worship can be traced back to an early time period, 
soon after the crucifixion.  This precludes the idea the idea that Christian practices 
substantially evolved decades after the Christ event.452  Early devotion to Jesus cannot be 
attributed to pagan religious influences on their Jewish-Christian thought, even to Jews 
who were living in the Diaspora.
453
  The antiquity of the practices reaches too far back in 
time.   
 
Assessing the Evidence for Jesus’ Resurrection 
Responsible historians recognize that historiography is not about pronouncing 
mathematically certain conclusions about the past.
454
  Rather, it is about ascertaining 
probabilistic conclusions about the past.  Some events are more likely to be true than 
others.  Ehrman, for instance, departs from many other historians when he denies that the 
resurrection hypothesis (cast as an historical inference) is the best explanation of the 
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evidence.
455
  Instead a different scenario is proposed by him: Jesus taught that God was 
soon going to intervene in history.  Because Jesus‘ disciples loved him, they were 
convinced that God would eventually vindicate him as the Messiah.  After Jesus was 
crucified, the disciples had visions of him (visual experiences akin to the widow‘s 
bereavement experiences
456
), remembered his messianic teachings about himself, and 
decided that he must be risen from the dead.
457
        
Now, apologists might play a significant role in helping doubters and unbelievers 
to overcome intellectual obstacles set in the path of faith.  Let us now turn to some of the 
most salient challenges of skeptics in the post-Vatican II era in light of the previous facts 
which are widely accepted by the majority of New Testament scholars who study the 
subject.  
The first objection is that there are too many contradictions in the resurrection 
narratives for them to be considered reliable.  But this complaint shows a hesitancy to 
take the evidence that was tentatively established in the New Testament documents 
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seriously.  Since we have already admitted to certain facts as evidence, this objection acts 
as a smokescreen in taking the explanation of that evidence seriously.  New Testament 
historians are not trying to demonstrate the resurrection of Jesus, and so they admit that 
other possible explanations might account for the data.  The more interesting question, 
however, is whether the resurrection hypothesis is the best explanation of the evidence.    
Even if there are contradictions in the resurrection narratives, this would not be 
any more significant than the report of a past event by a number of individuals with 
different perspectives.  The different theologies of the Evangelists can correspond to 
historical figures.   
Although it may be the case that no harmonization in the Gospels is possible, ―these 
irreconcilable divergences . . . agree on one thing: Jesus appeared to certain disciples 
after his death; he proved himself living and was proclaimed to have been risen from the 
dead.  That is the centre, the core, where all the traditions meet.‖458   
           So, notwithstanding the legends, exaggerations, and the obvious use of 
imagination portrayed in the Gospels, this does not preclude the possibility of historicity.  
Blomberg concluded, ―the similarities far outweigh the differences.  And of the 
differences which do appear, many simply reflect varying theological interpretations of 
the same historical events without calling into question the fundamental historicity of the 
events themselves.‖459  
Considering that the appearances were in history, but still had a mysterious, 
eschatological quality about them, we should not be surprised to see some 
―contradictions‖ in the texts.  The different theological emphases in the narratives might 
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reflect different accommodations directed to the original readers.  Likewise, it would be 
a mistake to consider the narratives purely legendary because they are not ―word for 
word‖ translations of what Jesus said (or that the narratives are not chronological listings 
of what happened first, second, and so on).   
We must also keep in mind that we are dealing with texts that have been analyzed 
and pulled apart more than any other work of literature in the past 300 years.  Clearly we 
should expect to see a few ―contradictions‖ in them.  Be that as it may, no reputable 
historian who finds a few of these discrepancies in her sources would automatically 
conclude that they are purely legendary.  Many historians argue that some contradictions 
may provide greater weight to the reliability of the central events reported in them.  
These contradictions would give the careful reader the impression that the story was not 
contrived.   
           Lastly, even if the Gospels were hopelessly contradictory (which they are not), 
this would not leave us with nothing.  We still have to reckon with Paul’s account in 1 
Corinthians 15.    
The second argument against the resurrection hypothesis is that the oral traditions 
undergirding the Gospels are unreliable.  Ehrman, for instance, claims that cultural 
anthropologists have shown that oral means of preserving religious teachings are usually 
unreliable.   
But these studies do not necessarily apply in the case of ancient rabbinic oral 
tradition.  More important for our purposes is that this objection confuses the two steps 
in the argument (step one is about gathering the evidence, and step two is about 
explaining the evidence).  No matter the uncertainties surrounding the agreed upon 
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evidence, the reader is already expected to concede the historicity of the empty tomb, the 
appearances, and the origin of the disciples‘ faith.   
Let us try and address this objection from another perspective.  The critic may be 
confusing the deposit of oral teaching and the way it was expressed (or applied) in 
different circumstances.  As I. Howard Marshall observed: ―If Jesus meant so much to 
his followers, then it is overwhelmingly improbable that they remembered so little about 
him, or that they so completely refashioned the content of their memories.‖460   
Moreover, the fact that we have multiple sources within such a short generation 
after Jesus‘s ministry makes us fortunate as ancient historians.  As Ehrman himself 
states: ―Therefore, if there is a tradition about Jesus that is preserved in more than one of 
these documents, no one of them could have made it up, since the others knew of it as 
well, independently.  If a tradition is found in several of these sources, then the 
likelihood of its going back to the very beginning of the tradition from which they all 
ultimately derive, back to the historical Jesus himself, is significantly improved.‖461  
Usually ancient historians have much less material to work with than historical Jesus 
scholars.  Usually in ancient history one or two sources renders the reported fact 
unimpeachable.  But in the case of Jesus‘ resurrection, we have multiple, independent 
sources.  It can also be argued that there was an insufficient amount of time for legends 
to accrue because of the living apostolic restraints at the time.  More than one or two 
generations might have been needed for the Evangelists (and Paul) to completely 
refashion their depictions of Jesus.   
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Lastly, one might mention Paul and the ancient creed he recites in 1 Corinthians 
15.  Because this creed can be traced back well before the writing of 1 Corinthians,
462
 it 
seems to nullify Ehrman‘s concerns about the circumstantial reasons for holding to the 
evidences that he already agrees with.  N.T. Wright, for instance, states that it ―was 
probably formulated within the first two or three years after Easter itself‖ and is ―the 
earliest Christian tradition.‖463  Walter Kasper concurs; it goes back to ―30 AD.‖464  
James Dunn dates it to ―within months of Jesus‘ death.‖465  The atheist critic Gerd 
Lüdemann says it can be traced back to within ―30 and 33 A.D.‖466  Further, the sources 
used by the author(s) of the ancient creed in 1 Corinthians must stretch back even further 
to the events described in the creed itself.    
Likewise, the Gospels not written by eyewitnesses.  And they were written too far 
after Christ to be considered reliable.
467
  Once more this objector (Ehrman) confuses the 
notion of evidence and explanation.  Even if the Gospels were not written by 
eyewitnesses, this does nothing to undercut the evidence that has already been deduced 
by him.     
Nonetheless, let us still try and respond to his criticism.  Ehrman is well aware 
that later datings of the Gospels does not necessarily render them completely 
unreliable.
468
  Though scholars generally do not believe that we have eyewitness 
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accounts, a strong case can be made for the eyewitness traditions behind them.
469
  As 
illustrated by Lapide: ―To blame the rabbis and evangelists for deception or to accuse 
them of lying would have been as foreign to the Jews and Jewish Christians of that time 
as an accusation of ‗embellishment‘ against Van Gogh or of the corruption of history 
against Shakespeare‘s Macbeth would be to us.‖470  According to Dulles: ―Anglicans and 
Orthodox, as well as Roman Catholics, have generally rejected the Protestant position, in 
so far as this is purely Biblicist, and have insisted that the Bible cannot be the rule of 
faith except when conjoined with a continuous Church tradition. In this perspective, 
which is fundamentally Catholic, the very sections of the New Testament which the 
liberals tend to discount as too far removed from the events can be seen as providing 
privileged interpretations, for, as [John Henry] Newman pointed out, events of great 
importance require a considerable span of time in order to be rightly comprehended.‖471  
Later compilers may have more well-rounded evidence from various perspectives at their 
disposal to determine what should be included in the most up to date reporting.  
Historians do not need earlier sources to ensure that their case is more historically 
trustworthy. 
What is more, the ―eyewitness argument‖ does not seem to apply in the case of 
Paul.  Paul himself wrote that he saw an appearance (1 Cor. 9:1).  And he was originally 
an enemy of earliest Christianity.  He did not expect Jesus to appear to him.  He became 
a believer well after the Christian movement began in Jerusalem.  The ancient creed 
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found in 1 Corinthians 15, moreover, was formulated within years (or even months) after 
the crucifixion.       
Ehrman‘s next challenge is that the evidence is biased.  For him the evidence is 
furnished by individuals who already believed in the resurrection and so cannot be trusted 
by critical historians.  Here the principle of disinterestedness seems to be upheld.  But 
again this challenge has nothing to do with the evidence already established by Ehrman in 
the first step.   
Second, it should also be said that bias explains everything and so explains 
nothing.  Notwithstanding the issue of bias, the resurrection hypothesis is said to be the 
best explanation of the known evidence, not the only explanation.  Other explanations are 
certainly possible, but Ehrman (and the other critics) have not provided one so far.  
Alternative explanations can be given, but unless Ehrman can provide positive evidence 
to establish that the early Christian movement remained deliberately silent about some 
alleged, hitherto unknown source(s), historians remain completely within their rights to 
use the New Testament documents to make arguments about the origins of resurrection 
faith.  He should use the evidence that is currently available instead of constructing a 
causal theory on the basis of sheer possibility or of silence. 
What is more, it is true no historical account is written from a neutral, objective 
standpoint.  But this does not mean that the Evangelists could not (or did not) report 
anything accurate about the Jesus.  Ehrman himself explains what those facts were!  
Undoubtedly the Gospels are not biographical in the modern sense of the term.  Unlike 
modern biographies, the Gospels are only concerned with the last two to three years of 
Jesus‘s life.  Nor can the Gospels be classified as ―lives of Christ,‖ or as aretalogies.  
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Rather, they are to be classified in the line of ancient Greco-Roman biographies or Greek 
and Jewish ―historiography.‖472  Given the genre of the Gospels, the Evangelists were 
somewhat concerned about presenting accurate depictions of Jesus (cf. Luke: 1:1-4) in 
the face of different situations facing the earliest churches.   
Fourth, the issue of bias seems to be drastically undercut in the case of Paul (and 
the 500).  Paul was not always a believer, and presumably some of the 500 did not know 
or believe in Jesus either.  To be sure, Paul challenges the Corinthians to ask any of the 
500 who were alive at the time of his writing to convince them of the reality of the 
appearances (1 Cor. 15:6).    
The next argument is that other figures of history were said to perform miracles 
and be resurrected.  Ehrman lists figures such as Apollonius of Tyana, Honi the Circle 
Drawer, Hanina ben Dosa, and the Roman Emperor Vespasian.
473
  If we already accept 
Jesus‘ resurrection, Ehrman says, then why couldn‘t we say these figures were raised 
too?  Let me say from the outset that apologists should not hold that Jesus was the only 
figure of history ever to be raised.  This closed-minded attitude is detrimental to the 
virtue of open-mindedness about the probability of miracles.  But notice that the 
admission of special divine acts in other religio-cultural contexts does not undercut the 
credibility of Jesus’ resurrection either.   
Second, even if there is evidence for these divine acts, this would not mean that 
the evidence is equally compelling in all cases.  Poorly evidenced miracles scarcely rule 
out the validity of well attested evidence in other scenarios, especially in the historical 
case for Jesus‘ resurrection.  By contrast, in these other scenarios there is minimal 
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evidence appearing literally hundreds of years after the original event.
474
  And they are 
not usually corroborated by multiple, independent sources.  Consequently, the evidence 
for these special divine acts allow for many plausible explanations.             
Third, Ehrman asserts that many Christians naively reject miracle claims in other 
religious contexts because they are not found in Scripture or church teaching.  But this is 
a textbook example of committing the genetic fallacy: how one comes to believe in X 
does not have anything to do with the truth of X.  Christians might believe in the 
resurrection of Jesus because of the circumstances they found themselves in (i.e., 
upbringing, living in a Christian culture), but this does not mean that it is a false belief or 
that the resurrection hypothesis is not the best explanation of the evidence.  Many 
Christians (and atheists, agnostics, and other religionists) hold to specific beliefs and 
reject other ones for poor reasons.   
Both faith and reason can lead individuals to certain conclusions.  But in the case 
of critical historians, they do not claim to establish, demonstrate or prove the resurrection.  
Instead the resurrection hypothesis is cast as a piece of inductive reasoning on the basis 
of agreed upon evidence.              
The next argument is that historical understanding is relegated to multiple causes, 
not just one.   It is true that the early Church could have had more than one cause for its 
existence, but this would not prevent historians from positing Jesus‘ resurrection as the 
ultimate cause that set off a chain reaction of additional causal conditions that brought the 
Christian movement into full bloom.  Various causes have different values and contribute 
variously to forming historical phenomena.  True, historians rarely affirm that entire 
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movements can be accounted for by a single cause.  Many conditions surrounding the 
primary event under consideration, the resurrection of Jesus, contributed to its ongoing 
influence. 
Larry Hurtado, for instance, has recently outlined and explained some of the many 
reasons why the earliest Christian movement spread at the astounding rate it did.  First, it 
began in Jerusalem – a city that allowed for many persons to hear the Good News in 
order for the first disciples to take the message out to a wider world.
475
  Outsiders found 
the strict nature of Christian worship attractive
476
 including its exclusive stance with 
respect to Christianity‘s relationship to all other religions.477 Christianity, moreover, was 
unlike any other religion at the time.  It did not discriminate on the basis of gender or 
social class.  It called on everyone to repent and believe in the Gospel.
478
  Christian 
worship was more intense than the conventional liturgies of Judaism.
479
  The earliest 
Christian worship featured the belief that God was active in the midst of ritual action.
480
  
Lastly, says Hurtado, the Christian attitude in worship was not passive, but one in which 
the believer could expect to be changed by the Spirit. The early Church's intense 
charismatic experience of the risen Jesus in the context of worship was attractive to 
outsiders.
481
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 Bereavement experiences can account for the appearances.
482
  Offering this 
explanation as a sheer possibility, Ehrman and other critics say that the appearances can 
be explained by the experience that widows and widowers sometimes have of their 
deceased spouses.  Undoubtedly, bereavement experiences have similar characteristics to 
what the evidence has concluded about the appearances.   
For one thing, both groups find themselves immersed in grief after the recent 
death of a loved one.  Second, both groups came into contact with the beloved.  Third, 
these meetings were not initiated by the living, but came from ―the other side.‖  And as a 
result of these experiences, the living felt enlightened and empowered.   
Notwithstanding these four similarities, there are many differences that preclude 
this alternative explanation from being taken seriously.
483
  First, they usually occur to 
spouses, not to disciples of dead religious leaders.  As O‘Collins writes: ―before the 
‗bereavement,‘ the disciples of Jesus had enjoyed a different kind of relationship with a 
remarkably different kind of person who made quite extraordinary claims about his 
identity and mission.  This dissimilarity affects the ‗point of departure‘ for the proposed 
analogy.‖484   
Second, one might argue that Paul had no acquaintance with Jesus during his 
earthly ministry.  Thus the experience of grief would not apply in his case.  ―From the 
outset,‖ says O‘Collins, ―any analogy between his meeting and with the risen Jesus on the 
road to Damascus and the experience of Rees‘s widows and widowers seems to be ruled 
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out.‖485  Third, there are no indications that those who appeared to their living spouse 
remotely died in the same way as Jesus.  Indeed, the best research indicates that they 
passed away from natural causes or accidents.  There are no cases of suicides or 
homicides, let alone executions.   
A fourth reason for differentiating the two visual experiences is that bereavement 
experiences do not happen to groups.  But in the New Testament there are simultaneous 
group experiences of the risen Jesus (Matt. 28:9-10; Luke 24:13-35; John 21:1-14; 1 Cor. 
15:6).  A fifth reason is that these bereavement experiences can occur for many years 
after their spouses die.  Aside from Paul, the resurrection appearances ceased shortly after 
Jesus was executed.   
Another difference is that the vast majority of the bereaved do not tell anyone 
about these episodes.  On the other hand, a unique mission inaugurating experience was 
perceived by the original percipients.  Lastly, in the case of these bereavement episodes 
there is no life-long change.  But the disciples set the world ablaze with their new 
convictions about Jesus‘ rising from the dead. 
What is more, belief in the bodily resurrection makes bereavement experiences 
highly untenable, especially in light of the Jewish matrix from which it came.  As Wright 
suggested: ―‗Meetings‘ with Jesus, likewise, could by themselves have been interpreted 
in a variety of ways.  Most people in the ancient world (though not so many, it seems, in 
the modern world) knew that visions and appearances of recently dead people 
occurred.‖486  So it might be asked: why didn‘t these experiences lead the apostles to say 
Jesus was in Abraham‘s bosom?  Or that he was in apocalyptic glory as some martyr-
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prophet?   These inferences would have made more sense than the bodily resurrection in 
light of the religious context of first century Palestine.  As Kasper keenly asserted: ―In 
neo-Judaism exaltation (or ecstasy) was the only category available to express the fact 
that a human being on earth would still play a part in the eschatological events.  
Exaltation was therefore a current category, which was used in an attempt to express a 
person‘s eschatological importance.‖487   
The earliest believers could certainly discriminate between physical, post-mortem 
encounters with Jesus and other experiences of living in Christ.
488
  As Pannenberg rightly 
says: ―one must at the same time take into consideration that primitive Christianity itself 
apparently knew how to distinguish between ecstatic visionary experiences and the 
fundamental encounters with the resurrected Lord.‖489  Indeed, an alternative explanation 
of these so-called meetings would have confirmed that Jesus was truly dead, not 
gloriously risen from the dead, never to die again!
490
  
  Ehrman claims that it is not within the province of historians to discuss the 
probability of miracles.  He writes:  ―I‘m willing to grant that miracles—that is, events 
that we cannot explain within our concepts of how ‗nature‘ normally works—can and do 
happen.  There still remains, however, a huge, I‘d even say, insurmountable problem 
when discussing Jesus‘ miracles.  Even if miracles are possible, there is no way for the 
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historian who sticks strictly to the canons of historical evidence to show that they have 
ever happened.‖491  Lest historians commit the ―god-of-the-gaps fallacy,‖492 
methodological constraints prevent the historian from responsibly inferring the 
resurrection hypothesis as a viable option.  For miracles are a matter of faith, not proof.  
 Part of the problem for Ehrman is that he defines miracles as special divine acts 
outside the natural world.  Miracles are, by definition, meta-historical.
493
  By contrast, 
special divine acts are more than historical, but they are definitely not less than historical. 
They take place in the spatio-temporal realm, thus leaving them open to historical 
investigation.  But they are not of the historical process.  Thus there is an empirical and 
superempirical aspect to them. The former is knowable in an objective way but the latter 
has subjective appeal.  They are not merely internal experiences; though there is a 
subjective response to them.  They remain objective in nature.  For instance, Jesus could 
be seen (Matt. 28:7, 17; Mark 16:7, John 20:14, 18; 1 Cor. 9:1, 15:5-8), heard (Matt. 
28:9, 10; John 20:15, 16), and touched (Matt. 28:9; Luke 24:39; John 20:17, 20, 27).  He 
also ate food (Luke 24:41-43; cf. John 21:13).   
Now, when it comes to determining the cause(s) of the evidence, historians 
normally appeal to law-like regularities, not miraculous ones.  But, in a sense, all events 
are unique and without parallel.  So if a naturalistic explanation does not seem to account 
for the facts because the evidence is pulling in a direction which strongly suggests that a 
miracle has happened, and if the context in which the event is thought to have occurred is 
                                                             
491 Ehrman, The New Testament, 225, 226.  Cf. 228, 229.  See also Jesus, Interrupted, 175. 
492 The ―god of the gaps‖ fallacy is committed when historians prematurely invoke the 
supernatural to explain uncertainties about the past. 
493 Ehrman, The New Testament, 226.  Curiously, Ehrman recognizes that Paul at least viewed the 
―appearances‖ as historical phenomena.  See Ehrman, Peter, Paul, and Mary Magdalene, 135; idem, Jesus, 
Interrupted, 178. 
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religiously charged, then it would be feasible for the historian who believes in a personal 
God who would reveal himself in history to conclude that a miracle has happened.
494
  
Notice the indispensability of scholastic apologetics at this point.     
Troeltsch‘s ―principle of analogy‖495 is not a hard and fast rule.  It can be 
qualified and subsequently recast in a way that is hospitable to the likelihood of miracles.  
Historicism is no longer a prevailing view in the academy in a postmodern age.  As 
Avery Dulles wrote: ―According to a positivist view that was widely accepted fifty or a 
hundred years ago, history is a science analogous to physics or chemistry.  It proceeds on 
the assumption that the world is a closed system in which causes and effects are 
connected by strict necessity.  History, in that view, leaves no place for the unique, the 
exceptional, and especially not for events brought about by God‘s direct activity.‖496  But 
such a view of history has been widely abandoned.
497
  As John Meier writes: ―Whether 
we call it a bias, a Tendenz, a worldview, or a faith stance, everyone who writes on the 
historical Jesus writes from some ideological standpoint; no critic is exempt.‖498  
Even if the historian is debarred from inferring a miracle as an explanation 
because of methodological restraints, this would not mean that intellectually curious 
individuals cannot take the reins from professional historians at this step in the argument 
and draw this conclusion as an explanation.  It would certainly be a tragedy if scholars 
                                                             
494 For a good discussion, see John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, 
Vol. 2, Mentor, Message and Miracles, (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 512-515. 
495 The ―principle of analogy‖ is a general rule in historiography which says historians should 
draw inferences about the past that bear some similarity with observable events in the present. 
496 Avery Dulles, ―Historians and the Reality of Christ,‖ First Things 28 (1992): 21.   
497 Richard Evans, In Defense of History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 217; C. Behan 
McCullagh, The Truth of History (New York: Routledge, 1998), 35. 
498 John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Vol. 1, The Roots of the 
Problem and Person (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 5, 6.  For additional support of Meier‘s 
uncontroversial claim, see the fine essay by Alan G. Padgett, ―Advice for Religious Historians: On the 
Myth of a Purely Historical Jesus,‖ in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O‘Collins, (eds), The 
Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus (Oxford: Oxford University, 
1997), 287-307.   
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were prevented from drawing the correct explanation because of methodological 
restraints.  The fact that we do not have absolute certainty when it comes to 
understanding each piece of evidence, or that the resurrection is a miraculous event does 
not mean that historians and other critics should refrain from using the evidence that is 
currently at their disposal.  Background theories are inevitable and have an impact on the 
kind of conclusions that are made (one background theory is that God exists; thus  the 
previous chapter in this dissertation).  No one can do history from a strictly neutral 
standpoint.  This is precisely why the classical approach to apologetics is needed.   
Hence, skeptics usually acknowledge that there is evidence for the resurrection.  
But he easily hesitates to explain it because of ancillary reasons that are related to 
establishing what should count as evidence in the first place.  Though Christian 
theologians might be passionate about the argument for the resurrection, this should not 
be confused with the attempt to demonstrate it.  Rather, the most sophisticated critics 
generally speak in tentative terms about the nature of the evidence, affirming the 
resurrection hypothesis as the best explanation of the data, not the only explanation.   
Ehrman claims that the appearances can be reinterpreted as bereavement 
experiences, but this possibility is ruled out for a variety of reasons.  Historians are not 
forced to disprove all competing views before they award historicity to the most 
defensible one.  If a single conclusion (the appearances) seems to stand out among all 
other alternatives, then historians should accept that view as the best explanation.   
Ehrman‘s only significant argument against the case for the resurrection―let alone 
taking it as the best explanation of the evidence ―has to do with his endorsement of 
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methodological naturalism.  But this restraint is outdated in a postmodern age, one in 
which historians take interdisciplinary work seriously.   
All historians are inevitably influenced by the social sciences, philosophy, and 
even religious commitments.  There is no such thing as the historical method apart from 
the influence of presuppositions.  In conclusion, we are of the opinion that Ehrman‘s case 
against the resurrection is inadequate.  The rationality of the resurrection should be 
upheld over its rival (rational) hypotheses. 
Let us turn to what I believe is the most powerful alternative to the resurrection 
hypothesis, one that is put forth by Dale Allison.  
 
Resurrection and the Paranormal 
Undoubtedly parapsychology has become increasingly popular in recent times.  
Consequently, many scholars have employed the term ―apparition‖ as a substitute for 
understanding the nature of the appearances.
499
  Geza Vermes, for instance, repeatedly 
described the appearances as ―apparitions‖500 in his book on the resurrection.  Though 
John Dominic Crossan has apparently changed his position on the historical credibility of 
Christ‘s resurrection, he also characterized the appearances as ―apparitions.‖501  
                                                             
499 For some older works that make this connection, see James Hyslop, Psychical Research and 
the Resurrection (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1908); Michael C. Perry, The Easter Enigma: An Essay on the 
Resurrection With Special Reference to the Data of Psychical Research (New York: Faber and Faber, 
1959); Renée Haynes, The Hidden Springs: An Enquiry Into the Extra-Sensory Perception (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1972), 147-151; C. Pearce Higgins, ―Biblical Miracle II,‖ in C. Pearce Higgins and G. Whitby, 
(eds.), Life, Death and Psychical Research (London: Rider, 1973), 147-156; Paul Badham, Christian 
Beliefs About Life After Death (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 18-64.  Also see Hugh Montefiore, The 
Miracles of Jesus (London, SPCK, 2005), 105-114.         
500 Geza Vermes, The Resurrection of Jesus: History and Myth (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 17, 
92, 102, 108, 120, 140, 148, 150.        
501 John Dominic Crossan, ―The Resurrection: Historical Event or Theological Explanation?: A 
Dialogue,‖ in Robert T. Stewart, (ed.), The Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright 
in Dialogue (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 33.  ―Then there‘s the terrible shock of the crucifixion.  
Now what has to happen next is that plus the risen apparitions.  I am convinced as a fact that they had 
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Notwithstanding their uncritical references in their writings, Dale Allison has become the 
most salient representative of the apparitions hypothesis in recent years, flaunting the 
research in parapsychology with the purpose of defusing the argument in defense of 
Jesus‘ resurrection.   
However, a balanced comparison of apparitions and the evidence for the 
appearances reveals that there are more differences than similarities.  Because the earliest 
Christians considered the appearances as unique irruptions of the divine in human 
history, apparitional experiences cannot be extrapolated as the exclusive basis for 
understanding the appearances.  Let us first turn to the field of apparitions research. 
Sometimes the field of parapsychology is considered a ―pseudo-science,‖ but this 
prejudice seems to be receding in certain quarters of the scientific community.  As 
Harvey Irwin and Caroline Watt have explained: ―Historically speaking there has been a 
clear progression in parapsychology from the collection of anecdotal material to the 
experimental investigation of laboratory analogues of psi phenomena.  Thus a major 
element in parapsychologists‘ efforts to put their discipline on a scientific footing is the 
recourse to scientific method.‖502   
 Most apparitional experiences are documented in anecdotal reports.  Unlike 
experimental evidence, which is controlled under laboratory conditions, anecdotal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
apparitions.  How you explain that is a separate issue; but it happened; they are not making it up; it‘s not 
hallucinations.  My statement is that the stories in the Gospels, as I‘ve argued, are primarily interested in 
who‘s in charge and had an apparition.  But that presumes, even as I claim, as I would, that Mark‘s tomb 
story is made up.  I think I‘m with you, apparitions happened.  But I think, apparitions plus the experience 
of ‗kingdom is already here‘; that‘s my explanation of those two things.  With regard to the empty tomb, 
honestly, I would say, plus or minus, it‘s not worth it.  I don‘t mind.  Historically, I‘m not sure because I 
think Mark created it, but it‘s not something I would argue.  I concede it.‖  Crossan confirms this idea 
toward the end of the book (176): ―I do not for here and now debate either the historicity of either Jesus‘ 
burial or the empty tomb‘s discovery.  Instead, for here and now (dato non concesso, to be sure) I take the 
Gospel stories of the empty tomb’s discovery and of all those risen apparitions as historically factual in 
their entirety.‖   
502 Harvey J. Irwin and Caroline A. Watt, An Introduction to Parapsychology, 5th ed., (Jefferson: 
McFarland, 2007), 247. 
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evidence is provided by eyewitnesses who pass on the information related to their 
experience.  Whether the experience can be explained by paranormal processes is hotly 
debated in contemporary parapsychology.  Sometimes these experiences are best 
explained by naturalistic processes such as hallucinations.     
Now, apparitions should be distinguished from mirages, illusions and, more 
problematically, hallucinations (which usually stem from drug use and/or mental illness).  
One of the criteria used to delineate apparitions from hallucinations or illusions is that 
new information is gleaned from a veridical apparitional experience (perhaps the 
percipient learns something from the encounter that could not have been ordinarily 
known).  A second criteria is that apparitions are sometimes seen by many people at 
once, whereas hallucinations cannot be collectively shared.   
Apparitional research has resulted in what might be called a taxonomy of 
apparitional experiences.
503
  The first type is usually called an experimental apparitional 
experience.  In these cases the living can somehow make themselves seen to someone 
else in another location.  Though very few examples are outlined and discussed in the 
literature, these occurrences almost always happen to experients who are asleep or in a 
trance-like state.  Experimental apparitions have led some parapsychologists to maintain 
                                                             
503 Henry Sidgewick, et. al. ―Report on the Census of Hallucinations,‖ Proceedings for the Society 
of Psychical Research, 10 (1894), 25-422; George N.M. Tyrrell, Apparitions, (New York: Collier, 1963), 
35-36; Charles Green and Celia McCreery, Apparitions (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975);  E. Haraldsson 
et al., ―National Survey of Psychical Experiences and Attitudes Towards the Paranormal in Iceland, in J.D. 
Morris et al., (eds.), Research in Parapsychology, (Metuchen: Scarecrow, 1977);  J. Palmer, ―A 
Community Mail Survey of Psychic Experiences,‖ Journal of American Society of Psychical Research, 69, 
(1979): 226-339.     
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that at least some apparitions are not merely subjective.
504
  However, almost two-thirds of 
all apparitions reported are of the dead, not the living.
505
         
A second type is commonly known as the crisis apparition.  These meetings occur 
when the person represented by the apparition is in some sort of crisis (such as an 
accident or is near death).  As a general rule of thumb, parapsychologists hold that these 
experiences occur within twelve hours before or after the crisis begins.  These apparitions 
are very short lived, meaning they do not reoccur over an extended period of time.  In 
many cases the percipient does not expect or think about the person represented by the 
phantasm.   
The third type is known as the postmortem apparitional experience.  Almost all of 
these represent someone who has been dead for at least twelve hours.  Based on the 
famous Chaffin case (1927), the persons involved with these apparitions have been 
known to exchange unknown information to the experient(s).  Thus Irwin and Watt: 
―Note also in this case the apparition had both a visual and an auditory component.  As 
with the other types of apparition, the figure is lifelike and appears suddenly and 
unexpectedly.‖506  Sometimes these experiences appear in a dream; but in other cases the 
apparition appears in ordinary circumstances.  They are sometimes seen by a group of 
people, although all experients may not see the phantasm.  Most apparitions are 
experienced visually, in about four-fifths of the reported cases.
507
                 
                                                             
504 Cf. D. Rugo, ―Apparitions, Hauntings, and Poltergeists,‖ in Edgar D. Mitchell and John White, 
(eds.) Psychic Exploration: A Challenge for Science (New York: Putnam‘s, 1974), 376-377; Tyrrell, 
Apparitions, 142-148.   
505 Palmer, ―A Community Mail Survey of Psychic Experiences,‖ 228.   
506 Irwin and Watt, An Introduction to Parapsychology, 197.  
507 Green and McCreery, Apparitions, 143.  
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 The fourth category is known as the common ghost experience (otherwise known 
as a ―haunt‖).  In these cases a figure appears in the same locality over an extended 
period of time.  Given this description of hauntings, usually many different people have 
the chance to see them.  Ghosts do not show much awareness of the living.  These 
characteristics seem to evade the common depiction of ghosts in folklore.  ―Additionally, 
ghosts seem more somnambulistic in their movements.  Some ghosts reportedly perform 
the same actions in the same location on each occasion they are experienced.‖508  They 
perform the same ―behavior‖ whether they are seen or not.               
 Now if we are going to use apparitions to explain the appearances, then we should 
focus on the postmortem apparitional experience.  Like many of the reports describing 
the postmortem apparition, the resurrection appearances happened over a period of time, 
not within twelve hours after Jesus‘ death.  Thus, the other types of apparitional 
experience do not resonate with the New Testament witnesses.  As Andrew MacKenzie 
and Jane Henry rightly observe: ―The hardest apparitions to explain by normal means are 
crisis apparitions where information about the death of a person appears to have been 
transmitted correctly by the apparition, and collective cases where more than one person 
sees the same apparition‖ (emphasis mine).509   
So if a skeptic is going to focus on apparitions as a substitute for explaining the 
appearances, then the responsible thing to do is cite the relevant case studies from 
postmortem apparitions, not haphazardly cite studies from the other three types.  Nor 
does it seem responsible for critics to patch together unrelated cases of apparitional 
experiences to explain the nature of the appearances (simply because the other three types 
                                                             
508 Irwin and Watt, An Introduction to Parapsychology, 197.   
509 Andrew MacKenzie and Jane Henry, Parapsychology: Research and Exceptional Experiences 
(New York: Routledge: 2004), 182.   
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do not resemble what has been concluded by the New Testament).  Because the current 
state of apparitions research is highly indecisive and uncertain in this regard, it is 
exceedingly difficult to extrapolate individual cases of postmortem apparitional 
experiences as the univocal basis for understanding the appearances.   
Though many apparitions can be explained by the paranormal, other 
parapsychologists are not as easily convinced.  This observation seems to make matters 
even more complicated for scholars wanting to emphasize similarities between 
apparitions and the appearances.  There is no general consensus in the scientific 
community of parapsychologists heading in either direction about this problem.
510
  As 
MacKenzie and Henry observe: ―Apparitions can be thought of as nothing more than 
hallucinations and the bulk of cases probably are just that.‖511  For every apparitional 
case study that runs parallel to the appearances, another case study can be cited against it.  
There is simply no end to this point-counterpoint contest.   
Consider the following case: ―The apparition itself may appear solid and lifelike 
or semitransparent.  It may be seen and heard by all present; or some people may not see 
it, even when their attention is drawn to the position where it is.  It may appear and 
disappear in locked rooms.‖512  Quite naturally, this report runs parallel to the 
appearances.  Further, we also have reports where the phantasm ate food and was 
touched.
513
  Perhaps, then, Jesus ate the fish!  But, as Green and McCreery point out, the 
referent person usually appears within three meters of the experient(s) and is not 
                                                             
510 James Houran and Rense Lange, Hauntings and Poltergeists: Multidisciplinary Perspectives 
(Jefferson: McFarland, 2001), 4.  See also Irwin and Watt, Introduction to Parapsychology, 201.  
511 See also MacKenzie and Henry, Parapsychology, 183.  
512 Brian C. Nisbet, ―Apparitions,‖ in I.G. Guinness, (ed.), Psychical Research: A Guide to its 
History, Principles and Practices: In Celebration of 100 Years of the Society for Psychical Research 
(Wellingborough: Aquarian, 1982), 92.   
513 Green and McCreery, Apparitions, 102-113; Tyrrell, Apparitions, 63ff.  
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previously known by them.
514
  Obviously this report paints a picture that runs contrary to 
the appearance to the disciples―and to those who knew of Jesus (such as the apostle 
Paul).   
Other examples could easily be cited.  Postmortem apparitional experiences 
almost always happen indoors.  By contrast, the New Testament writers suggest that 
Jesus appeared outside and inside.  Or again, parapsychologist Alan Gauld says that 
apparitions (of the four types, we are not told) cannot be used as evidence for life after 
death.
515
  Irwin and Watt seem to agree: ―The spirit hypothesis of apparitional 
experiences now is promoted by a minority of modern parapsychologists.‖516  Still others 
maintain that apparitions provide evidence for the afterlife.
517
  Of course, Catholic 
theologians have always held that Jesus‘ resurrection serves as the exemplar and 
forerunner of our own resurrections from the dead at the eschaton.  Belief in Jesus‘ 
resurrection provides believers with necessary ingredient for upholding the eschatological 
resurrection.   
Or again, one of the basic features of the appearances is that they were mission-
inaugurating (cf. Matt. 28:18-20).  But, in the majority of apparitional reports (again, 
which of the four types we are not told!), there seems to be no life-changing mission that 
accompanies the experience.  As Brian Nisbet has mused: ―The genuine apparition . . . is 
more likely to appear as a normally clothed figure, which is seen for a few brief moments 
                                                             
514 Green and McCreery, Apparitions, 123. 
515 See Gauld‘s chapter in MacKenzie and Henry, Parapsychology, 215-223. 
516 Irwin and Watt, An Introduction to Parapsychology, 202. 
517 H. Hart, ―Six Theories About Apparitions,‖ Proceedings for the Society for Psychical 
Research, 50 (1956): 153-239; idem, ―Scientific Survival Research,‖ International Journal of 
Parapsychology, 9 (1967): 43-52.  Also see Nisbet, ―Apparitions,‖ 99.   
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and then vanishes or gradually fades away.  Sometimes a reason for its appearance can be 
suggested; but more often there is none.‖518   
It should be kept in mind that most apparitional experiences do not resemble the 
appearances.  Only certain cases will characterize certain features that run parallel to the 
appearances.  Apparitions are not usually seen by groups (2-12 percent), let alone 500 at 
one time.
519
  They are not usually seen by enemies (less than 1 percent of the deceased 
appear to one of their former enemies).
520
  The vast majority of them are unable to be 
touched (only 2.7 percent can be touched).  And less than 1 percent of the cases lead the 
experient(s) to believe that the referent person had been raised bodily from the dead.  Yet 
all of these characteristics are featured at the origins of Easter faith.   
So, it would be an exceptionally rare case that an apparition would be 
characterized by all of these features in a series of different episodes over a period of 
weeks (or much later on, as in the case of Paul).  When each improbability is multiplied 
by other improbabilities, we arrive at an staggeringly incomprehensible chance: 
1:3,800,000.
521
  In effect the chance that any one apparition would be described by all 
four of these characteristics makes the possibility of a constructive comparison between 
apparitions and the appearances exceptionally implausible.  Even worse for the chances 
of comparison, it is highly uncertain how any of these cases could be neatly categorized 
into any of the four apparition types (i.e., crisis, experimental, postmortem, or haunts).                          
While most parapsychologists confidently hold to the reality of parapsychological 
experiences, they are highly divided as to whether paranormal factors account for them.  
                                                             
518 Nisbet, ―Apparitions,‖ 91.    
519 Green and McCreery, 41.  
520 Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 267, n283, 284.  
521 0.12 x 0.009 x 0.27 x 0.009 = 0.0000002644.  
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Added to this problem is the lack of understanding individual apparition cases and how 
the statistics pertaining to each of them might compare to the conclusions established 
about the appearances.  For every apparitional experience that is similar to the 
appearances, another case can be cited to highlight the dissimilarities between them.  
Although it is not logically impossible to patch together unrelated apparitional 
experiences as a control belief to retranslate the original meanings assigned to the 
appearances, an agnostic position seem to be more justified.  We do not have enough 
positive evidence for apparitions to make a constructive comparison between them and 
the appearances. 
Now, one New Testament historian who is sympathetic to using the research on 
apparitions to understand the resurrection appearances is Dale Allison.  Gerald O‘Collins 
has responded to Allison‘s allusions to bereavement experiences (as mentioned earlier 
on), but no scholar has interacted with his references to apparitions and how they might 
be linked to the appearances and the much greater project of arguing for Jesus‘ 
resurrection.
522
  Because some apparitions resonate with the appearances, Allison claims, 
Christian apologists cannot responsibly deduce the resurrection hypothesis as the best 
explanation of the agreed-upon evidence.   
For Allison, the apologist‘s inference would only make sense given the traditional 
meaning of the appearances.  Let us discuss Allison‘s positions and how they might 
affect the inference to the resurrection over its competing casual explanations.  Allison 
grants that the disciples saw Jesus in a series of appearances in different times and places: 
―These appear to be the facts, and they raise the question of how we should explain 
                                                             
522 Gerald O‘Collins, Believing in the Resurrection: The Meaning and Promise of the Resurrection 
(Mahwah: Paulist, 2011), 12-16, 175-191. 
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them.‖523  The emphasis is not exclusively placed on the disciples‘ experience.  Jesus 
also saw them.
524
  After experiencing the risen Lord (1 Cor. 15:8), Paul believed in a one-
to-one correspondence between the earthly body and the transformed, resurrected body 
that is to come: ―there is no good evidence for belief in a non-physical resurrection in 
Paul, much less within the primitive Jerusalem community. . . . Even Paul, in 1 Cor. 15, 
when defending the notion of a ‗spiritual body,‘ teaches―like 2 Bar. 51:10―the 
transformation of corpses, not their abandonment.‖525  The earliest percipients were 
convinced that Jesus had been raised bodily, not just spiritually, or immaterially.
526
  Thus 
the appearances are to be distinguished from later visual phenomena in the early 
Christian communities.
527
   
Believing in the resurrection did not mean that the recently deceased was 
naturally present to the living, but it included one‘s physical body coming back to life, 
never to die again.  In Wright‘s memorable words, the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection 
meant ―life-after-life-after-death.‖  Commenting on the possibility of understanding the 
resurrection as the natural presence of the deceased, Allison wrote: ―I know of no 
evidence for this point of view.‖528  He also speaks of the widespread belief in the bodily 
resurrection of Jesus.
529
                                
Anecdotal evidence for apparitions indicates cases where the referent person was 
seen and heard; seen by many individuals at a time; seen by some but not all; offered 
reassurance to the living; seen as real and/or solid; and seen less and less as time goes 
                                                             
523 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 269; cf. 346.    
524 Dale C. Allison, ―The Resurrection of Jesus and Rational Apologetics,‖ Philosophia Christi, 
10.2 (2008): 315; idem, Resurrecting Jesus, 346. 
525 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 317.     
526 Ibid., 314, 317, 325n497. 
527 Ibid., 260. 
528 Ibid., 325n497.   
529 Ibid., 230. 
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on.
530
  Notwithstanding these parallels to the appearances, Allison himself recognizes that 
these cannot be used to retranslate the original meaning of the appearances: ―I eschew 
explaining the appearances of Jesus in terms of typical appearances from the dead―an 
unfeasible task anyway given our limited knowledge and understanding of apparitions in 
general―but simply ask what light a wider human phenomenon might shed on some of 
the issues surrounding the resurrection stories.‖531  
Indeed, he goes on to say apparitional experiences ―cannot explain the specific 
content of the words attributed to the risen Jesus.‖  And of the reported cases, none of 
them led ―to the founding of a new religion.‖532  Because Jesus was a messianic figure, 
the appearances took on a different kind of significance to the original percipients, 
leading the first disciples to worship the Christ.
533
  Context begets meaning.  An empty 
tomb, to be sure, does not usually accompany an apparition either!  Allison does claim 
that apparitional experiences can be used as a heuristic tool for understanding what 
happened to Paul and the other percipients.
534
   
Now, with these apparitional reports in hand, a skeptic might challenge (and, then, 
presumably overturn) the apologist‘s inference to the resurrection hypothesis.  According 
to Allison:  
A skeptic, however, would, with some justification readily respond that these defects of 
apparition reports apply equally to the New Testament accounts.  For example, can 
anyone really come up with proof or even strong evidence that the stories in Luke and 
John in which the risen Jesus eats and invites himself to be touched (Luke 24: 36-43; 
John 20:24-29) comes ultimately from eyewitnesses?  I freely grant that one cannot show 
that they do not; but this is scarcely the same as showing that they do.  So are not these 
important gospel paragraphs, from an evidential point of view, ‗lacking‘ something?  In 
                                                             
530 Ibid., 279-282. 
531 Ibid., 285.   
532 Ibid., 283.  Cf. 284. 
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other words, just like so many apparitional accounts, they are ‗questionable,‘ because 
their origin cannot be established.  Many scholars have no problem classifying Luke 
24:36-43 and John 20:24-29 as later apologetic.  Is this not a possibility?535     
        
A disputable issue arises when Allison limits himself to possibilities instead of taking the 
initiative to present a defensible position that can account for the New Testament 
evidence.  In effect Allison has explained everything and so has explained nothing: ―one 
can draw any number of curves through a finite set of points to create a thousand 
different pictures.‖536  The issue is not whether historians can construct viable hypotheses 
that can compete with the resurrection hypothesis, but whether other hypotheses can 
outstrip the latter through their use of defensible arguments.   
Allison retorts: even if the resurrection happened, this does not mean that we can 
show that it happened; and if the resurrection did not happen, this would not mean that 
we can show that it did not happen.
537
  But no reputable apologist would seek to 
demonstrate the resurrection.  Rather, apologists usually argue that the resurrection 
hypothesis is the best explanation of the data.
538
  Representative of this modest 
epistemological inference is William Lane Craig: 
 I do not assert that belief in the resurrection of Jesus ‗is the only reasonable option, and 
thus it would be irrational not to believe in it.‘  Rather, I argue that four established facts . 
. . ‗provide adequate inductive grounds for inferring Jesus‘ resurrection,‘ and that ‗it‘s 
very difficult to deny that the resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation.‘ of these four 
facts. . . . These statements are carefully chosen and indicate that I am employing 
inductive reasoning understood according to the model of inference to the best 
explanation.  This model holds that there may be a number of reasonable explanations for 
a body of evidence, and that one is to choose from this pool of live options that 
explanation which is the best, that is, which most successfully meets such criteria as 
having explanatory power, explanatory scope, and not being ad hoc. . . Again, I did not 
say that it is irrational to fail to believe in the resurrection.539 
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So, the more appropriate alternative is to develop a defensible argument that might 
persuade others when looking at the available evidence.  Allison reflects on what might 
count as evidence for the resurrection hypothesis, and he concludes that some facts are in 
fact relevant.  Why then does he refuse to propose an hypothesis that can account for 
these facts?  In other terms, Allison deduces what he thinks should count as evidence (by 
garnering the relevant evidence to establish the appearances and the empty tomb), but he 
balks at the opportunity to explain it.  Instead he flaunts the mere possibility that the 
appearances might have been apparitions in order to defuse the apologetic claim.     
 A paucity of evidence should drive historians down the path of epistemological 
humility about retrieving the shape of the past.  But in some cases humility can be 
employed immoderately, fortifying an agnostic outlook that militates against the evidence 
in favor of one position over the others.  Such a problem is paramount in Allison‘s work.  
Even if we have ―meager evidence‖ for a purported event, this would not mean that 
historians should not attempt to explain the evidence at their disposal.  Sometimes a lot of 
evidence can sometimes make it more difficult to explain what happened.  Thus 
historians are not forced to disprove all competing hypotheses before they award 
historicity to the most defensible explanation.  If a single hypothesis seems to stand out 
among the alternatives, then historians should accept that hypothesis as the best 
explanation. 
Allison agrees with the biblical evidence in support of the existence, distribution 
and nature of the appearances.  Correspondingly, he should not easily concede to other 
possibilties.  For every apparitional experience that is similar to the appearances, another 
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case can be cited to highlight the dissimilarities between them.  Thus agnosticism is the 
proper stance to take with respect to apparitions research.   
Positively speaking, the apologist has something meaningful to say about the 
appearances.  She assesses the New Testament writings not as the Word of God but as a 
collection of reliable Greek documents coming down to us from the first century.  Allison 
himself agrees with the conclusions tentatively established by the critical historian.  
Negatively speaking, there is not enough positive evidence to establish anything 
significant about apparitions to make a constructive comparison between them and the 
appearances.  Again, Allison agrees with the latter point.            
Furthermore, Allison is well aware that the appearance narratives are not 
historical in every detail.  And he knows that this circumstantial problem should not 
preclude one from affirming the historicity of the appearances.  Critical realism allows 
the historian to arrive at this conclusion.  Parapsychologists are equally critical when 
analyzing the extraordinary experiences of many individuals but have not arrived at an 
equally warranted positive conclusion.  Rather, the established facts within the field of 
apparitions research are practically nil.  So it is disanalogous for Allison to compare the 
―skepticism‖ of the New Testament scholar and the ―skepticism‖ that apologists might 
have about apparitional experiences.  Practitioners within each of these fields arrive at 
two different conclusions with different degrees of certainty (or, uncertainty).  Allison 
concedes with the conclusions set by both camps.                 
 By appealing to the pre-Easter predictions of Jesus, Allison‘s next argument is 
that a skeptic could responsibly hold that the appearances were in reality apparitions but 
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later retranslated into the language of the bodily resurrection.  Jesus‘ predictions about 
himself are  
the sort of thing a skeptic would wholeheartedly welcome.  Would not the evidence for 
the resurrection be stronger if we could believe that Jesus did not forecast his 
resurrection, so that the appearances were utterly surprising, totally unprepared for, and 
so out of the blue? . . . I am unsure of the apologetical payoff.  Keeping in mind that 
religious movements tend to interpret events in terms of already established categories 
and expectations, . . .could one not argue that the disciples, upon having apparitional 
encounters with Jesus, interpreted them in terms of  resurrection because resurrection was 
the category that Jesus had antecedently given them?540 
 
Notice that Allison once again refers to logical possibility of apparitions to explain the 
appearances.  This historiographical problem has already been addressed.  Secondly, it 
should be remembered that Allison himself affirms the reality of the appearances.  And 
he disputes the positive meaning that may be established (albeit tentatively) in the field of 
apparitions research.  Thus Allison might wish to play the role of the apologist when 
facing the skeptical challenge that gives him anxiety about this problem.   
If Jesus predicted his resurrection, then this would have added weight to the 
religiously charged context that is not only needed to advance the argument for Jesus‘ 
resurrection, but would have been useful for understanding the nature of the appearances.  
Nonetheless, Paul was unaware of these pre-Easter predictions.  Presumably, at least 
some of the 500 (1 Cor. 15:6) were unaware of them as well.   
Allison responds that a skeptic‘s world-view might allow her to make the 
apparitions inference.  Perhaps she has had a firsthand experience of an apparition and, 
consequently, strongly suspects that if the original percipients had the same 
experience(s), then this would have driven them to affirm with unwavering constancy 
that Jesus had been raised bodily:  
                                                             
540 Allison, ―The Resurrection of Jesus and Rational Apologetics,‖ 331. Cf. Resurrecting 
Jesus, 347.  
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While there is not a sliver of evidence for such a fantastic state of affairs, it cannot be 
dismissed as inconceivable, only wholly unlikely for utter lack of evidence. . . The 
hypothetical scenario goes to show that proof of the Christian confession can never be 
achieved because possible alternatives can always be imagined.  It also raises the 
question how Christians have come to the view that invoking space aliens beggars belief 
whereas crediting God with a resurrection is sensible.  Science fiction . . . has certainly 
not hesitated to give aliens the power to raise human beings from the dead, so at least we 
find the notion intelligible.541               
    
Allison repeatedly conflates the historians‘ use of the best explanation and the notion of 
proof.  He needs to recognize that apologists usually cast their argument through the use 
of the former, not the latter.  Nevertheless, Allison needs to assess the arguments of 
natural theology with the evidence for aliens in order for the analogy in support of the 
apparition hypothesis to work.    
One of the deepest and most perennial questions that people ask pertains to life 
after death.
542
  These common questions stem from our natural inclinations.  It makes 
sense that God will concern himself with personal creatures to give them some answers to 
help resolve the problem of death.  If we take the questions about human destiny 
seriously, then people must search for clues in history to get some answers about what 
lies beyond the grave.  In the words of Walter Kasper: 
The question of man‘s purpose in life cannot be answered from within his own history 
but only eschatologically.  Implicitly, therefore, in all the fundamental processes of his 
life, man is driven by the problem of life and its ultimate purpose.  The answer will not be 
found until the end of history.  For the moment all man can do is to listen to and look at 
history and try to find signs in which that end is portrayed or even anticipated.  Those 
signs will always be ambiguous within history; they will only become clear in the light of 
faith‘s perceptions of that end of history, just as conversely that perception must 
constantly make sure of its own validity in the light of history.  Only if the problem is 
seen in this comprehensive perspective can the testimonies of the early Church and of the 
later church tradition be understood meaningfully.
543
 
 
In Christianity, life does not end at the grave, but continues on in a bodily life that is 
glorious, incorruptible, and eternal.         
                                                             
541 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 340.   
542 Cf. Nostra Aetate, N. 1. 
543 Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1976), 136.    
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Allison seems to support the conciliar teaching about God‘s existence and the 
importance of ramified natural theology: ―In like fashion, I understand why Richard 
Swinburne, in his recent defense of the resurrection, commences by first seeking to 
establish the existence of a certain sort of God and the likelihood of this God 
communicating with and redeeming the human race.‖544  So, after showing some 
openness to Swinburne‘s ramified natural theology, he refuses to consider it as an 
underlying philosophical presupposition and settles for agnosticism about this natural 
theology instead.
545
  He is inclined to accept a bare deism: ―I am reluctantly a cryptic 
Deist.  My tendency is to live my life as though God made the world and then went away.  
It is hard for me to see the hand of providence either in history or in individual lives, 
including my own.‖546  At times Allison brushes aside philosophy when it comes to 
―doing history.‖  But philosophy, including the arguments of ramified natural theology, 
deserve to influence historical thinking and argument, especially in a postmodern age 
which stresses academic collaboration and interdisciplinarity (thus chapter one of the 
dissertation).  If historians follow philosophers in acknowledging good reasons to think 
that God might reveal himself to us in a particular way, then that could rightly predispose 
them to see God at work in the person of Jesus.
547
   
So Allison‘s reference to aliens as another historical possibility is disanalogous to 
support for his case from apparitions as an undercutting defeater of the historical 
argument for the resurrection.  Unless he can refute Aquinas‘ proofs for the existence of 
God and then provide convincing evidence for the existence of aliens and explain why 
                                                             
544 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 341.     
545 Ibid., 351. 
546 Ibid., 215.   
547 Cf. O‘Collins, Believing in the Resurrection, 16.  
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they would have a likely interest to raise Jesus, the apologist seems to be amply justified 
in holding to the resurrection hypothesis over its competing causal theories.  It is possible 
that a theistic God will make a personal entry into human history in order to provide 
human beings with answers to their deepest questions about their final destiny.
548
      
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter of the dissertation I have tried to highlight an evidential apologetic  
approach to defending Christianity (for the evidential approach is one of a few models 
broadly discussed in the conciliar documents).  Because the Council Fathers 
reemphasized the historical value of the New Testament writings for the purposes of 
showing the credibility of Christianity, I have focused on the historical evidence for 
Christ‘s resurrection.  This concern resonates with the philosophical arguments 
surrounding the natural knowledge of God in the chapter on scholastic apologetics.  For 
unless God exists, then there is no need to argue for the probability of a special divine act 
that will ignite the Christian movement.     
The broad consensus of scholarship in the postconciliar period indicates that there 
are some generally established facts that critics must take into consideration when 
weighing the resurrection hypothesis in comparison to other naturalistic explanations.  I 
have outlined the relevant facts (the burial, empty tomb, the appearances, and the origins 
of Christian worship), and combed through the relevant literature in resurrection studies 
                                                             
548 Cf. Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate, (Oxford: Oxford University, 
2003), 62: ―No other of the major (or medium sized) religions is founded on a purported miracle for which 
there is even a moderate amount of historical evidence.‖  The atheist turned theist, Antony Flew, There is a 
God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2007), 
157, 187, agrees: ―As I have said more than once, no other religion enjoys anything like the combination of 
a charismatic figure like Jesus and a first class intellectual like St. Paul.  If you‘re wanting omnipotence to 
set up a religion, it seems to me that this is the one to beat! . . . .Today, I would say the claim concerning 
the resurrection is more impressive than any by the religious competition.‖    
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scholarship to pinpoint the major arguments that scholars have used to construct their 
case.  I am of the view that naturalistic explanations of the data do not make as much 
sense as positing the bodily resurrection of Jesus as an event that occurs in history, a 
special divine act of God that answers questions about human destiny.  The most salient 
rebuttal to the resurrection comes from Dale Allison and his apparitions hypothesis.  I 
also explained why I think his explanation is shortsighted, if not mistaken.                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202 
 
 
A TEST CASE IN EXPERIENTIAL APOLOGETICS 
 
 
From the time of the reformation until Vatican II, Catholic apologists sought to 
demonstrate the truth of the existential truth of the Catholic Church by showing how it 
alone epitomizes the four notes (i.e., oneness, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity).  As 
a result of the Council, theologians now argue that the marks can be found in equal if not 
greater measure—qualitatively speaking—in other churches and ecclesial communities.  
Gone is the pre-conciliar approach which says that the Catholic Church is the one true 
church.
549
  This theological shift resulted in a decreased concern for apologetics.   
Yet this decline does not mean the discipline of apologetics should be abandoned.  
The ecumenical movement continues to grow out of the conviction that when Christians 
are truly one, holy, catholic, and apostolic, the Gospel increases in credibility.
550
  
Apologetics needs to be modified in light of the Catholic Church‘s participation in the 
ecumenical movement, taking on a more holistic approach than before.  When Christians 
recite in the creed that the church embodies the marks, they are still affirming the 
fundamental features by which the true church is recognized.   
Although the Council says that ecclesial elements, sanctification, and gifts of the 
Holy Spirit can be found outside the influence of Catholicism, this does not nullify her 
claim that she is the truest expression of the church.
551
  Hence, although other Christian 
                                                             
 549 For an article length discussion of the pre-conciliar use of the marks for apologetic purposes, 
see Joseph Fenton, ―The True Church and the Notes of the Church,‖ The American Ecclesiastical Review, 
114, (1943): 282-297.    
 550 Michael Kinnamon, The Vision of the Ecumenical Movement and How it Has Been 
Impoverished by its Friends (St. Louis: Chalice, 2003), 150.  
551 Dignitatis Humanae, 1; Lumen Gentium, 8; Unitatis Redintegratio, 8. 
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groups might be true churches, they are not the truest Church.  Ecclesiastical relativism is 
not constitutive of conciliar teaching.    
This chapter is formed under the theological vision of Vatican II in order to (1) 
heighten an appreciation of post-conciliar apologetics by (2) utilizing the marks of the 
church to (3) lend credibility to the Gospel.  Prior to the Council, theologians sought to 
establish the Catholic Church‘s distinctive doctrinal and moral claims over Protestant and 
Orthodox Christianities on the basis of the marks.  A post-conciliar apologist would 
certainly be within his or her epistemic rights to show the superior expression of the 
marks within Catholicism,
552
 but that is not the intention of this essay.  My aim is to 
reach outsiders and even hesitant believers within the church community.  Here the marks 
are utilized to lend credibility to the Divine Founder, not to provide support for any 
denomination over and against another.   
  
Catholic Apologetics and the Ecclesial Attributes 
In contrast to Pius XII‘s papal encyclical Mystici Corporis, which identified the 
Church of Christ directly with the Catholic Church, the Fathers of Vatican II inaugurated 
a remarkable shift by more broadly identifying the nature of the church.  In Lumen 
Gentium, for instance, the bishops declared that the church subsists in (and not simply is) 
the Catholic Church.
553
  Given this more expansive view of the ecclesiastical landscape, 
the bishops envision the church as a complex reality, not a ―perfect society‖ (as expressed 
                                                             
552 Examples of the post-conciliar apologetic use of the marks (the via notarum) can be found in 
Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury, 1978), 346-
369; René Latourelle, Christ and the Church: Signs of Salvation, trans. Sr. Dominic Parker (New York: 
Alba House, 1972), 133-163, 211-264; Benedict M. Ashley, Choosing a World-View and Value-System: An 
Ecumenical Apologetics (New York: Alba House, 2000), 211-268.         
 553 Lumen Gentium, 8.    
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in the manuals of pre-conciliar apologetics) or a single community holding to the four 
properties exclusively.
554
  Correspondingly, the church is recognized as an invisible and 
visible reality, a mystical and hierarchical society, unable to be fully grasped.
555
   
Because the Catholic Church subsists in the Church of Christ, Catholics can no 
longer hold to the older style of Catholic defense.  Grace is not a quantitative thing, 
limited to Catholics alone.  Rather, it is qualitative, dynamically and efficaciously 
working in the entire Church of Christ.  Grace is the very life of God working in creation 
and in human life.  Avery Dulles rightly observed: ―Vatican II attributes the four 
properties to the church of Christ, not directly to the Roman Catholic Church.‖556  As a 
result of the conciliar teaching, many Catholic theologians think differently about the 
marks today.
557
  Other churches are also said to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic.        
Extended further, holiness can also be found outside the boundaries of 
institutional Christianity.  The church rejects nothing that is true and holy in non-
Christian religions.
558
 
One consequence of this remarkable shift is that other believers who take 
advantage of the gifts and callings they received can become more one, holy, catholic, 
and apostolic than Catholics: all churches can in fact attain an equal if not higher degree 
                                                             
 554 Ibid., 8.  
 555 Ibid., 8.   
 556 Avery Dulles, ―The Church as ―One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic‖‘, Evangelical Review of 
Theology, 23.1, (1999): 16.    
557 Hans Küng, The Church (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 263-359; Johannes Witte, ―One 
Holy, Catholic and Apostolic,‖ in Herbert Vorgrimler, ed., One, Holy Catholic and Apostolic, trans. 
Edward Quinn and Alain Woodrow (London and Sydney: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 3-43;  Yves Congar, I 
Believe in the Holy Spirit, trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury, 1983), II: 5-61; Avery Dulles, The 
Catholicity of the Church (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); Leonardo Boff, Church, Charism, and Power (New 
York: Crossroad, 1986), 108-124; Francis A. Sullivan, The Church We Believe In: One Holy, Catholic, and 
Apostolic (New York: Paulist, 1988); Robert J. Schreiter, The New Catholicity (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1997), 
116-131; Thomas P. Rausch, Towards a Truly Catholic Church (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2005), 131-151; 
Richard Gaillardetz, Ecclesiology for a Global Church (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2008), 35-131, 173-248.    
 558 Nostra Aetate, 2.    
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of sanctity than Catholics alone.  As Dulles concludes: ―Unity, holiness, catholicity, and 
apostolicity are dynamic realities that depend on . . . the Holy Spirit.  Evangelical 
communities that excel in love for Jesus Christ and in obedience to the Holy Spirit may 
be more unitive, holy, catholic and apostolic than highly sacramental and hierarchically 
organized churches in which faith and charity have become cold.‖559   
Thus the Council makes it difficult for apologists to demonstrate that Catholic 
Christianity better embodies the ecclesial attributes than other religious communities.  
The church of Christ is a mystery.  And grace is not quantitative.  As a human institution, 
the Catholic Church may fail to live up to her divine calling.  However, all other things 
being equal, ecclesial vitality and institutional integrity can be found in greater measure 
in the Catholic Church than in other churches.
560
  According to Francis Sullivan: ―What 
the Catholic apologist now has to justify is the claim of his church to have a certain 
fullness of what it means to be a church, and a fullness of the essential properties, such 
that it can rightly be said that the church of Christ subsists there in a way that is not found 
in other churches‖ (emphasis mine).561   
Although the ambitious argument of showing the superior quality of the marks 
within Catholicism is occasionally pursued by apologists in the post-conciliar era, my 
goal in this essay is to provide a defense of Christian faith in response to the secularist 
allegation which says Christian faith does more harm than good in the world.
562
  In the 
pre-conciliar period, this argument was known as the via empirica.  My argument is more 
                                                             
 559 Dulles, ―The Church as ‗One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic,‘‖ 27.     
560 Dignitatis Humanae, 1; Lumen Gentium, 8; Unitatis Redintegratio, 8. 
561 Francis A. Sullivan, ―Notes of the Church,‖ in René Latourelle and Rino Fisichella, ed., 
Dictionary of Fundamental Theology (New York: Crossroad, 2000), 174.     
562 Cf. Christopher Hitchens, god is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: 
Hatchette, 2007); Sam Harris, The End of Faith (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). 
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attentive to a more broadly ecumenical era.  Says Sullivan: ―there is reason to hope that 
in the future a Catholic apologist will be able to base the via notarum on an 
understanding of these properties that would represent at least a convergence, if not a full 
convergence, that had been achieved through ecumenical study and dialogue.‖563   
Unlike the strict use of the via notarum, which was used to argue for Catholic 
Christianity, the argument of this paper will uphold and defend a contemporary version of 
the via empirica―itself a form of the via notarum.564  Here credibility is given on behalf 
of the Divine Founder, not to the doctrinal distinctives of any one church.    
By definition grace manifests itself in persons and changes them for the better.  
That is why this argument should always remain valid, even in a post-conciliar church.  
As Joseph A. Komonchak observes,  
The church‘s very existence is supposed to make the world different.  It would be a 
mistake, then, to imagine a tension, much less a dichotomy, between the texts of the 
council that, to use a not entirely happy distinction made at the time, speak of the 
Ecclesia ad intra and those that speak of the Ecclesia ad extra, to contrast a theological 
to a sociological or historical approach to the Church, or to divide the theological notions 
of the Church up between these two pretended oppositions.  It is true, of course, that 
some notions direct attention more clearly than others to one or another of these 
dimensions, but it is a single dynamic historical agent that these dimensions constitute 
and these notions describe. . . . The mystery of the Church is realized in the history of the 
world.565   
 
Each of the four marks logically implies the presence of the others.  God‘s grace brings 
people together (unity), and it enables them to reach their potential as human beings 
(holiness).  Part of what it means to be a human is to be inclusive towards others 
                                                             
563 Sullivan, ―Notes of the Church,‖ 174. 
564 Allusions to the via empirica can be found in Hans Küng, The Church, 3-39.  Also relevant is 
Dennis Hollinger, ―The Church as Apologetic: A Sociology of Knowledge Perspective,‖ in Timothy R. 
Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, (eds.), Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World (Downer‘s Grove: 
InterVarsity, 1995), 182-193.    
565 Joseph A. Komonchak, ―The Significance of Vatican Council II for Ecclesiology,‖ in Patrick 
Granfield and Peter C. Phan, (eds.), The Gift of the Church (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2000), 90, 91. See also 
Joseph A. Komonchak, ‗Ecclesiology of Vatican II‘, Origins, 28.44, (April 22, 1999), 768; Sullivan, The 
Church We Believe In, 17.     
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(catholicity).  With this spiritual connection, there is historical continuity with other 
believers, reaching backward into the past (apostolicity).   
The notion that the church in its concrete existence can provide testimony to its 
Divine Founder has never been absent in Christian thought.
566
  As the French Catholic 
theologian René Latourelle once noted: ―The argument is a traditional one in the church.  
From the first centuries, the Fathers, primarily Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, and 
Augustine, appealed to it to defend Christianity, its miraculous spread, the constancy of 
its martyrs, and the brilliance of its holiness.‖567  In modern theology the argument was 
eventually taken up by Savonarola, Bossuet, Pascal, Lacordaire, Bautin, Dechamps, 
Kleutgen, and Franzelin.   
As a result of its widespread acceptance in the church, the argument was 
dogmatically defined at the First Vatican Council (1869-1870).  Vatican II (1962-1965) 
followed the theology of Vatican I, but it did not call the church a ―moral miracle.‖  
Instead it spoke of the church as a ―sign to the nations.‖568  In other places the Council 
Fathers assert that Christianity helps change the world for the better.
569
  Conversely, the 
world‘s ominous doctrines, when construed apart from the values of true religion, will 
gradually destroy the fabric of society.
570
  Let us now turn to some philosophical and 
theological arguments to understand how Christian belief is thought to make a moral 
difference in the lives of its constituents.                 
 
The Inner-Rationale of Catholic Beliefs and the Difference it Makes 
                                                             
566 Augustine, City of God, bk. 22; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 6.   
567 René Latourelle, Theology of Revelation (New York: Alba House, 1966), 417, 418.    
568 Lumen Gentium, 1.  
 569 Cf. Lumen Gentium, 35, 46. 
 570 Ibid., 36. 
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Traditional Catholic theology holds that the strongest form of moral motivation 
can only be discovered by receiving God‘s grace, culminating in a life that is lived in 
relationship with him.  God‘s special infusion of grace is the necessary ingredient to live 
out the virtues in the way they are intended to be lived out.  Healing the person, God‘s 
grace brings the acquired virtues to fulfillment by elevating believers to perform 
supernatural acts, securing them on the right path to their final end.  These supernatural 
acts cannot be performed unless one receives God‘s grace.     
Rather than merely stating that grace makes believers more virtuous than they 
would be without I (which would be an unapologetic way of putting it!), there are at least 
four reasons that can be philosophically adduced to provide an inner-rationale of the 
difference Christianity makes in the world.  Only someone who has faith will recognize 
the effects of receiving grace, but unbelievers can still apprehend the intrinsic connection 
between Christian beliefs and the way in which they develop stronger forms of moral 
motivation.   
 First, because human life does not end in death in a Christian universe, all persons 
are held accountable for their actions during their earthly lives.  In the end the scales of 
justice will finally be balanced, and righteousness will prevail over evil.  Every evil will 
be transformed for the greater good.  In turn every decision that is made by Christians in 
this lifetime has eternal significance because there is something to hope for in the end.
571
  
Christian believers can, therefore, make decisions that run strongly against temporal 
pressures and embrace acts of extreme self-sacrifice for the greater good.  As Linda 
Zagzebski says: ―the moral life involves more than time and effort.  At least some of the 
                                                             
571  Cf. Gaudium et Spes, N. 20, 21, 34, 39, 43.   
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time it involves the sacrifice of self-interest.  It is not rational, however, to give up a 
known good unless it is probable that the sacrifice really is for a greater good.‖572   
 Second, belief in the Christian God provides moral resolution in a world which is 
highly pluralistic and uncertain with respect to moral matters.
573
  Moral pluralism can 
easily lead to moral skepticism and despair, making it easy, if not inevitable, to doubt the 
moral efficacy of human beings altogether.  The problem with atheism is that not only is 
objective morality undermined, but so is rational thought.
574
  A world of total and 
unmitigated ―chance‖ is not a world of reason, but of chaos.  Rational beliefs may help us 
in our struggle for survival, but the worldview of atheistic materialism does not build up 
persons‘ confidence in helping them to know that their beliefs about the world are true.     
Sometimes moral skepticism makes it seemingly irrational to sacrifice oneself for 
another for their greater good because there is no guarantee that this is precisely what is 
needed in certain ethical contexts.  In this way, skepticism can lead to a deprivation of the 
motivating force in building virtue.  As Zagzebski asserts, moral skepticism ―does not 
take away the natural desire to be moral, but it does take away the motivating force 
because morality is intimately connected with feelings, commitments, sacrifices, 
expectations, and hopes.  The moral life involves risk; both because of the personal 
sacrifices it requires and because of the emotional commitments it involves.‖575  In order 
to transcend the impasse, something must provide moral guidance, to wit,—something 
such as a divine revelation
576
 and providence.    
                                                             
572 Linda Zagzebski, ―Does Ethics Need God?,‖ Faith and Philosophy, 4.3, (July 1987), 295.   
573 Gaudium et Spes, 33.   
574 Victor Reppert, C.S. Lewis’ Dangerous Idea (Downer‘s Grove: InterVarsity, 2003).     
575 Zagzebski, ‗Does Ethics Need God?‘ 299.   
576 For example, the revelation of the Trinity reinforces  and makes clear the importance of human 
community.  Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, N. 813, 2205.    
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 Third, if one embraces the moral point of view, then one needs the satisfaction of 
knowing that they will have a reasonable chance of success at being moral.  Atheists—
whether they are of the critical or practical variety—do not have the benefit of knowing 
that they will have a good chance of success at being moral because there are so many 
factors outside of their control that prevent them from reaching their full potential within 
the limited amount of time they have to live.  As Robert Adams observes: ―Having to 
regard it as very likely that the history of the universe will not be good on the whole, no 
matter what one does, seems apt to induce a cynical sense of futility about the moral life, 
undermining one‘s moral resolve and one‘s interest in moral consequences.‖577   
Belief in the living, revealed God, by contrast, enables one to overcome moral 
weakness and inefficacy when facing the difficulties of moral living.  The grace that 
manifests itself in the infused virtues provides one with a greater chance of moral success 
in facing the challenge of living the moral life.       
 Fourth, Catholic belief in the communion of saints helps believers to live a more 
moral life by removing the feeling of cosmic loneliness, which can lead to despair.  At 
the heart of this doctrine is the belief that there is a communication of spiritual gifts 
among the elect.  This sharing includes those who have passed into the next life.  With 
this conception of spiritual communication in mind, believers become more conscious of 
their obligation to contribute to the common good and also the extent to which they are 
indebted to others for their own spiritual blessings.  All believers, regardless of their 
situation—no matter how dismal life might appear—can contribute to the betterment of 
                                                             
577 Robert Adams, ―Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief,‖ in C.F. Delaney, (ed.), Rationality and 
Religious Belief (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979), 127.    
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the entire world through their lived example, prayer, and other spiritual sacrifices (even if 
they are performed alone or in secret).
578
   
Now these arguments are suggestive and not individually probative.  Each piece 
of evidence is presented to create a cumulative case argument.  An accumulated amount 
of evidence, while unable to be persuasive if one takes one piece at a time, becomes more 
persuasive when combined together.  By no means are these four points comprehensive 
accounts of the inner-rationale of Catholic or Christian beliefs; other doctrines could 
certainly be included.  The point is that Christianity enables believers to embrace a 
distinctive life view that seems incapable of being reached in worldviews antithetical to 
Christianity.  Ideas have consequences.  Beliefs affect behavior.  And doctrine helps to 
determine devotion.    
Given the inner-rationale of Christianity, we should expect empirical traces of the 
influence it has left in those societies it has deeply permeated.  Karl Rahner once drew 
attention to this: ―God really has redeemed, he really has poured out his Spirit, he really 
has done mighty things for sinners, he has let his light shine in the darkness. . . she 
{meaning the church} must not declare this merely as a possibility provided by God. . . as 
if one could merely ‗presume‘ that God has poured out his Spirit without giving any 
evidence at all of his mighty wind and his tongues of fire.‖579   
The church can count a large number of believers who have lived as heroic 
exemplars of sanctity in every historical age and circumstance.  So confident is the 
church‘s belief in the effects of Christianity that she has declared that the church itself is 
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a motive of credibility.
580
  Exemplifying a type of sacrament, the church ―is not a force or 
entity which exists in its own right.  On the contrary, it points away from itself, and 
beyond itself.‖581  The transformation of so many people in so many different cultures 
across the ages is so impressive that it requires an explanation.   
        
Prospects for Developing the Via Empirica 
Observations from history strongly suggest that Christianity has contributed to an 
improvement in the physical, scientific, artistic, social, and political lives of countless 
individuals.
582
  Observations also suggest that Christianity has contributed to violence, 
but I will address this issue in the second half of the chapter.  As for now, I will focus on 
the positive apologetic issues involved with the via empirica.  The church‘s beliefs and 
practices are distinctive in the sense that they form the worldviews of individuals to 
perceive reality in a certain way, inaugurating the Kingdom of God ―on earth as it is in 
heaven.‖   
Now, only someone who has faith will recognize the mystery of the four marks, 
but reason can apprehend the change that Christianity has had on a civilization.  The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church remarks: ―Only faith can recognize that the Church 
possesses these properties [i.e., the four marks] from her divine source.  But their 
historical manifestations are signs that also speak clearly to human reason. As the First 
Vatican Council noted, the ‗Church herself, with her marvelous propagation, eminent 
holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in everything good, her catholic unity and 
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invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable 
witness of her divine mission‘.‖583   
Some detractors might note that historical effects are usually accounted for by 
multiple causes, not just one.  Thus Christian beliefs cannot be exclusively responsible 
for any particular historical effect.  It is true that historical effects usually have more than 
one cause, but this does not mean that historians cannot posit specifically Christian 
beliefs that are widespread in the culture as a necessary cause for certain widespread 
effects.  Because various causes have different values and contribute to forming various 
phenomena in history, historians rarely affirm that entire movements and institutions can 
be accounted for by a single cause.  Many necessary causes, however, might contribute to 
the ongoing influence of historical effects.  Christianity is thought to be a major 
contributor to the positive differences made in different cultures.   
The following areas of research are not usually written with apologetic intentions, 
but they do happen to coincide with the apologists‘ use of the four marks.  Beginning 
with the assumption that Christian beliefs can make a difference for the greater good, it is 
now time to briefly introduce the relevant evidence that seems to confirm the soundness 
of the philosophical arguments in the last section.  We now turn, then, to some prospects 
for developing the via empirica.  Readers are encouraged to consult the footnotes for 
developing the argument in more specific ways.                   
 From the beginning of the Christian movement, a tradition developed in which 
believers encouraged the use of reason and celebrated the possibility of progress in light 
of their eschatological outlook.  Unlike many other religions, which are focused on law, 
Christianity was a religion based on grace by which the fecundity of theological 
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reasonings were made possible.  Theological development is taken seriously in 
Christianity.  Reason itself is seen as a gift from God.  While many other religions are 
based on mystery, intuition, ―esoteric knowledge‖ (gnosis), or even belief in capricious, 
humanlike deities, Christianity embraces reason and logic as God-given guides to 
understand unchanging religious truth.   
Christianity continued to spread rapidly throughout Europe into the middle ages.  
Its unique emphasis on rational theology and eschatology continued to transform its 
adherents and entire societies.  Though some antiquated works of history claim that after 
the Roman Empire collapsed Europe eventually entered the so-called ―Dark Ages,‖ 
contemporary scholars repeatedly call this contention into disrepute.  Rapid intellectual 
and material progress began as soon as the church escaped from Roman rule and Greek 
idealism.  Consequently, medieval Europe soon surpassed the rest of the world in science, 
culture and technology.
584
   
Innovations in productive capability, including advanced military weaponry and 
improved transportation, were all significant features of medieval Europe.  In the words 
of Rodney Stark: ―So much progress took place during the so-called Dark Ages that by 
no later than the thirteenth century, Europe had forged far ahead of Rome and Greece, 
and ahead of the rest of the world as well.  Why? Primarily because Christianity taught 
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that progress was ‗normal‘ and that ‗new inventions would always be forthcoming.‘ This 
was the revolutionary idea.‖585    
The novelty of Christian beliefs helps to explain why the new faith was able to 
grow at such an astounding rate.  Outsiders found the strict nature of Christian belief 
attractive,
586
 including its exclusive stance with respect to other religions.
587
  Christianity, 
moreover, was unlike any other religion at the time.  Unlike Judaism and many other 
religions, it did not discriminate on the basis of gender and social class.  Christians called 
on everyone to repent and believe in the Gospel.
588
   
Christian worship was highly intense in the face of the mundane liturgies of 
ancient Judaism.
589
  To be sure, earliest worship practices featured the belief that God 
was active in the midst of ritual action.
590
  The attitude in worship was not passive, but 
was one in which the believer could expect to be changed by the Spirit. The intense 
charismatic experience of the early Christians was highly attractive to outsiders.
591
  
Gerald O‘Collins writes:  
A number of ‗this-worldly‘ factors, which help explain the propagation of Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and Islam by the Gautama, Confucius, and Muhammed, respectively, do 
not apply to Christianity. . . In these three instances we can point to publicly verifiable 
causes which furthered the spread, respectively, of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam: 
the long careers of the founders, financial resources, and success in battle.  In the case of 
Christianity, the founder enjoyed none of these advantages: his public career was 
extremely short, he lacked military and financial support, and his life ended in a 
humiliating failure and a disgraceful death on a cross. After all this, the subsequent 
propagation of the message of universal salvation in his name remains an enigmatic 
puzzle unless we admit a cause . . . adequate to account for the effect.592   
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To be more precise, the rapid rise and success of Christianity in the face of contrary 
pressure cries out for some sort of an explanation.  Thus the Christians‘ refusal to 
accommodate the substance of their worship in the face of alternative pressure, and the 
rapid rise and success of worshipping a crucified Messiah in the face of secular 
opposition should all be exploited.
593
      
Closely linked to the Christian concern for reason and innovative progress is the 
endorsement of natural law principles.  No matter one‘s race, religion, or gender, every 
human being is created in the image of God.  Different understandings of natural law can 
certainly be found in Greco-Roman cultures before the rise of Christianity, but it was 
Christian thinkers who held that God was the author of nature.  This deeply held 
conviction set the stage for the defense of human integrity and universal rights in later 
centuries.
594
  Reference to human dignity is used to defend labor and economic 
freedom.
595
  It has also played a significant role in liberation movements.
596
             
Although it may seem obvious today that everyone is created equal under God, 
the historical evidence points in the opposite direction.  Without the influence of 
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Christian faith, it is not at all evident that equality trumps inequality given the various 
strengths, talents, and circumstances of so many different individuals.  Because God 
creates and loves each person infinitely, however, everyone has intrinsic value in 
Christianity.    
Christianity‘s revolutionary ideas about human beings eventually contributed to 
opposition to slavery.
597
  When we look at the relationship between Christianity and 
slaveholding, it must be admitted that the church originated and later developed in a 
world teeming with slavery.  Because the institution of slavery was so widespread and 
uncontested in so many parts of the world, it was rarely protested against.
598
  Hence one 
might argue that the history of humanity is a history of slavery.  The church may have 
been the only organized group that eventually ‗declared the diminution, if not the final 
elimination, of slavery to be meritorious‘.‖599  Even though it may have taken centuries to 
abolish this repugnant practice in many places, Christians can be credited for 
overthrowing it at times.   
Similar circumstances apply in the development of women‘s rights.  While the 
earliest churches did not immediately protest against patriarchy, it elevated the status of 
women in the face of Greco-Roman pressures to the contrary.
600
  So different were the 
ways that Christians treated women in the ancient world that the Romans scorned the new 
religious sect as being effeminate and soft, lacking strong male virtues such as justice.   
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Another fascinating area of research should center on the impact of Christian 
theology upon the elevation of sexual norms.
601
  The new standard set by the early 
Christians has had a monumental impact on civilization.  Detractors of Christian 
morality, on the other hand, have argued that Christians borrowed their ideas about sex 
from Greek philosophies and religions.  But this contention is not at all sustainable in the 
face of contemporary scholarship.  As Kathy L. Gaca concluded in her groundbreaking 
study, The Making of Fornication, ―Foucault and others are therefore mistaken in 
maintaining that ‗the codes in themselves did not change a great deal‘ between Greek and 
Christian Greek sexual principles.  Paul‘s unconditional imperative to flee fornication 
was radically new to the Greeks and other Gentiles, and its aim was to supplant religious 
sexual existence as they lived it, or, in the case of the philosophers, as they conceived it 
should be lived.‖602                     
The impulse of reason in the service of faith also gave impetus to the weighing 
and assessing of evidence to understand God and his relationship with the world.
603
  
Eventually the intellectual milieu of the medieval period culminated into the university 
system.
604
  As one noteworthy commentator reports, the ―university was a Christian 
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invention that evolved from cathedral schools established to train monks and priests.‖605  
According to Rodney Stark:  
. . . was not a monastery or place for meditation.  Rather, as Marcia L. Colish put it, ‗The 
scholastics who created this heady educational environment rapidly outpaced monastic 
scholars as speculative thinkers.‘  The key word here is ‗speculative.‘  The medieval 
universities were unlike Chinese academics for training Mandarins or a Zen master‘s 
school. They were not primarily concerned with imparting the received wisdom.  Rather, 
just as is the case today, faculty gained fame and invitations to join faculties elsewhere by 
innovation.  
The results were entirely predictable: factions formed and reformed; new schools of 
thought abounded; controversy became the dominant fact of scholarly life.  In a world 
over which One True Church claimed exclusive doctrinal authority, the spirit of free 
inquiry cultivated in the universities made theology the revolutionary discipline.  As 
increasingly large numbers of learned scholars pored over scriptures in search of original 
insights, inevitably they often reached contradictory conclusions, some of which 
prompted serious religious conflict and dissent.606  
          
The medieval university simply cannot be compared to the academy of Greece or 
Rome.
607
  Correlatively, the medieval church was the first organized institution in the 
world that showed consistent interest in the cultivation and preservation of knowledge.  
The lineage of modern universities can be traced back to medieval universities such as 
Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge, not Greece or Rome.
 608
        
The emphasis on God and reason also helped spur the rise of modern science.  
Historians now almost universally recognize that the modern scientific revolution would 
have been manifestly impossible without deeply embedded Christian philosophical 
presuppositions in those societies where science originated.
609
  Though we might take 
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science and the orderly nature of creation for granted today, belief in a transcendent, 
personal Creator who endows creation with orderly laws eventually provided the fathers 
of modern science with some of the necessary intellectual resources for a quantitative 
analysis of the universe.  At the time western Europe was deeply influenced by the 
rational theology of the scholastics and the university‘s emphasis on speculative thinking.     
In Christianity all of creation is seen to reflect the rationality of the Creator.  
Science developed because of the belief that creation is a cosmos (being orderly), not 
chaotic or animistic as in other religions and cultures.  Scripture lent support to the 
rationality of the universe in late antiquity, and this subsequently laid the foundations for 
understanding the world in a certain way.  Conversely, non-Christian cultures did not 
have the intellectual resources needed for the development of science as traditionally 
understood.   
Stanley Jaki and many others have argued that these civilizations worked out of 
conceptual frameworks that hindered the growth of science.  Jaki extended his thesis to 
several civilizations as test cases and demonstrated that in each of them science was 
unable to develop as a result of non-Christian conceptions of reality: Arabic, Babylonian, 
Chinese, Egyptian, Greek, Hindu, and Mayan.
610
  Conversely, it seems that the decline of 
Christianity in the West will only harm the advancement of science (especially the 
biological, chemical, and physical sciences).  As the British physicist Peter Hodgson 
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recognizes: ―While there are many causes for the decline of science, the decline of 
Christian belief must be among them.‖611     
Belief in one God is one of the single most influential beliefs of western 
civilization.
612
  Science seems to vindicate this conclusion.  Over the last few years, a 
cumulating amount of research has confirmed the notion that spirituality has a positive 
influence on human well-being and longevity.  Believers are happier, healthier, and live 
longer than their unbelieving counterparts.  Affirmed with consistency in the medical 
community, researchers maintain that belief in God and human health grow in direct, not 
in inverse proportion with one another.
613
  As W.R. Miller and C.E. Thoreson assert: ―It 
is hardly news that spirituality and religion can have an important influence on human 
health and behavior.  Religious resources figure prominently among the methods that 
people call on when coping with life stress and illness.‖614   
The causal relationship between religion and health is occasionally challenged by 
projection theorists and their nineteenth century forebears (i.e., Freud, Marx, and 
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Feuerbach),
615
 but the thing to keep in mind is that these challenges do not square with 
the prevailing clinical evidence.  As Miller and Thoreson recognize:   
In the spirit of two-tailed tests, clearly research on religion should examine both its 
positive and its negative potential effects on health. Certainly misuses and abuses exist 
within religion, as they do in any significant social institution. Apart from such 
distortions of religion, however, it is entirely possible that certain religious beliefs or 
practices are associated with adverse health effects. At present there is no substantial base 
of empirical evidence regarding negative effects of religion on health (Thoresen et al., in 
press). If research on health benefits of religion has been widely avoided within 
mainstream psychology, well designed studies of its potential adverse effects appear to 
have been even more shunned.616   
 
The projection theory is not a scientific one, but a philosophical contention—and a highly 
presuppositional one at that.  Freud himself once said: ―Let us be quite clear on the point 
that the views expressed in my book [i.e., The Future of an Illusion] form no part of 
analytic theory.  They are my personal views.‖617  Indeed, Freud had very little 
acquaintance with patients who believed in God.  Nor did he ever publish a report based 
on hard evidence garnered from working with believers.
618
   
 Yet another area of apologetic research should focus on the emergence of 
charitable organizations, health care, and organized hospitals in the patristic and medieval 
periods.
619
  Because Jesus taught the importance of unconditional love, countless forms 
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of charitable organizations have formed since the patristic era.  Part of the reason for the 
emergence of monastic orders during the medieval period was to help the poor and help 
the sick recover from disease.   
Critics of this viewpoint have argued that early Christianity was ubiquitously 
characterized by magical means of healing and other superstitious practices.  But this 
contention is not a convincing argument in light of more recent scholarship.  
Contemporary scholars maintain that the churches relied on the best available naturalistic 
sources of healing in the early medieval period.  Moreover, the origin of the medieval 
hospital was influenced by Christian ideals such as compassion for the patient, regardless 
of past sins.  As Gary Ferngren, an expert in the rise of medicine, explains:  
Throughout the Hebrew scriptures one finds the popular view enunciated that illness and 
disease are God‘s punishment for sin and wrongdoing. . . . Pagan culture [on the other 
hand] discouraged all attempts to deal with the sick as a societal problem, in part, because 
it assumed that the sick were suffering deservedly; in part, because of the pessimism that 
regarded society as incapable of significant improvement; and, in part, because of a 
quietism that rejected the desirability of attempting real change in society.  The resulting 
passivity accounts for the failure of state officials to undertake public relief during times 
of plague and reflects the ease with which ancient societies accepted suffering without 
undertaking efforts to ameliorate it.  Underlying it as well was the belief that plague was 
retributive, a punishment by the gods on society for some failure of an individual or 
magistrate that could be removed only by their propitiation.  
Unlike the classical world, Christianity rooted its attitude to philanthropy in 
theology.  The impulse behind Christian philanthropy was the encouragement of a self-
giving love of one‘s fellow human beings that reflected the love of God in the Incarnation 
of Christ and his death for the redemption of the world. . . .The Incarnation of Christ had 
changed and elevated the human body, including that of lepers.  Their bodies transmitted 
their holiness to those who had cared for them.620  
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The church‘s interest in physical healing was intimately linked to its concern to fulfill the 
Great Commission.  Undoubtedly the rise of Christian faith helped spur the emergence of 
health care and medicine.         
On another front, believers have depicted the created world and the events of 
salvation history in different forms of artistic expression across the ages.
621
  Since belief 
in the incarnation is taken to mean, in part, that God has elevated the creation to a new 
level, creation should be appreciated.  Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find an art 
historian that denies the positive influence of Christian faith on art.  Despite the repeated 
attempts of iconoclasts, the Magisterium has consistently defended art as a form of 
spiritual expression by referring to theological principles.
622
   Inspired by the Scriptural 
conviction that the world is orderly and capable of being pondered, for instance, Christian 
artists seek to construct their work according to ―measure, number, and weight‖ (Wisdom 
11:21).
623
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Many examples immediately come to mind: the Sistine Chapel, Da Vinci‘s The 
Last Supper, Michaelangelo‘s Pieta, and Rembrandt‘s Christ at Emmaus and Simeon in 
the Temple.  Veronese, Titian, and Tintoretto are responsible for painting some of the 
most well- known murals in Europe.  These can all be found in Venice.  Who can ignore 
Handel‘s Messiah, Mozart‘s Requiem, and the music of Johann Sebastian Bach?  Not to 
be overlooked, the centerpiece of medieval art is the gothic cathedral.  As Paul Johnson 
writes: ―The medieval cathedrals of Europe . . . are the greatest accomplishments of 
humanity in the whole theatre of art.‖624   
No impartial historian denies that some of the most memorable works of literature 
have also come from Christians: Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton.  The point here is not 
to say that these artistic works were produced by Christians.  Rather, the more forceful 
(and interesting) claim is that Christian beliefs provided these geniuses of art with a 
distinctive way of expressing themselves.  This influence has been so monumental that 
even critics of the church have, in many cases, borrowed from Christian themes to 
convey the points that they do.  Take Goethe‘s Faust as an example.  In the story the 
allegory of suffering is derived from Christian views on suffering.                
 
Response to Objectors to the Via Empirica 
A major criticism of this argument is that high levels of morality (and human 
benefits) can be found outside the institutional church.
625
  As the atheist sociologist Phil 
Zuckerman recognizes, ―nations marked by high levels of organic atheism—such as 
Sweden or the Netherlands—are among the healthiest, wealthiest, best educated, and 
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freest societies on earth.‖626  Now, casting aside the difficult contention of having to 
show that these societies have never been affected by Christian beliefs in either a direct 
or indirect manner, the more important thing for Christians to remember is that Christian 
beliefs and the concrete expression of the marks do not always go hand in hand.  Vatican 
II does not endorse the exclusivist viewpoint in the strict sense of the term.  Catholic 
theology does not hold that holiness can only be found in those cultures influenced by the 
church.  Because grace is not a quantitative thing, holiness can be found outside the 
influence of institutional Catholicism.       
So if the claim of the via empirica is that holiness can only be found in those  
societies influenced by the Christian world-view, then of course Zuckerman‘s findings 
gain some force.  Unlike fundamentalist advocates of Christian faith, mainstream 
theologians do not argue that holiness can only be found in Christian communities and/or 
societies.  Zuckerman repeatedly caricatures the Christian view as a strict exclusivism.
627
  
But the via empirica claims that, all things being equal, Christianity will make a moral 
difference.  Above I presented four philosophical arguments to elucidate that contention, 
and it is confirmed by recent findings in social sciences.  What is more, this evidence 
itself is not all that controversial.     
Vatican II affirms that human beings are the only creatures that God has willed 
for their own sake.
628
  Hearing the Gospel is merely an outward sign that God is calling 
its hearers to a greater relationship with himself, not that he loves those who hear and 
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respond favorably to the message more than those who remain cognitively ignorant of it.  
Nor does conciliar teaching hold that God is not working for the betterment of persons in 
societies outside the influence of Christianity.  As Eugene Hillman rightly said: ―if there 
are degrees of holiness among Christians, then we would assume that these same degrees 
may be actual also among those who, because of their historical situation and through no 
fault of their own, cannot have explicit faith and historical belief in Jesus Christ.   God 
truly wills the salvation of every member of the human race, not just those who happen to 
be born in the right time and place.‖629 
What, then, is the benefit of the institutional church given the multifaceted nature 
of God‘s grace?  Given the nature of God‘s revelation, believers have the opportunity to 
point to something tangible in history to substantiate God‘s love for the human race.  
Christ confirms divine revelation and gives it a historical, concrete expression.
630
  
Therefore, God is working outside the formal influence of the church, but is explicitly 
known and reinforced through the church‘s teachings.  Maurice Boutin observes that 
―God‘s grace is not bound to Christianity, but Christianity is bound to God‘s grace, which 
is for Christian faith Christ‘s grace as well.  As such, explicit Christianity is the full 
realization of God‘s grace.‖631  Being a part of the institutional church enables one to 
have the highest potential of living out the grace of God.  By no means is this opportunity 
always actualized by Catholics.      
Thus we should expect to see positive contributions to societies in non-Christian 
contexts without the outward sign of grace we call ―the church.‖  However, spiritual 
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vitality and Christ oriented institutional integrity can only be found in the Catholic 
Church.  God‘s grace can be detected in places not influenced by institutional 
Christianity.  Grace is not limited to Christians, but is manifested in the world in different 
times, locations, and degrees.  By the grace of God, some ―non-Christian‖ cultures may 
outshine ―Christian‖ ones.  Grace can be indirectly felt in societies affected by the 
church, but it is not limited to manifesting itself in Catholic (or Christian) circles alone.   
This chapter has thus highlighted some of the unique ways that God has graced 
the institutional church, and it seems to vindicate the idea that Christian belief can make a 
moral difference in the lives of believers for the better.  While it has not shown the 
superior expression of the marks within Catholicism over other Christianities or even 
other world religions, it was concerned with undercutting the challenge which says that 
the Christian faith does more harm than good in the world.                   
 When one thinks of the terrible incidents of church related persecution, including 
the pettiness and inadequacies of so much daily church life, it becomes easy to doubt the 
vital work of the Spirit.  Who we are is more important than what we can say.  Let us now 
turn to the negative apologetic concerns with the via empirica.   
 
Violence as a Defeater of the Via Empirica?  
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the experiential approach is that Christianity has 
led many of its adherents down the path of violence.  Or, Christianity is associated with 
violence.  Indeed, one of the primary arguments in the recent spate of atheist literature is 
that Christianity causes violence.  Steven Pinker is representative of this viewpoint: 
―religions have given us stonings, witch-burnings, crusades, inquisitions, jihads, fatwas, 
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suicide bombers, and abortion clinic gunman.‖632  He says that humans once believed 
God commanded them to ―massacre Midianites, stone prostitutes, execute homosexuals, 
slay heretics and infidels, throw Protestants out of windows, withhold medicine from 
dying children, and crash airplanes into skyscrapers.‖633  Let us be clear about the atheist 
claim: the argument is not that violence results when religious groups engage in war 
because the right conditions are in place for a defensive strategy to justify political ends 
(as proponents of the just war have traditionally maintained), but that Christianity is one 
of the primary reasons why violence breaks out in the first place.   
Attributing violence to the fundamental teachings of Christianity―in either a 
direct or indirect manner―is tantamount to affirming that God is a malevolent God who 
works through his people to spread evil in the world.  On this view, the Christian God is 
nothing other than an evil god, not an omnibenevolent deity who is concerned with the 
welfare of the human race.  There might as well be no god at all.  Steven Weinberg pulls 
no punches: ―Good people will do good things, and bad people will do bad things.  But 
for good people to do bad things—that takes religion.‖634   
As a Catholic theologian who is concerned with the atheist claims pronounced 
against Christianity (and not so much against the claims of violence in other religions), I 
will argue that the new atheists‘ claims are refutable.  Christians are within their 
intellectual rights to believe in Christ.  Christians who have become violent in the name 
of the Savior have either knowingly or unknowingly allowed reductive ideologies for 
religious justification to control their thinking and choices.  Christianity does not cause 
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violence per se, but violence that is committed under the banner of Christianity is 
actually a distortion of Christian faith.  To clarify some potential confusion, I will discuss 
the papal endorsement of the just war and show that it cannot be equated with 
Christianity as a cause of violence.      
This aspect of the via empirica must be interpreted as a piece in negative 
apologetics; it is concerned with responding to atheistic claims pronounced against 
Catholicism as a violent religion.  Another task of negative apologetics is to expose the 
weaknesses within those criticisms.  On the other hand, a work in positive apologetics 
would attempt to undercut the atheists‘ claims by overwhelming them with positive 
evidences showing the beneficial impact Christianity has had upon the world.   
 
The New Atheists and Christian Absolutes 
Different proponents of the new atheists propose different types of arguments.  
Sam Harris, for instance, claims that inter-religious warfare was much more prevalent in 
the pre-modern world than it is today.  Given the fact that Christianity thrived in the pre-
modern period, its anachronistic religious tenets help to explain why religiously related 
violence occurs today.
635
  Therefore it is likely that Christianity is responsible for 
inaugurating violence in today‘s world.   
Harris‘s assertion is vague and imprecise for a variety of reasons.  When I use the 
word ―vague,‖ I mean that it is extremely difficult to decide whether war is more of a 
―pre-modern‖ phenomena than a modern one.  How, exactly, does Harris determine this?  
Does he compare the frequency of battles fought during these two time periods?  Or does 
he calculate the intensity of the fighting?  Or body count?  The reason why this is 
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important is that there are other historians of warfare who argue for the exact opposite 
conclusion.  They contend that war is a peculiarly modern phenomena, not a pre-modern 
one.   As James Turner Johnson suggests, ―the ongoing civil strife in Northern Ireland 
aside, the last time wars were fought for religion in the West was during the century after 
the protestant Reformation.‖636  Certainly, from the time of the 16th century onward, 
religion would only remain, in the words of David Martin, ―one marker of national 
identity.‖637  Indeed, many anthropologists now recognize that the idea that pre-modern 
religion is the cause of violence is often founded on unreliable, uncritical, or even 
nonexistent positive evidence.
638
                    
Harris also seems to beg the question with respect to the supernatural (i.e., he 
assumes that pre-moderns were superstitious).  But if supernaturalism can be shown to be 
the superior worldview over naturalism, then Harris‘s claim is severely undercut.  In 
some respect, the modern worldview is no more ―enlightened‖ than the pre-modern 
worldview.  As Huston Smith has written, very few, if any, persons ascribe to either the 
modern or pre-modern worldview at the expense of the other; they inevitably hold on to 
elements from both.
639
  Modernists may know more about some things than pre-moderns 
(e.g, modern science and technology), but in other cases we are less perceptive than they 
were (e.g., pre-moderns had a healthier imagination than moderns); moderns may be 
enlightened over them in different ways, but pre-moderns may have been more subtle and 
perceptive in others.  Thus, if God exists, then Harris‘s argument loses its force.                                
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Still others claim that part of the reason why Christianity has lasted well into 
modernity is that it continues to meet the needs of humanity.
640
  Harris can give reasons 
for why he thinks Christianity is wrong, but he cannot deny that modern people continue 
to be drawn to its message.  Thus critics who are condescending about Christianity today 
will have a negative estimation about understanding its past.   
Closely related to Harris‘s objection is the idea that Christians believe in moral 
and doctrinal absolutes.  As Richard Dawkins wrote, absolute truth predisposes 
Christians to engage in violence, and, to a more intense degree, war.  When asked to 
explain his contempt for religion, Dawkins responded that it is a sure spawning ground 
for violence: ―Certainly [belief in God] can be positively harmful in many ways‘, he 
replied, ‗obviously in causing wars, which has often enough in history . . . causing people 
to do ill to one another because they are so convinced that they know what is right.  
Because they feel it from inside—they‘ve been told from within what is right—anything 
goes—you can kill people because you know that they‘re wrong.‖641   
Dawkins has a significant point here (as I will explain later on, a rigid 
understanding of absolute truth is a sure sign that Christianity is becoming corrupt).  
What he seems to forget is that absolute truth is undeniable, regardless of one‘s 
worldview.  For example, he argues that Christian doctrines are, to paraphrase him, 
false;
642
 and he also upholds the truth of atheism.  But these are two absolute claims!  
Thus, if he is right about the absolutism of Christianity, then he is wrong about the 
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epistemic warrant of Christians who defend absolutes; and if he is wrong about absolutes, 
then he is wrong about the absolutism of Christianity.  To put this in other terms, if inner-
religious clashes between Christians causes violence because of doctrinal and moral 
differences, then wouldn‘t Dawkins‘ differences with Christians put him at risk in 
becoming violent as an advocate of atheism?   
Epistemologically speaking, the issue is not whether Christians are setting 
themselves up to become violent in thinking they have the truth (metaphysics), but in 
how rigid they perceive (epistemology) it.  Because truth is one (metaphysical), unity 
arises between people as they come to know (epistemology) it more clearly.  Unity in the 
truth, however, does not automatically entail uniformity in the truth.  This rationalistic 
view of absolutes can lead to intolerance and violence.  But this is not how the Catholic 
Church understands truth.  There is supposed to be a legitimate pluralism within the 
bounds of orthodox truth.
643
                 
Although Catholics can and must learn to be tolerant with what we think are 
erroneous beliefs in other world and life-views, we must strive to respect everyone‘s right 
to think and choose differently.  This is completely in line with the ecumenical 
movement.  This conviction can and must be upheld, especially in light of the 
fundamental Christian conviction that all people are created in the image of God.  Indeed, 
disagreement can and must co-exist with respect.  When I say ―respect,‖ I mean that 
Christians are in fact called to peacefully acknowledge that others can disagree with them 
without resorting to force in the process.  To put this in more positive terms, the fact that 
we can agree to disagree about our fundamental beliefs can actually become an 
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opportunity for us to keep our fundamental questions and interaction about God alive and 
even renewed.  Despite our differences in a pluralistic society, Christians can contribute 
to promoting the common good with others who do not agree with them without 
advancing violence at the same time.                      
Many Christian theologians have stressed that all people can apprehend the 
absolute truth about God and humanity.
644
  But Catholic theology is a little bit more 
nuanced than this and holds that every person can see and articulate this absolute truth in 
different ways.  The metaphysical truth is the same for all (God‘s existence, with Christ 
as the Savior), but the epistemological can be radically different for different individuals.  
This does not lead to outright pluralism (where the epistemological is exploited, and the 
metaphysical is abrogated to nothing), but to an inclusive faith that maintains the unique 
role of Jesus Christ.        
In many cases the atheistic charge of absolutes is closely linked to biblical 
injunctions in the Old Testament.  A widespread argument of the new atheists is that the 
God of the Old Testament once commanded the extermination of certain groups.
645
  For 
them the God of the Old Testament is a God of war.  As new atheist Victor Stenger one 
put it, ―The Old Testament is filled with atrocities committed in the name of God.  These 
are rarely mentioned in Sunday school, but anyone can pick up a Bible and read them for 
herself.‖646  
 Instead of arguing on a literalistic point-counterpoint basis with the atheists, one 
must provide a more nuanced response.  The Old Testament must be seen as a collection 
of individual books from different cultural traditions, written at different times.  All of 
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these books shed light on how the nation of Israel perceived what they thought was God‘s 
providence for them at the time.  Since Revelation continues to develop as time goes on, 
our understanding of it today should clarify the meaning of these older texts.  Today 
some Christians interpret the Old testament through the lens and prism of the life and 
teaching of Jesus (cf. Matt. 5:17, 18).  Christians have always used a variety of methods 
of interpretation when viewing the Old Testament with that lens in focus.
647
  This is very 
important to keep in mind in responding to this atheistic argument.  When the historical-
critical method of interpretation becomes the sole method of interpretation, it is easy to 
infer that the God of the Old Testament is a violent God who has timelessly commanded 
his people to kill those who would oppose him.
648
            
 As such, a Catholic understanding of the Hebrew Scriptures should not only 
include the literal sense of interpretation, but also the spiritual sense.  As Pope John Paul 
II declared, the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, in addressing biblical exegesis, 
―rejects a split between the human and divine, between scientific research and respect 
for the faith, between the literal sense and the spiritual sense.‖649  Later on in this 
document, he writes, ―exegetes have to make use of the historical-critical method.  They 
cannot, however, accord to it a sole validity. . . . Exegetes should also explain the 
Christological, canonical, and ecclesial meanings of the biblical texts.‖650  The Old 
Testament books are also shaped by the community and historical and social contexts 
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through which individuals engage, internalize, and act upon these text.
651
  In order to 
understand them accurately today, one must interpret them within the community that 
was responsible for originally writing them down, including those communities that 
continue to pass them down today.   
So although Catholics hold that all Scripture is inspired by God, this does not 
mean that everything reported in Scripture should be taken at literal face value (which is 
how a historical-critic will tend to view them).
652
  For it is widely recognized that the 
books of the Old Testament are not mere historical reports, but are highly colored by 
theological motifs.  This is another reason why historical-critical exegesis cannot be the 
sole means of interpretation.  It will fail to do justice to the texts to understand them 
correctly.  When many methods are used through the lens of Christ‘s life, the picture of 
God that emerges is not a God of war, but a merciful God who demands justice, urging 
his people to remain faithful to the covenant.  
        
The New Atheists as Doctors of Modernity 
Harkening back to Karl Marx‘s view of religion, Christopher Hitchens complains 
that belief in the afterlife predisposes believers to not care about what happens in this 
lifetime. The more and more believers project their cares onto the next lifetime, they less 
and less they will care about what happens in this lifetime.  They will not care whether 
they die, or whether they die in battle or in suicide attacks.  In many cases belief in the 
afterlife predisposes believers to become violent.   
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Now this is an understandable conclusion for Hitchens and others (like John 
Lennon, for instance, who sang ―Imagine there‘s no heaven‖ with a promise that this 
would leave us with ―nothing to kill or die for‖) to make if they deny the continuity 
between this lifetime and the next.  It is also understandable if these atheists think that 
Catholicism teaches that all people will go to heaven.  But in the Catholic view, there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between the person who dies and the person who rises.  
Christian theology has always maintained that hell is a real state of final existence.
653
       
The individual fate of each individual person—whether it ends in the bliss of 
heaven or the justice of hell—is ultimately determined by the way in which we shape our 
characters in this lifetime.  Because there is a heaven and hell, this invests every moral 
decision in our lifetime with eternal significance.  Life is filled with meaning because 
good actions are worthy to perform in and of themselves.  Immoral actions must always 
be avoided.   
Because human life does not end at the grave in a Christian universe, all persons 
are held accountable for their actions during their earthly lives.  In the end the scales of 
justice will finally be balanced, and righteousness will prevail over evil.  Every evil will 
be transformed for the greater good.  In turn every serious decision that is made by 
Christians in this lifetime has eternal significance because there is something to hope for 
in the end.
654
 Christians can make decisions that run highly against contrarian pressures 
in their lifetime and embrace acts of extreme self-sacrifice for the greater good.   By no 
means does the acknowledgement of God‘s existence entail heavenly reward and/or final 
justice.  Christian belief can afford one that type of motivation.  
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Catapulted by the Paschal Mystery, the first Christians were led to care more 
about earthly life, including the goodness of creation itself.
655
  Belief in the incarnation 
demanded this kind of attitude.  Again, God entered into creation and became human.  
Not caring about one‘s embodied life and the creation itself is therefore diametrically 
opposed to the very meaning of believing in the incarnation itself. At most, Hitchens 
argued against a false conception of what it means to be a Catholic/Christian.  Like the 
other arguments surveyed here, Hitchens‘ argument is completely unsuccessful.         
Celestial escape from worldly affairs is brought to the fore by Dawkins in 
Freudian terms.  According to Richard Dawkins, Christianity is actually bad for people—
it is a ―kind of mental illness.‖656  In this view, belief in God is a kind of mental virus that 
infects what is otherwise a healthy mind.  The more and more people succumb to 
religion, they more they become inclined to do things normal people would not do.  This 
includes include violent behaviors.
657
 
Dawkins‘ argument is basically a newer version of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud‘s 
projection theory against belief in God.  In their view, God can be merely explained in 
terms of sociological, psychological, and/or anthropological categories of the mind.  
When individuals begin with this atheistic presupposition, the projection theorist has a 
strong point in arguing that faith leads people down the path of self-destructive behavior.  
But until good arguments are first given for atheism, the projection theorist simply begs 
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Delusion, 186, 188.    
657 Cf. Dawkins, The God Delusion, 167.   
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the entire question.
658
  Basically what the neo-atheist is saying is that because God does 
not exist, how could there be such a thing as religion or religiously related violence?  But 
this starting point is the very thing that needs to be challenged.  Arguments in favor of 
theism are often seen as cogent in contemporary theology and philosophy—arguments 
that are often unaddressed in the new atheist literature.         
Similarly, the atheistic projection theorist seem to commit the genetic fallacy.  
That is to say, they confuse how one comes to believe in God with whether the belief in 
question is true.
659
  Certainly, the psychology of belief is not the same thing as the 
rationality of belief; how one comes to believe in God may not have anything to do with 
whether the belief in question is true.  
 Moreover, the idea that God is a projection of our minds to keep us safe from the 
unrelenting forces of nature and society is somewhat idiosyncratic.  To be sure, the God 
of Christian tradition is merciful, but he is also seen as retributive.  This kind of God 
makes it difficult to understand why anyone would want to project him.  This is a point 
that even Dawkins concedes in his book on atheism.
660
  Christians might ask the atheists 
in response: is it really a bad thing to say that belief in God brings satisfaction and peace 
of mind to those who need it?  All people need to be comforted with a variety of things—
                                                             
658 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 193, is very well aware of this problem.  His response is that 
believers are also begging the question.  But this is exactly where the philosophical arguments for God‘s 
existence are needed.           
 659 Conversely, it often shown that militant atheists usually come from families in which the father 
figure was either absent, indifferent, or abusive to them.  Theists, on the other hand, usually come from 
families where the father figure played a more positive role in their life.  See Paul C. Vitz, The Faith of the 
Fatherless (Dallas: Spence, 2000).   
660 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 168.   
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food, shelter, friendship, and camaraderie.  All of these are real human needs.  Perhaps 
there is a real human need for God.
661
   
So, it should be remembered that there is nothing wrong with coming to God for 
help in our time of need, but in Christian worship we also adore God for who he is.   In 
Catholic theology, salvation becomes more demanding for anyone exposed to the Savior, 
not easier to attain.
662
  In lieu of the last point, it must be admitted that believers do 
sometimes project things about an incomprehensible God.  But some false projections do 
not entail that all beliefs about him are false.
663
  Growing in discipleship and knowing 
God is an ongoing, daunting process.  Lastly, the atheists might also be confusing the 
Christian call to a lead a simple lifestyle with psychological weakness.             
 On another front, the issue has very little to do with electro-chemical and 
neurobiological processes in the brain.  It is has everything to do with how the scientific 
evidence is interpreted.
664
  Some will interpret the evidence and argue that belief in God 
can be merely reduced to complex physical mechanisms.  Others will argue that all 
human experience has, in fact, a neurobiological component to it.  Seen in this way, brain 
processes are the proximate cause of how people experience God, but the ultimate cause 
is due to the extra-mental reality of God himself.  Until Dawkins can explain why a 
                                                             
661 For an account, see Peter Kreeft, Heaven: The Heart’s Deepest Longing, exp. ed. (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1989).     
662 Lumen Gentium, 14.   
663 Gregory R. Peterson, Minding God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 186, 187.    
664 See Dean Hamer, The God Gene (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 16: ―This is a book about why 
people believe, not whether those beliefs are true.  Nonbelievers will probably argue that that finding a God 
gene proves there is no God—that religion is nothing more than a genetic program for self deception.  
Religious believers, on the other hand, can point to the existence of God as one more sign of the creator‘s 
ingenuity—a clever way to help us humans acknowledge and embrace his presence.‖                 
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single layered explanation of the evidence should be preferred, this interpretation remains 
a valid one.
665
   
In addition, there is a growing amount of well-established scientific evidence that 
indicates a direct causal link between religious commitment and well-being.
666
  To my 
knowledge, Dawkins is either completely unaware of these findings or chooses to ignore 
them.  Dennett, it may be added, who is an avid reductionist in the biological sciences 
like Dawkins, admits that this conclusion about the relationship between religion and 
health is sound.
667
  In fact, he says, one of the advantages of religion in the long struggle 
of evolution was that it helped human beings to live in communities without fighting and 
killing one another!
668
      
 
Christianity, Atheism, and the Testimony of History 
The testimony of history clearly reveals that Christians have committed many 
heinous crimes.  Whether it is the Crusades, the Inquisition, the fighting between 
Catholics and Protestants, the justification of slavery, the slaughter of those who refused 
to convert, or the fighting in Northern Ireland, history conclusively shows that 
Christianity is a violent religion.  All of these episodes, according to Regina Schwartz, 
explain how ―monotheism‖ has brought a ―violent legacy‖ to the west.669  
Now there is no question that many Christians have committed an incalculable 
amount of hate crimes.  But the thing to keep in mind is that this objection must show 
                                                             
665 Cf. John F. Haught, Is Nature Enough? (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006). 
666 For two recent examples, see Harold G. Koening and Harvey J. Cohen, The Link Between 
Religion and Health: Psychoneuroimmunology and the Faith Factor (Oxford: Oxford University, 2005); 
Kenneth I. Pargament, The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice (New York: 
Guilford, 1997).            
667 Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell (New York: Viking, 2007), 55, 272-277. Cf. 190.      
668 Ibid., 172.  Cf. 179.      
669 Regina Schwartz, The Curse of Cain (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997).   
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that Christianity causes violence, not that it is correlated with it.  With this extreme 
difficulty in mind, this ―argument from historical observation‖ does not demonstrate that 
Christianity causes violence, but has more of a descriptive character to it, exposing the 
very problem that needs to be addressed.   
Even though historians can give many examples showing where the faith has been 
correlated with violence, it is difficult to deny on those same grounds that Christianity 
has been associated with a tremendous amount of good.
670
  As Michael Shermer has 
admitted, ―for every one of these grand tragedies there are ten thousand acts of personal 
kindness and social good that go unreported. . . . Religion, like all social institutions of 
such historical depth and cultural impact, cannot be reduced to an unambiguous evil.‖671  I 
have already discussed
 
some of these positive changes above.  All of the good and the 
bad must be weighed and assessed together, not just the bad track record that is 
associated with Christianity.  But considering the bad over against the good is exactly 
what the atheists have done.   
These examples of Christian violence indicate that we are dealing with highly 
ambiguous scenarios that are open to interpretation on a variety of levels.  Given this 
ambiguity, it becomes difficult to demonstrate that Christianity was directly responsible 
for driving believers down the narrow path of committing such awful crimes.  The causal 
factors involved with war, for instance, are usually explained in terms of social, political, 
and economic causes—not religious ones.672   
                                                             
670 Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-
Hunts, and the End of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University, 2003); idem, The Victory of Reason: How 
Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism and Western Success (New York: Random House, 2005).        
671 Michael Shermer, How We Believe, (New York: Freeman, 2000), 71; cf. Dennett, Breaking the 
Spell, 253.         
672 Cf. William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence (Oxford: Oxford University, 2009). 
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To make matters even more complicated, the problem of identifying the true 
causes of war and violence comes in the attempt to identify and explain what actually 
counts as good and bad.  For example, many persons all over the world viewed Mother 
Theresa as doing much good for the destitute in the streets in India.  Others saw her as 
having a bad social effect on the Indian political system.  They believe that her resources 
could have been utilized for better reasons.  So the problem of defining what is good and 
evil (which must be distinguished from the very fact of good and evil, which is universal) 
usually varies from one culture to the next.  The point is that this often makes it difficult 
for anyone to identify that Christianity causes violent acts. 
 To bring this point home, this generalized ―argument from historical observation‖ 
is no more effective than saying atheism causes violence.  After all, some historians seem 
to think that atheist politicians such as Lenin admitted to using ―protracted violence‖ to 
eliminate religion off the face of the earth.
673
  The same could be said with respect to 
politics.  In Latin America, millions of people ―disappeared‖ in the words of extreme 
right wing politicians and their militias.  In Cambodia, Pol Pot was responsible for killing 
millions in the name of socialism.  But surely it is safe to conclude that politics is not 
evil.
674
   
The same could be said about science.  Surely no atheist would claim that science 
is evil simply because some scientists were responsible for creating weapons to torture 
people—like napalm.675  The main point is that every single human institution can be 
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utilized for evil when it is abused.  As Alister McGrath urges, ―All ideals—divine, 
transcendent, human or invented—are capable of being abused.  That‘s just the way 
human nature is.  And knowing this, we need to work out what to do about it rather than 
lashing out uncritically at religion.‖676  
Many of the examples that are often mentioned by atheists should be 
contextualized to get a better idea about the causal factors involved.  In many cases, 
historians have shown that many traditional stereotypes about Christian violence is 
simply not as bad as commonly thought (e.g., the amount of people killed in the Spanish 
Inquisition or the amount of people killed in the witch hunts in Salem
677
).   
Further, slavery is not commanded in the New Testament.
678
  Paul commanded 
Christian slaves to obey their masters simply because all Christians are called to service 
in whatever vocation they happen to be in.  So, when Paul says ―slaves, obey your 
masters‖ he is not commanding slavery, but that slaves must live out their calling within 
the context in which they find themselves.         
 
Reductivism as a Catalyst for Religious Violence 
One of the strengths of the new atheism is that they expose a correlation between 
Christianity and violence.
679
  No one should doubt the importance of exposing this 
problem.  This ought to drive Christians to identify the root cause(s) of the violence 
performed in the name of Christ to correct these problems accordingly.  We are still left 
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with having to explain why Christians become violent in the name of Christ.  In order to 
accomplish this task, I will explain and describe the thought patterns and/or ideologies 
that influence believers to engage in these acts.  When one or more of these patterns of 
thinking are in place, this can alert us of the seeds that can potentially sprout into 
violence.  At the same time, we can look back in history and see that when Christians 
used force, these thought patterns were already operative and in place.    
 Well-meaning Christians who construe everything in terms of black and white 
about reality may unknowingly feed attitudes and actions to justify violence that is 
literally opposed to genuine Christian faith to begin with.  The issue is not about 
renouncing the notion of absolutes (a metaphysical reality), but about a specific 
interpretation of them (a one-sided epistemology)—one in which truth demands uniform 
consent from everyone.  In this rigid view of truth it becomes easy to view non-Catholics 
as outsiders, and, to a more extreme degree, as enemies who deserve punishment.
680
  As 
Charles Kimball writes: ―When particular understandings become rigidly fixed, and 
uncritically appropriated as absolute truths, well-meaning people can and often do paint 
themselves into a corner from which they must assume a defensive or even offensive 
posture.‖681  The official Catholic position does not do away with absolutes, but allows 
for a variety of interpretations along an orthodox spectrum.  Truth should lead to a 
symphony of voices in unity, not stagnant unison.  Epistemological subjectivity is 
certainly compatible with metaphysical objectivity.       
                                                             
680 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 330, is correct about the fact that rigid forms of absolutism can 
lead Christians into becoming violent.  As he puts it, ―If a man believes in a different god, or even if he 
uses a different ritual for worshipping the same god, blind faith can decree that he should die—on the cross, 
at the stake, skewered on a Crusader‘s sword, shot in a Beirut street, or blown up in a bar in Belfast.‖  What 
Dawkins points out is that a rigid faith can lead one to brutal acts of violence.  But this would obviously not 
include all forms of Christian faith.         
681 Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2002), 46.  Cf. 
Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 51, 251, 295.      
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 Historically speaking, the rigid view of truth probably led the crusaders to see 
their Muslim opponents as disobedient to the gospel—simply because they were Muslims 
and not Christians.  This led them to slaughter the Muslims by the thousands.  
Fundamentalist Christians in our own day have also fallen prey to this one-sided ideology 
in murdering doctors who performed abortions (e.g. the reverend Paul Hill).  They 
claimed that their interpretation of the Bible was the only right one.  According to Hill, 
whoever opposed his interpretation deserved to die.       
 Second, when Christians limit the freedom and intellectual engagement of faith, 
this can make them and others prone into taking directions that lead to violence in an 
uncritical fashion.  These individuals think that they know what God wants for them and 
everyone else (put this together with epistemological absolutism, and the recipe for 
violence increases exponentially).   
For example, it is a known fact that David Koresh and Jim Jones ordered the 
women in their groups to have sex with them.  These women completely bypassed the 
voice of common sense and conscience and, in blind faith, did what they were told—all 
in the name of ―faith.‖  ―When people embrace this orientation, their brains often appear 
to stop working properly; they no longer rely on their judgment and common sense.‖682   
Catholic faith, on the other hand, affects the whole of human nature.  It begins 
with the conviction of the mind based on adequate evidence, and culminates in good 
conduct.  Despite what Dawkins asserts when he describes faith as ―blind trust, in the 
absence of evidence, even in the teeth of evidence,‖683 faith is all about critical and 
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responsible thinking.  The Catholic view of faith is not a leap into the dark; it is a rational 
step into the light, demanding responsible thinking (cf. Matt 10:16; Rom. 12:2; 1 Cor 
14:20).  Reasons can be given for faith.  And no truth of reason will contradict a truth of 
faith.                                 
 Third, reductive interpretations of the Bible can induce believers to become 
violent.  This violent approach usually occurs when the literalist method of historical-
critical interpretation is used at the expense of other methods when looking at certain 
passages in the Bible that seem to suggest that God wants his people to fight and kill 
others.
684
  Many Christians have fallen prey to this bible-based fallacy.  Without 
interpreting the Scriptures correctly, using a variety of methods, many Christians have 
irresponsibly used prooftexts in support of slavery, discrimination against women, racial 
minorities, homosexuals, and Jews.  It has also led married couples to think that God was 
going heal their children without using the necessary medicine (after all, they argued, 
God works miracles for those who have ―enough faith‖).  It has also been used by 
Christians who sincerely believed that Mark‘s Gospel sanctions the use of snake 
handling.  Lopsided readings, therefore, can lead many uninformed interpreters into 
thinking that certain behaviors are fine without recognizing at the same time that these 
actions can lead to dire consequences.         
 Fourth, psychological debilitations make it easy to perceive one‘s situation as 
bleak, catapulting them down the path of destructive behavior.  When believers are in 
need of psychological help, it becomes easy for them to say or do things in the name of 
the Savior that they wouldn‘t ordinarily do.  Likewise, when certain ends are heightened 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
further justification‘.  Dawkins is correct to maintain that those Christians who are ‗blind in their 
obedience‘ can lead to violence, but this is a human corruption of Christian faith.        
684 Ward, Is Religion Dangerous?, 36-38.   
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at the exclusion of others, this can lead Christians into becoming violent toward those 
who get in the way of them being able to fulfill these obligations.
685
  Kimball suggests:  
In authentic, healthy religion the end and the means to that end are always connected.  
But it is often easy for religious people to lose sight of the ultimate goal and focus instead 
on one component of religion.  When a key feature of religion is elevated and in effect 
becomes an end, some people within the religion become consumed with protecting or 
achieving that end.  In such cases, that component of religion functions like an absolute 
truth claim, and zealous believers become blind in their single minded defense of it.  As 
we will see, this corruption takes many forms, but the pattern is unmistakable.  The end 
goal of protecting or defending a key component of religion is often used to justify any 
means necessary.686     
 
Sometimes this mentality manifests itself in trying to defend sacred spaces, or in 
maintaining religious life or a group identity.  In history we see the concept of the end 
justifying any means in Catholics who defended their group identity so intensely that they 
ended up demonizing others in the process—against Jews, women, and other races and 
classes.  Another example is when certain bishops in the Catholic Church hid and shifted 
priests from parish to parish who were pedophiles.  Of course, the moral end of trying to 
maintain the Church‘s reputation ended up superceding the moral end of simply being 
honest.  To conclude, when Christians consider certain goals sacrosanct and above all 
else, it is easy for them to do whatever it takes to make sure these ends are met—even if 
it takes violent action to do so.        
 Fifth, Christians have often used religious rhetoric to cover up their secular and/or 
political purposes to engage in war.
687
  As Keith Ward rightly observes: ―It is when 
religious institutions are blended with political institutions that religion can be enlisted in 
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the use of force—and even then it is just one identifying marker among others.‖688  The 
issue of political power was at least one of the markers in the case of the crusades.  The 
concern for spreading Christianity may have played some part in advancing these terrible 
battles by stroking them with religious overtones, but the fundamental motivating factor 
was the hunger for power and wealth.
689
   
The wars of religion (between Catholics and Protestants) are another perfect 
example when political leaders used religious categories to advance their cause, but 
actually their decisions were shaped more by geo-political and economic factors.  As 
James Turner Johnson argued, a common theme in Europe during the time of the thirty 
years war was ―a link between the religious reformers and forces seeking more local 
autonomy.  The result was what we could today recognize as an ideological use of 
religion to bolster claims essentially political and economic in nature.‖690   
Here I have identified the various thought patterns that dispose Christians
691
 to 
engage in brutally violent acts.  Reductionism pervades their mindset.  By recognizing 
these warning signs and remaining close to the true source of faith (i.e., the God of Jesus 
Christ), Catholic Christians can begin to root out the causes of violence that is performed 
in the name of faith before it actually happens.        
Some critics will undoubtedly argue that Christians can be just as vicious as the 
worst unbelievers.  This would also tell against God‘s work in the Church (thus calling 
the ecclesial attribute of holiness into serious question).  But at most this would only 
show how much worse true Christians would be without their faith.  This allegation is not 
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a definitive refutation of the holiness of the Church.  For we should expect this holy 
alteration from unbelief to belief to effect changes in habits of action.  But we should not 
expect these changes to be radical in new believers who already possess a significant 
amount of virtue before embracing Christian faith (these individuals are not holy as such, 
but are, more or less, more disposed to accepting Christ).  The change is relative, 
depending upon the person (and continues to be relative within the believing 
community).   
As such, sin is not a genuine effect of believing in Christ, but the result of having 
a reductive understanding of believing in him (sometimes this reductionism is so extreme 
that it can only be equated with unbelief
692
).  The Church includes all that is holy, even 
that which is holy in her sinful members.  But she excludes whatever is impure—even 
that which is unholy in her morally holy members.  As Avery Dulles acknowledges:  
―Sin, therefore, cannot be attributed to the church when considered in its formal 
principles, but only when considered materially, in its guilty members.  They exhibit not 
the true nature but the ‗un-nature‘ of the church.  Nevertheless it is true that, . . . In all its 
historical forms the true nature of the Church is accompanied, like a dark shadow by its 
‗un-nature;‘ the two are inseparable.‖693  Again, critics must be able to demonstrate that 
Christianity is responsible for causing sin, not that violence is merely correlated with it.            
 
When War is Justified in Christianity 
 Ever since the time of Augustine and Ambrose Christians have developed the 
―just war theory.‖  Just war theorists recognize that if no one can figure out how to 
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peacefully resolve a major dispute first, and that war must be waged to overcome 
unjustifiable evil (like killing innocent civilians), then it can be fought.  War can be 
waged only to lessen an evil that would have been worse had the war not been fought at 
all.  Just war thinkers also contend that all means of peaceful resolution must be 
exhausted before resorting to physical force.  Thus there is a strong presumption against 
going to war to begin with.   
Just war theorists also recognize that when war is permitted, it is based on the sad 
reality that even though the Kingdom of God has broken into our midst, this does not 
mean it is completely here.  We must wait for the coming of the fullness of the Kingdom.  
Christians believe that all people are created in the image of God, and that we live in a 
fallen world.  With these two doctrines in mind, it is possible that a war can be fought.  
The presumption of peace in just war thinking has also led its theorists to formulate 
strategies to prevent war before it happens (interestingly, this presumption for the 
peaceful means of resolution flows from the teachings of the New Testament, not the 
criteria of the ius ad bellum which was later developed by Christian thinkers
694
).  This has 
flowed from later trajectories in just war thinking as well.
695
  Just war theorists have also 
formulated a standard ethical set of criteria that must be followed at all costs as the just 
war is being fought.  These criteria are known as the ius ad bello.                 
The important point to keep in mind is that the beginning point in Christian just 
war thinking is nonviolent.  Real Christian faith, which finds its source in a God-man 
who would rather die at the hands of his adversaries rather than retaliate with force, can 
allow for ―just wars‖ under certain circumstances.  This does not mean that Christian 
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faith has caused the war.  Only when these attempts at nonviolent action have failed to 
protect the innocent against injustice can legitimate political authorities use limited force 
as a last resort as a means of self-defense to rescue the innocent in establishing justice.  
―The Christian acceptance of warfare was always somewhat conditional,‖ observes James 
Turner Johnson.  ―The use of force was justified only if it was undertaken against evil, 
and the soldier was enjoined to hate the sin against which he was fighting the sinner.‖696  
This beginning point pervades an authentically Christian mindset.   
 
Conclusion 
What constitutes a Christian believer is the divine life that has been imparted to 
her.  The violence that believers commit is not due to the fundamental teachings of 
Christ, but to sinful believers who are in continuous need of God‘s saving grace.  Francis 
Sullivan put it this way, ―to put it more acutely, the mystery is that the church is the 
people of God which, as consisting of real people, is inevitably marked by sin, but, as 
people of God, cannot fail to be holy.‖697   
All Christians have either knowingly or unknowingly allowed certain ideologies 
such as oppressive political, economic, and psychological forces to control their religious 
thinking and/or choices.  So long as Christ is followed by sinful persons, the faith 
inspired by Christ will be ‗corrupted‘ to some extent.  Believers are not the only ones to 
share the burden of sin.  But true believers will always partake against the struggle to 
fight against sin.  And this is precisely the reason why God took on flesh and came into 
our world—to redeem us from violence (Luke 24:34).  And this is precisely the reason 
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why God continues to renew Christians in the Spirit who have yet to reach the fullness of 
the Kingdom.     
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REDEFINING APOLOGETICS 
 
 
 My proposal that a ―traditional apologetics‖ might find a place in a 
postconciliar Catholicism will be welcomed by some and deplored by others.  What are 
some of the positive features of this dissertation?  In the first half of this chapter I will 
point out the positive contributions my dissertation makes; in the second half I will point 
out some shortcomings and where further work needs to be done.   
 
A Positive Evaluation of the Dissertation 
 There are at least ten positive aspects of this dissertation.  Let me briefly 
mention them here.  Each of the following points will be discussed in more detail in this 
section.  
(1) Apologetics will always have a role to play in the church, no matter whether 
the church is ―postconciliar‖ or not.  There will always be objections and concerns that 
prevent individuals from taking the claims of the church seriously.  This fundamental 
contention of the universal applicability of apologetics should be clear to all readers.  
Whether one chooses to use the word ―apologetics‖ or not, the task of defending and 
explaining the central truths of the faith will remain an ongoing struggle in the life of 
faith.  I have given my ―apologetic for apologetics‖ in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation.  This dissertation also helps to fill in a gap left unaddressed by many 
theological publications in the postconciliar period. High ranking officials of the Church 
have been calling for projects like this.
698
   Indeed, this dissertation is consistent with 
Scripture, the history of Catholic thought, and Magisterial teaching.   
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(2) The second positive feature of the dissertation is that it helps reintroduce the 
task of probing some of the deepest questions that anyone can ask about Christianity.  
Undoubtedly the contents of this dissertation will resonate with Christians and skeptics 
who are able to think through the ramifications of Christianity as a religion that makes 
truth claims (it will especially resonate with college age students and other intellectually 
engaged laymen and women).  There aren‘t too many theological works that address the 
kinds of questions that I have written about in this dissertation.   
As an example I addressed the existence of historical credibility of Jesus‘ 
resurrection from the dead from an evidential point of view.  One of the most significant 
challenges that Christians must face has to do with the miraculous origins of Christianity.  
Is Jesus merely a great but dead person, or is he a risen living person and presence?  
Christians claim that the crucified Jesus had been raised from the dead and remains 
powerfully present in the world―a claim that deserves serious attention from any 
thoughtful person.  These kinds of questions are perennial ones.   
 (3) Third, unlike many older approaches to apologetics, which focused almost 
exclusively on the deliverances of reason (scholastic apologetics), I have stressed the 
importance of human experience (experiential apologetics), the meaning of doctrine 
(theological apologetics), and the tentative nature of evidence (evidentialism).  My 
dissertation therefore emphasizes the apologetic enterprise without necessarily giving the 
negative impression of ―combativeness‖ which typically characterized preconciliar 
approaches to Catholic defense (approaches which focused almost exclusively on 
reasoned approaches to defending Christianity).  The models approach to apologetics is 
therefore sensitive to the individual avenues through which people come to faith.   
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Older approaches were heavily concerned with gradually building a case for faith 
(beginning with God, and then arguing for Christ and the Church, in that order).   Thus 
the dissertation recognizes the contextual nature of the different avenues of coming to 
faith.  My approach does not relegate apologetics to reasoned defenses alone.  Instead this 
dissertation is sensitive to the different contexts in which the arguments are made.  One 
might become convinced of the truth of Christianity because they analyzed the arguments 
for God‘s existence before they sit down to look at the evidence for his divinity.  In my 
dissertation I acknowledge this approach (I realize that scholastic and evidential 
apologetics are complementary, with the former having more foundational importance), 
but also realize that other means of persuasion can be given in any order depending on 
how the discussion between Catholics and their interlocutors proceeds.      
Likewise, I recognize that apologetics cannot be relegated to the sphere of reason 
before one comes to faith).  Though I do not say it often in this dissertation, I recognize 
that apologetics is not always needed in the dialogue before one comes to greater 
experiences of faith.  Hence I realize the limitations of traditional forms of apologetics in 
a postconciliar church, but still believe in the validity of whatever was good in those 
approaches.       
(4) In the preconciliar manuals of apologetics, there was an emphasis on being 
able to ―prove Christianity.‖699  Yet nowhere do I claim to prove Christianity in this 
dissertation.  At the very most I claim that aspects of the Christian faith are the most 
                                                             
699 See, e.g., the various citations of Ludwig Ott in Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma   
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reasonable position to take given the evidence we have to work with.
700
  As I said in the 
chapter on postmodernism:  
Christian doctrine can be seen as an explanatory hypothesis that accounts for a wide 
variety of features, including history, the cosmos, and the nature of humanity.  We would 
still be within our epistemic rights to argue that the Catholic worldview can outstrip rival 
hypotheses because of its explanatory power, comprehensiveness, plausibility, logical 
consistency, livability, and whether competing hypotheses are ad hoc, and so forth.  
Christian scholars are now beginning to utilize the newer approach to apologetics in 
contrast to the evidentialist challenge.  As a reaction to modernism, postmodernism 
accords with the provisional nature of knowledge advanced by fallibilism.  John 
Polkinghorne holds that believers can retain their presuppositions when comparing and 
contrasting their views with other competing claims.  The final assessment is predicated 
on whose Weltanschauung resonates and makes the most sense out of the agreed upon 
evidence. 
 
I still maintain the best features of the apologetic manuals, but add additional nuances to 
them by addressing the concerns that theologians and apologists must work with in a 
newer intellectual climate.  Simply because the traditional apologetic approaches were 
faulty does not mean that everything in them should be discarded in a postconciliar 
church.     
(5) Another salient problem with many preconciliar works of apologetics is that 
they were based on older scholarship and evidential findings.  In this way they were the 
product of their time.  My approach, however, uses the most up-to-date scholarship in 
making a case for Christian faith.  For instance in the chapter on the resurrection I said:   
Undoubtedly the newest quest for the historical Jesus has ushered in a strong wave of 
apologetic writings defending the historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection.  The main evidence 
considered usually consists of the post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, and the 
origin of the earliest disciples‘ belief in the Risen Christ, along with earliest Christians‘ 
worship practices despite their every predisposition to the contrary.  Apologist Gary 
Habermas has developed what is called the ―minimal facts approach‖ to defending the 
resurrection.  According to him there are twelve widely accepted facts that have been 
furnished by the majority of New Testament scholars.   
 
One will notice that in older, preconciliar approaches to apologetics that the historical 
critical method of Scripture scholarship was literally absent.  There was a lack of 
                                                             
700 It is also true that I say that God‘s existence can be proven, but only in the non-mathematical 
sense of the word. 
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understanding the historical critical method and what could be deduced (or responsibly 
inferred) about Christian origins.  Yet in my approach the most up to date sociological 
and historical works were appealed to in the case for the resurrection and the positive 
influence of Christianity upon the world.   
(6) The older style of apologetics seemed to rely on an overly propositional 
understanding of doctrine.  Here I emphasized that although God‘s revelation to 
humanity is beyond propositions, this would not mean that we are to renounce the 
propositional.  In this way my approach is consistent with traditional Catholic apologetics 
(which was almost exclusively propositional), but at least acknowledges that God‘s 
revelation is beyond propositions. Gaillardetz says:  
the Second Vatican Council presented divine revelation as nothing less than the self-
communication of God. It taught that divine revelation takes its primary form not as 
information, facts or even doctrines, but as a person, Jesus Christ. Vatican II taught that 
revelation, in its primary mode, is not the transmission of information but the sharing of 
divine life. God addresses us as friends and invites us into relationship (Dogmatic 
Constitution on Divine Revelation, No. 2).701 
 
My concern to maintain the propositional is due to the fact that apologetics is, in many 
cases, concerned to reason with those who do not share our faith.  The common ground 
that is needed for effective dialogue must be situated within a context that believers and 
unbelievers can both understand.                        
(7) Another weakness of the older style of apologetics is that it was triumphalistic.  
Now my dissertation is somewhat continuous with the importance of recognizing that 
truth is better than error (necessarily speaking, beliefs are true and others are false or 
partially true), but recognizes the importance that each person in the dialogue is to be 
equally respected no matter what one believes.  I want to emphasize that truth is not 
equated with error (thus the truth certainly does ―triumph‖ over error), but that love is to 
                                                             
701 Richard Gaillardetz, ―Do We Need a New(er) Apologetics?, online article in America. 
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be given to all.  The more one loves, the more one is called to speak and defend what is 
true.  Though love is always emphasized, one must speak and explain Catholic truth 
when the circumstances allow for it.  Triumphalism is, therefore, to be distinguished from 
the triumph of Truth (cf. John 16:30-33).  My chapter on postmodernism and rational 
apologetics exploits this distinction.        
(8) Likewise, another weakness of many preconciliar apologetics works is that 
they often treated Catholicism as if all doctrines and practices of the faith were equally 
true.  But, as Vatican II acknowledges, there is a legitimate hierarchy of truths.  Because 
of the highly nuanced situation in Catholic theology today, I have chosen to focus on 
some of the foundational articles of the faith that nearly all Christians can agree with.  
My dissertation is highly sensitive to a broadly ecumenical era.  There is nothing in this 
dissertation that specifically addresses why one should embrace Catholicism over 
Protestantism, for example.            
(9) Still another weakness of older works in Catholic apologetics is that they too 
easily envisioned the Catholic faith as an unfailing entity that embodied the marks of 
holiness without fail at all times and places.  In this dissertation I somewhat continued 
this tradition in the sense that I believe that the church should still be described as holy.  
However, I also recognize that it is accompanied by sin.  I specifically addressed this 
issue in the last chapter on the via empirica.  Not only did that chapter address the good 
which Christianity has in fact brought to the world, but any adequate apologetic needs to 
address the unholy features which have accompanied the church‘s existence in the world.  
In this way my dissertation was positively and negatively apologetical.     
(10)  Another positive strength of my dissertation is that it is passionate about the 
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subjects discussed.  Any adequate apologetic work should be seriously concerned about 
the subject at hand, and I hope that the readers will agree with me that my dissertation has 
taken some of the most salient challenges to Christian faith seriously and with passion.  
Challenges from the ―other side‖ are presented and addressed, not just positive arguments 
in behalf of the Christian Catholic view.  
 
A Negative Evaluation of the Dissertation 
 Here I want to point out some of my own concerns with the dissertation.  These 
are negative evaluations of the project.  Each of the following points will be discussed in 
paragraphs below.      
(1) First, I began the dissertation by arguing that the Second Vatican 
Council indicates that there are four distinct models of apologetics.  Those four 
models carve out space which needs to be filled in with examples of apologetic 
challenges.  Those test cases were arbitrarily chosen by me.  But other examples 
could have been used.  The use of reason (scholastic), experience 
(experientialism), evidence (evidentialism) and the meaning of doctrine 
(theological apologetics), thus provide a framework that could have included 
other test cases as well.   
One could think of many other apologetic challenges that fall under the 
broad outline of the models approach to conciliar apologetics, including debates 
surrounding the celibacy of the priesthood and the sacraments, and other 
challenges related to bioethics.  One could also refer to liberation movements as 
apologetical in their own right as well.  Likewise, although I used categorized the 
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issue of God‘s existence under a scholastic approach to God‘s existence, it could 
have fallen under another apologetic model, such as experientialism.  The point is 
that some sort of test case had to fall under each model as pronounced by the 
council.        
(2) The second problem is that Catholicism can mean different things to 
different people.  As a result, how does the apologist know what to defend unless 
we understand what Catholicism is, given the form it takes in different cultural 
contexts?  As I said in the chapter on postmodernism, the very fact of truth must 
be distinguished from what is true.  The very fact there is a truth is easier to 
defend than knowing what should be considered true.   
The apologist can convincingly argue for the fact of truth (to deny that 
there is a truth is self-defeating and therefore impossible to evade).  But when it 
comes to defending what is true, we have no choice but to begin with the tenets of 
faith.  The problem becomes even difficult when one realizes that Catholicism 
itself can look very different in different contexts.     
Let me say from the outset that this problem is one of the reasons why I 
have focused on some of the fundamental truths of the Catholic faith as test cases, 
not on secondary doctrines in the hierarchy of truths (say, whether priests should 
be celibate, whether Thomism constitutes the norm for Catholic theology, or 
whether Catholics can vote for candidates who are not pro-life).  The apologist‘s 
reasons for defending one view against another in these debates are conditioned 
by factors that are not easily discernible or decisive as the reasons for Thomistic 
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proofs for the existence of God and the credibility of Christ‘ resurrection (in light 
of the newest quest for the historical Jesus).   
Therefore, I hope the reader will recognize that my dissertation is not 
intended to be an exhaustive treatment of postconciliar apologetics (including all 
the topics that might be covered), but is deliberately intended to lay out the 
Council‘s vision of apologetics, using certain test cases which have been linked 
together around a fundamental theme (basic Christian faith) for a certain kind of 
reader (perhaps an atheist or an agonistic living in North America or Europe).      
(3) This dissertation is heavily concerned with reason in matters of faith, 
even if those reasons are shaped in different ways (philosophical reason, historical 
reason, and sociological reasons).  At one point I mentioned that the 
phenomenological encounter with holiness is important for apologetic purposes, 
but since it has already been discussed in another dissertation, which later became 
a published book,
702
 I did need not feel the need to write about it. 
Apologetics should be theoretical.  Theoretical apologetics should be (A) 
positive, providing positive reasons for faith; and (B) negative, deflecting reasons 
against the faith, and showing where those alternative perspectives are 
shortsighted or even mistaken.  My dissertation admittedly concentrates on 
theoretical apologetics, even though the reasons in question are shaped by 
different disciplines (philosophy, history and sociology) for different audiences.  
However, I do not want the reader to overlook the fact that praxis itself can serve 
                                                             
702
 Victoria S. Harrison, The Apologetic Value of Human Holiness: Von Balthasar's Christocentric 
Philosophical Anthropology (New York: Springer, 2000). 
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as a motive of credibility.  My dissertation gives ―lip service‖ this kind of 
apologetic, and so it could be developed at length in another work.   
Practical apologetics can be characterized in the following way.  First of 
all it is contextual.  Here one is reminded of the different concerns of different 
people.  Admittedly, the proofs for the existence of God might not have much 
resonance with people who don‘t think in philosophical terms, but are more 
concerned about lived praxis.  Christians who help the poor give an excellent 
witness to the Christian faith.  The second characteristic of practical apologetics is 
that it must be humble.  I maintain that the ultimate apologetic is how one lives 
their Christian life in the face of unbelief.     
(4) The fourth model of the Council might be called ―theological 
apologetics.‖  Good theology is always necessary for the purposes of credibility.  
A perfect example of this is when students reject Christian truth on the basis of 
caricatures which simply cannot be sustained theologically.  I immediately think 
of the facetious objections some of my students have mentioned here at St. 
Joseph‘s University.  ―How about evolution vs. creation, Mr. S?  We now know 
that evolution is true; therefore Christianity has been proven false.‖  Well, that‘s a 
false dichotomy to begin with!  Another one is the longstanding belief that 
Christianity is the one true religion. When this well established position of 
Catholic theology is mentioned, many outsiders or skeptics think that this view 
entails that Catholics must believe all ―outsiders‖ are going to hell.  Good 
theology has an apologetic effect in the sense that it undercuts objections before 
skeptics can even present their challenges to him or her.  Respectable Catholic 
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theology recognizes that the opening chapters of Genesis are not to be taken as a 
record of scientific facts, and that there is nothing wrong with positing Christian 
uniqueness and outsider salvation at the same time.  My dissertation has tried to 
nuance certain theological beliefs in several ways, but the theological model of 
apologetics is a unique model that needs to be developed.  
Though many theologians do not consider themselves as apologists, 
Catholic theologians are concerned about the importance of accurately describing 
Catholic beliefs and practices.  Here the theologian can help the apologist in 
numerous ways, for why defend something if it‘s not even worth defending?  In 
other words, if what we believe is immune from the straw mean attacks of 
skeptics, then there is nothing for the apologist to worry about.                           
 (5) The fifth and final point is that a postconciliar apologetics needs to be defined 
in comparison to other fields of theology.   Defining what is meant by apologetics may 
help readers to interpret apologetic texts more accurately.  For instance, in the Catholic 
Church we know there is tension between dialogue and proclamation.  The principles 
which govern dialogue and the principles which govern proclamation are very different. 
On the one hand, the believer is within his or her rights to engage in evangelization and 
apologetics when the circumstances allow for it. On the other hand, that same believer 
can and must engage in interreligious dialogue and ecumenism when different 
circumstances arise. Dialogue is never about converting one's dialogue partner. So, one 
might conclude that dialogue (as expressed in interreligious dialogue and/or ecumenism) 
and proclamation (as expressed by evangelization and apologetics) have an analogous 
relationship in the life of an individual Catholic. These two paradigms (dialogue and 
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proclamation) are not antagonistic to one another, but epitomize the analogical thinking 
of a mature believer who knows when to engage in one and not the other.  
 The tension between proclamation and dialogue is fierce and is sometimes played 
out between ―conservatives‖ and ―liberals‖ in a postconciliar Catholic Church.  
Nonetheless, the distinctions between these two paradigms must be kept in delicate 
balance and individually pursued when necessary.  Thus the definition of apologetics 
could be developed in the dissertation.       
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This discussion of postconciliar apologetics rests upon the teaching of Vatican 
II.  There the bishops proclaimed the importance of a multifaceted approach to defending 
Christianity.  One must also be aware of the context to make the Gospel credible.  This 
apologetical approach is directed toward our fellow brethren, and to those individuals 
who are formally outside the Church.  
 After outlining the conciliar vision of apologetics, I started the next chapter of 
the dissertation by defending a primitive correspondence theory of truth.  Christianity 
cannot be considered true by anyone unless the very fact that there is a truth can be first 
established.  The importance of first principles (i.e., the law of non-contradiction, the law 
of the excluded middle, etc.) cannot be naively brushed aside as merely historically 
conditioned principles.  The very statement that first principles are historically 
conditioned confuses epistemology and metaphysics.  How we understand 
(epistemology) those principles is different from one person to the next.  And the 
statement itself assumes the permanency of first principles, excluding its contrary denial.       
 Moreover, the universally binding nature of first principles enables the project 
of natural theology to get off the ground.  So long as first principles are true, then we can 
make sense of the bishops‘ claim that one can know that God exists apart from the 
influence of special revelation.  This rational approach to defending the faith is called 
scholastic apologetics.  In this part of the dissertation I briefly discussed the Church‘s 
teaching about God‘s existence and highlighted  the atheistic trends against the intellectus 
essentiae argument for God and found all of them wanting.    
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 The success of this approach provides a philosophical framework enabling one 
to make sense of historical or scientific evidence.  Indeed, as presuppositionalists have 
stressed to theologians, our background beliefs are necessary for understanding the nature 
of evidence and ascertaining what explanation might best account for it.  As I said in the 
chapter on the historical credibility of the resurrection, ―if a naturalistic explanation does 
not seem to account for the facts because the evidence is pulling in a direction which 
strongly suggests that a miracle has happened, and if the context in which the event is 
thought to have occurred is religiously charged, then it would be feasible for the historian 
who [previously] believes in a personal God who will reveal himself in history to 
conclude that a miracle has happened.‖  Indeed, without this presupposition, it would 
become impossible to favorably interpret the evidence in support of the resurrection.  
 Given the truth of God‘s existence and the resurrection of Christ, one inevitably 
wonders what difference these ―facts‖ in the past might have made upon the world.  For it 
is easy to ask: ―So what?  Even if a personal God existed, and even if Christ was raised 
from the dead, what bearing does this have on me?‖  This is precisely where the 
experiential approach is necessary.   
An experience with the true, good and the beautiful surely complements a rational 
defense of the Christian faith.  In the next chapter I did not focus much attention on the 
phenomenological approach to human holiness as much as I concentrated on the 
empirical traces left by those individuals who have been changed by their living 
experience with Christ in the Church.  Such an endeavor (i.e., a phenomenological one) 
would have been futile, if not self-defeating (because I would have to give reasons 
explaining the very nature and meaning of the encounter itself).  So, it is true that without 
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faith one cannot perceive the holiness of the Church, but reason can legitimately 
apprehend the changes that Christians cultures have left upon those cultures it has 
infiltrated.    
Moreover, the phenomenological encounter with holiness is fideistic at heart and 
is in need of the rational approach (evidentialism, scholasticism).  As I said in this 
dissertation: ―Experiences are never self-authenticating, and they must be interpreted 
through some other philosophical means.  Experiences are often unverifiable and must be 
taken on faith alone by outsiders.  In this way, the hardheaded skeptic is unlikely to be 
persuaded by hearing the testimony of believers and how they came to believe in 
Christianity.  Many skeptics will quickly dismiss the warm experience of the Church by 
dismissing them with naturalistic explanations.  Lastly, radical proponents of 
experientialism often overlook the primary sources of Christian theology (e.g., Scripture 
and Tradition) for the sake of their unique experiences.‖   
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